Wyatt v. A-Best, Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | A-BES,INC,COMPAN |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,432 Herbert WYATT, et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v., ACandS, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants, and James W. KYLE, et ux., Squire Coley, et ux., Terry Beeler, et ux., Jerome Cogswell, et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v., ACandS, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
George A. Weber, III, Mike G. Nassior, Jere Franklin Ownby, III, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, Knoxville, for Appellees.
M. Denise Moretz, Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter, Knoxville, for Appellant.
This appeal involves five products liability cases brought against ACandS, Inc., defendant-appellant, in which plaintiffs seek damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos 1 in the work-place. We granted defendant's application for permission to appeal challenging the reversal of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant on statute of limitations ground. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial.
Plaintiffs, members of the Knoxville Building and Construction Trades Council or its affiliated unions, were employed in the construction trade as pipefitters, sheetmetal mechanics, and carpenters. In 1988, the Council and its affiliated unions contacted the Law Office of Peter G. Angelos to discuss the establishment, maintenance, and administration of an asbestos screening program in which union members could participate to determine whether they had sustained injuries as a result of occupational exposure to asbestos. The Council and its unions subsequently chose the law firm to establish and administer the program and to represent those union members found to be suffering from asbestos associated disease. The screening program called for participating union members to first undergo a chest x-ray. If the x-ray disclosed the possibility of an asbestos-related disease, a physician would perform a medical examination to determine if, in fact, an asbestos-related disease was present.
In May, 1989, plaintiffs Wyatt, Kyle, Coley, Beeler, and Cogswell, and hundreds of other union members, underwent chest x-rays as part of the asbestos screening program. These x-rays were sent for analysis to radiologists who were certified by the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety in detecting chest x-ray abnormalities which indicated the possibility of occupationally-caused lung diseases.
Dr. Myung-Sup Kim was the radiologist who read plaintiffs' x-rays. According to Dr. Kim, the x-rays revealed the following:
Wyatt: Interstitial fibrosis consistent with pneumoconiosis. 2
Kyle: Interstitial fibrosis and pleural plaques consistent with pneumoconiosis.
Coley: Interstitial fibrosis and pleural plaques consistent with pneumoconiosis.
Beeler: Pleural plaques consistent with pneumoconiosis. No evidence of significant interstitial fibrosis is seen.
Cogswell: Pleural plaques consistent with pneumoconiosis. No evidence of significant interstitial fibrosis is seen.
In November, 1989, the Knoxville Building and Construction Trades Council notified plaintiffs by letter of the screening results. The form letter advised plaintiffs that further testing was necessary because the x-rays showed the possibility of an asbestos-related disease. The letters stated in pertinent part:
Re: Asbestos Screening
Dear Brother/Sister:
Recently you participated in a Union sponsored Asbestos Screening Program. We have received the reports of these x-rays and the results indicate that further testing is necessary in your case since your x-ray shows the possibility of an asbestos related disease.
We have asked the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos to represent our various members and we recommend that you contact attorneys from the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos who will explain to you the steps necessary to protect you and your family's rights.
(Emphasis added). Although these letters were printed on union stationary and signed by a union representative, the letters were actually prepared and sent out by the Angelos firm for the union. The law firm then scheduled medical examinations for plaintiffs and hundreds of other union members.
As a result of a medical examination, Wyatt was advised on March 26, 1990, by Dr. Jeffrey Hecht, for the first time, that the abnormalities on his chest x-ray were caused by the exposure to asbestos and that he had contracted an asbestos related disease (asbestosis) 3. Coley was examined on May 10, 1990, by Dr. Steve Ferguson, and diagnosed with having asbestosis at that time. Kyle was similarly diagnosed on July 6, 1990, after being examined by Dr. Sharon Sedarat. Dr. Ferguson examined Beeler on June 21, 1990, and also found asbestosis. On August 24, 1990, Cogswell was examined by Dr. Sedarat and was diagnosed with an asbestos-related pulmonary disease.
Plaintiffs filed products liability actions against more than twenty asbestos manufacturers and distributors throughout the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom seeking recovery for personal injury on the basis of strict tort liability, breach of implied warranties, negligence, and fraud. Wyatt, Beeler, and Coley filed their complaints on May 2, 1990. Cogswell filed his action on May 14, 1990. Kyle filed his complaint on May 25, 1990. Thus, except for Wyatt, plaintiffs filed their complaints prior to their medical examination and diagnosis.
None of the complaints initially named defendant, ACandS, Inc. However, on January 10, 1991, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaints to name ACandS, Inc., as a defendant. The motions were granted. Defendant subsequently filed motions for summary judgment asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. 4 In each of these five cases, the trial judge granted the motions and dismissed the cases. The basis for the dismissals were the judges' conclusions that the statute had commenced when plaintiffs learned in November, 1989, by letter, of the abnormal x-ray results. Therefore, plaintiffs' motions to amend their complaints to name defendant as a party were made after the statute had expired.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts' finding that the November, 1989, letter had merely placed on the plaintiffs a duty to exercise due diligence to discover their injuries. The court stated:
[I]is is clear that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of a work-related injury until they were diagnosed as suffering from probable asbestosis. The x-ray screening results ... served only to put the plaintiffs on reasonable inquiry.
We granted defendant's application for permission to appeal to decide whether plaintiffs' actions against ACandS, Inc., are time barred. The disposition of this issue entails consideration of two questions. First, we must determine what degree of certainty of a medical condition is sufficient to place a plaintiff on notice and trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations. Second, we must determine whether a tentative, preliminary diagnosis, insufficient by itself to commence the statute, activates a duty to make, with due diligence, further inquiries into the cause of a plaintiff's condition.
Since these cases are before the Court on the trial courts' grant of summary judgments, our inquiry is purely a legal one. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party establishes that no genuine issue as to material facts exists, thereby entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn.1993). The applicable statute of limitations provides:
(a) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued:
(1) Actions ... for injuries to the person ...;
* * * * * *
(b) For the purpose of this section, in products liability cases:
(1) The cause of action for injury to the person shall accrue on the date of the personal injury, not the date of the negligence or the sale of a product;
(2) No person shall be deprived of the right to maintain a cause of action until one (1) year from the date of the injury; and
(3) Under no circumstances shall the cause of action be barred before the person sustains an injury.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1995 Supp.) (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that the statute of limitations began to run in November, 1989, when plaintiffs were notified of the abnormal x-ray results. The notice, by letter, advised plaintiffs that "the reports of these x-rays and the results indicate that further testing is necessary in your case since your x-ray shows the possibility of an asbestos related disease." The letter also advised plaintiffs to contact the Angelos law firm for advice about protecting their legal rights. Conversely, plaintiffs contend that the statute began to run only when they were examined by physicians and actually diagnosed as having asbestos related diseases in the spring and summer months of 1990.
A personal injury cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should know, that an injury has been sustained. McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn.1975) (); see also Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 515-17 (Tenn.1974). The application of this so-called "discovery rule" results in personal injury actions being filed more than one year after the injury occurs in instances in which plaintiff does not discover and reasonably could not...
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