Wyo. Guardianship Corp. v. Wyo. State Hosp., S-18-0087

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
• Writing for the Court: FOX, Justice.
• Citation: 428 P.3d 424
• Parties: WYOMING GUARDIANSHIP CORPORATION, as guardian and conservator of Linda Gelok, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. WYOMING STATE HOSPITAL ; State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Department of Health; and Paul Mullenax, Appellees (Defendants).
• Docket Number: S-18-0087
• Decision Date: 11 October 2018

428 P.3d 424

WYOMING GUARDIANSHIP CORPORATION, as guardian and conservator of Linda Gelok, Appellant (Plaintiff),
v.
WYOMING STATE HOSPITAL ; State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Department of Health; and Paul Mullenax, Appellees (Defendants).

S-18-0087

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

October 11, 2018

Representing Appellant: Henry F. Bailey, Jr. and Douglas W. Bailey of Bailey Stock Harmon Cottam Lopez, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Bailey.

Representing Appellees: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; Daniel E. White, Deputy Attorney General; Jackson M. Engels, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Engels.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and BURKE^* , FOX, KAUTZ, and BOOMGAARDEN, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

¶ 1] Linda Gelok is an involuntarily committed incompetent person who was injured after being left unattended for 25 hours at the Wyoming State Hospital. On her behalf, Ms. Gelok’s guardian and conservator, Wyoming Guardianship Corporation,¹ sued the Wyoming State Hospital (WSH); the Wyoming Department of Health (Department); and Paul Mullenax, WSH Administrator, in his official and individual capacities, alleging negligence and violation of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found the negligence action time-barred and dismissed it. It also found that the WSH, the Department, and Mr. Mullenax in his official capacity were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed the constitutional claims against them. Finally, it found that Mr. Mullenax was entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity and dismissed the constitutional claim against him. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] We rephrase and reorganize Ms. Gelok’s issues on appeal:

1. Do the notice and filing requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act extend the medical malpractice statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 ?

2 Did Ms. Gelok’s Complaint allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ?

FACTS

[¶ 3] At the time of the incident giving rise to this appeal, Ms. Gelok was a sixty-two-year-old woman who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, dementia, and borderline intellectual functioning.² She had spent many years at various mental health institutions, including a significant amount of time at the WSH. On February 23, 2015, WSH staff found her sitting in the hospital’s dayroom with her neck kinked awkwardly. When approached, she stated, "I’m going to die, you’re going to let me die." She was anxious, trembling, breathing rapidly, and reeked of urine. As staff members attempted to lift her from her chair to walk her to the hospital’s "OT room," they noticed numerous ants crawling on her foot. During a physical examination, WSH staff found dried blood on Ms. Gelok’s visibly swollen feet, ants crawling on dark red abrasions on her feet and ankles, and insect bites. A WSH nurse practitioner diagnosed her bleeding abrasions as a "rash" and prescribed her prednisone.

[¶ 4] When Wyoming Guardianship Corporation became aware of the situation, it ordered

[428 P.3d 429

that Ms. Gelok be taken to Evanston Regional Hospital (ERH). At ERH, hospital staff placed Ms. Gelok on oxygen, diagnosed her with a urinary tract infection, and treated her abrasions. When Ms. Gelok returned to WSH, she had a poor appetite, displayed paranoid delusions, was described as "despondent," and complained of pain around her wounds.

¶ 5] Later investigation revealed that Ms. Gelok had been sitting in nearly the same position on the couch in the dayroom for approximately 25 hours. During that time, no one gave her food or water, took her to the bathroom, changed her, or took her to bed. Hospital staff had done some cursory "checks" into the dayroom, but none of them noticed Ms. Gelok until maintenance staff requested that she be moved so they could work on the television. Investigators noticed food on the floor in several areas of the hall and observed that the dining room area floor was very dirty with food and possibly human feces. Hospital staff confirmed that the hospital had an ongoing ant-infestation problem.

