Yancey v. Maestri

• Citation: 155 So. 509
• Decision Date: 23 April 1934
• Docket Number: 14593
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: YANCEY v. MAESTRI

155 So. 509

YANCEY v. MAESTRI

No. 14593

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans.

April 23, 1934

Rehearing denied Oct. 1, 1934.

Stanley McDermott and John C. Moulin, both of New Orleans, for appellant.

Albert B. Koorie, of New Orleans, for appellee.

OPINION

HIGGINS Judge.

This appeal presents, for the first time in this state, the question of whether or not an uninterdicted insane person who, without cause or provocation, shoots and seriously wounds an innocent person, can be held liable for damages in tort under the provisions of the Civil Code of Louisiana. The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff has appealed.

The issue presented involves an interpretation of article 3521 (formerly 2294) of the Revised Civil Code, upon which the plaintiff predicates her case, reading as follows:

"Every act whatever of man that causes damages to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. (3)5C"

Plaintiff contends, first, that the language of the article above quoted is all-embracing in its scope, and by no fair reasonable, and logical interpretation thereof can an exemption from liability in favor of insane persons for their tortious acts be read into the article; secondly, that article 2531 of the Civil Code of 1825 repealed the Spanish, Roman, and French laws which were in force when Louisiana was ceded to the United States (and upon which defendant relies to show that under the civil law there was no cause of action against an insane person for his torts), the acts of the Legislative Council, the acts of the Legislature of the territory of Orleans, and the acts of the Legislature of the state of Louisiana, in every case where provision was made therefor in the Code, and that these repealed laws were made absolutely ineffective because it was provided in the article "that they shall not be invoked as laws, even under the pretense that their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this Code"; that in order to finally eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding with respect to the old laws, the Legislature of 1828 adopted Act No. 83 of 1828, §25 of which provided "that all the civil laws which were in force before the promulgation of the Civil Code lately promulgated, be and are hereby abrogated"; and that, consequently, our courts are not controlled, in interpreting article 2315 of the present Code, by the civil law of Rome, Spain, and France with reference to torts; thirdly, that almost the entire body of the tort law of Louisiana has been developed under the guidance of the common law and is rooted therein, as is evidenced by the fact that the courts of this state have repeatedly cited decisions of the Supreme Courts of other states of the Union, as well as of the United States Supreme Court dealing with this particular branch of the law; and that as, under the common law, an insane person is liable for his torts, we should adopt the common-law rule rather than the civil law view, in construing the provisions of article 2315; citing R. C.C. arts. 2315-2320; Handy v. Parkison, 10 La. 92; Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395, 404; Williams v. Palace Car Co., 40 La.Ann. 417, 420, 4 So. 85, 8 Am. St. Rep. 538; Buechner v. City, 112 La. 599, 602, 36 So. 603, 66 L.R.A. 334, 104 Am. St. Rep. 455; Weaver v. Goulden Logging Co., 116 La. 468, 40 So. 798; Act No. 83 of the Legislature of the state of Louisiana of 1828, §25; Henry P. Dart on "Influence of the Ancient Laws of Spain on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana" (American Bar Assoc. Journal, February, 1932, also published in 6 Tulane Law Review, p. 83); Law of Insanity by Smoot, chapter 13, page 361; Ruling Case Law, vol. 14, p. 596; Corpus Juris, vol. 32, § 545, p. 749; Chapin on Torts, p. 162; Cooley on Torts, vol. 1, p. 187.

The curator ad hoc for the defendant based his legal position on the theory that, under the civil law as applied in Louisiana, an insane person is not liable for his tortious acts because, under the Roman, Spanish, and French jurisprudence, and in a number of countries where the principles of civil law are recognized, such injury falls within the category of damnum absque injuria, and that, while the language of article 2315, R. C.C., may appear to be all-embracing in its scope, it is nevertheless an adoption of the concept founded upon the old Spanish laws as applied in Louisiana prior to the adoption of the Code of 1825; that the language of the article had acquired a definite and established meaning which recognized an exception or exemption from liability in favor of insane persons, and, therefore, the provisions of the article should receive an interpretation and construction consistent with the theory of law which prevailed in Louisiana at the time of its adoption and which would cause it to be harmonized with the general theory of the civil law as recognized in the countries where its principles control.

At the outset we may state that it is conceded that under the common law an insane person's estate is liable in damages for his torts. Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396; Campbell v. Bradbury, 179 Cal. 364, 176 P. 685; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S.E. 679, 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) 898, 110 Am. St. Rep. 170, 4 Ann. Cas. 128; Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; Tucker v. Hyatt, 151 Ind. 332, 51 N.E. 469, 44 L.R.A. 129; McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140; Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348, 51 A. L.R. 829; Young v. Young, 141 Ky. 76, 132 S.W. 155; Feld v. Borodofski, 87 Miss. 727, 40 So. 816; Gibson v. Pollock, 179 Mo.App. 188, 166 S.W. 874; Morain v. Devlin, 132 Mass. 87, 42 Am. Rep. 423; Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581; Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 A. 902; Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449, 26 L.R.A. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 743; Moore v. Horne, 153 N.C. 413, 69 S.E. 409, 410, 138 Am. St. Rep. 675, 21 Ann. Cas. 1350; Ward v. Conatser, 63 Tenn. (4 Baxt.) 64; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499, 44 Am. Dec. 349; Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023, L. R.A. 1918C, 1158.

In the case of Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 170, 178, 115 So. 447, 451, decided in 1927, plaintiff sued to recover damages from defendant for alienating his wife's affections and companionship. The Supreme Court sustained the exception of no cause of action and dismissed plaintiff's suit. The reasons of the court are so cogent to the issue here presented that we quote copiously therefrom:

"It is argued for the appellant that he has a right of action under the broad statement in article 2315 of the Civil Code that every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. It is well settled, however, that that broad language, which first appeared as article 16 of title 4, Book 3, of the Act of March 31, 1808, called the "Digest of the Civil Laws in Force in the Territory,' and sometimes called the Civil Code of 1808, was only declaratory of a very general and fundamental principle of justice, and was not intended to give a cause or right of action for every grievance, or where none was allowed otherwise under the laws in force in the territory. The same principle which was declared in article 16 of title 4 of Book 3 of the Digest of 1808 had been stated as law 6 in the fifteenth title of the seventh Partidas, viz. "That he who causes damage to another, by his fault, is bound to make reparation therefor,' and it was a part of the Roman law. But, under those laws, which were in force when the Digest of 1808 was adopted, there was no right of action for damages for the loss of the services or support or companionship or affections of a free person caused by the wrongful act of another. It is certain that, under the Roman and Spanish laws, there was no right of action for alienation of a wife's affections. If a man attempted to seduce or corrupt the morals of a woman, either married or single, he was answerable in damages for the offense to her, but to no one else, no matter how the offense might have injured also her "father, husband, father-in-law, or other relations.' It was virtually so stated in the seventh Partida, tit. IX, law 5 (Moreau & Carleton's Edition) vol. II, p. 1176, viz.:

" "Men sometimes offend, dishonour and harass, by various means, married or unmarried women, or widows who lead virtuous lives at home and enjoy good characters, by endeavoring frequently to speak with them, either in the houses where they dwell, or by following them in the streets churches or other places where they are to be found; or by secretly sending jewels to them and those with whom they live, in order to corrupt them both; at other times by endeavoring to corrupt them, by means of pimps, and in various other ways, so that by great importunity and artifice, there are some women who are finally seduced. And even good women who resist their attempts are, in a manner, injured in their character, inasmuch as they will be suspected of committing some evil with those who pursue them so assiduously, in either of the ways above mentioned. Wherefore we consider that they who conduct themselves in this manner do great wrong, and injury to such women, as well as their fathers, husbands, fathers-in-law, and other relations. We therefore ordain that every man who shall offend in either of the ways herein mentioned shall make amends to the woman who sustains injury thereby.' (The italics are ours.)

"In the Digest of 1808, the article (16, of Book 3, tit. 4) which is now article 2315 of the Civil Code was written thus:

" "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it, even though the fault be not of the nature of those which expose to...