[¶ 6] On May 12, 2016, Ms. Gelok presented a notice of claim to the appropriate governmental entities, in compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113. On June 10, 2016, she filed a claim with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1518. The panel dismissed the claim on August 11, 2016. Ms. Gelok filed her Complaint in the district court on August 9, 2017, asserting claims for negligence and for violation of her right to safe and humane living conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³ The district court granted the State’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and Ms. Gelok filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Do the notice and filing requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act extend the medical malpractice statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 ?

[¶ 7] We review orders granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Whitham v. Feller , 2018 WY 43, ¶ 13, 415 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Wyo. 2018). Because statutory construction is a question of law, our standard of review is again de novo. Redco Constr. v. Profile Properties, LLC , 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg.

Code Bd. of Appeals , 2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2010) ). This case requires us to consider the relationship between the WGCA and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. Our rules for this task are well established. "In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent." Id. "We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." Id. "With specific regard to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, we have said that we should not ‘enlarge, stretch, expand or extend’ " its statutory language. Archer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Transp. , 2018 WY 28, ¶ 7, 413 P.3d 142, 146 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Fugle v. Sublette Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 9 , 2015 WY 98, ¶ 8, 353 P.3d 732, 734-35 (Wyo. 2015) ). Likewise, we "will not resort to reliance upon previous unsupported and unnecessary suggestions that the act is to be interpreted either liberally or strictly." Id . at ¶ 7, 413 P.3d at 146.

[¶ 8] Ms. Gelok alleges that the WSH and its employees negligently rendered health care services. She filed suit under section 1-39-110 of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), which waives governmental immunity "for damages ... caused by the negligence of health care providers who are employees of [a] governmental entity ... while acting within the scope of their duties." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-110(a) (LexisNexis 2018 Supp.) The parties agree that the alleged negligence resulting in Ms. Gelok’s damages occurred on February 23, 2015. They also agree that she complied with the claim procedure in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 by presenting a written statement to the relevant governmental entities within two years of the

[428 P.3d 430

occurrence. However, they disagree whether, together, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-113 and -114 can extend the two-year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. The district court concluded that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 governed and dismissed the medical malpractice claim, finding it time-barred. We agree and affirm dismissal of Ms. Gelok’s negligence claim.

[¶ 9] Ms. Gelok argues that her Complaint was timely on two grounds. First, she argues that "a cause of action under the WGCA does not come into existence until" a claimant presents her claim to the governmental entity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 and that "the date of the occurrence of the underlying facts, acts or omissions are irrelevant." She relies on a federal district court case which stated that "a person has no cause of action under the WGCA until the person has properly presented a notice of claim." Phillips v. Boyd , 925 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1205 (D. Wyo. 2012). However, "the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law," Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Comput. Consulting Holding, Inc. , 142 Idaho 235, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005), and our own cases undermine the federal district court’s conclusion. See Stroth v. N. Lincoln Cty. Hosp. Dist. , 2014 WY 81, ¶ 17, 327 P.3d 121, 128 (Wyo. 2014) ("The allegations asserted in Appellant’s complaint indicate that her claim accrued on [the date the alleged medical negligence occurred]."); Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. Util. , 2001 WY 6, ¶ 13, 17 P.3d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2001) ("The statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that some damage has resulted from the wrongful act....") (citing Anderson v. Bauer , 681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Wyo. 1984) ); Davis v. City of Casper , 710 P.2d 827, 829 (Wyo. 1985) (holding that a tort is complete and actionable when the elements, duty, breach, proximate cause, and damage, are present). Although we have stated that presenting a claim to a governmental entity is a "condition precedent to suit" under the WGCA, we do not agree that "condition precedent to suit" equates to the creation of a cause of action. Ms. Gelok’s cause of action accrued on the date of the occurrence, February 23, 2015.

[¶ 10] Second, Ms. Gelok argues that the notice and filing requirements of the WGCA extend...