Young v. State

Decision Date03 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 87099,87099
Citation699 So.2d 624
Parties22 Fla. L. Weekly S384 Taurance YOUNG, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Dan D. Hallenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Timothy D. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review a decision ruling upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

WHERE A SENTENCE IS REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ORALLY PRONOUNCE CERTAIN SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION WHICH LATER APPEARED IN THE WRITTEN SENTENCE MUST THE COURT SIMPLY STRIKE THE UNANNOUNCED CONDITIONS, OR MAY THE COURT

ELECT TO REIMPOSE THOSE CONDITIONS AT RESENTENCING?

Young v. State, 663 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We have already answered this question in Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123 (Fla.1996), wherein we held that improperly imposed special conditions could not be reimposed at a resentencing. We adhere to that holding in this case. We also hold that the decision to prosecute a defendant as an habitual offender is a prosecutorial function to be initiated at the prosecutor's discretion and not by the court. 1

FACTS

The record reflects that petitioner, Taurance Young, pled guilty to four separate criminal charges. The trial court independently determined, on its own initiative, that Young was eligible for sentencing as an habitual offender, and the court subsequently initiated, sua sponte, habitual offender proceedings against him. Over objection, the trial court found Young to be an habitual offender and sentenced him to the enhanced sentences provided under that statutory scheme.

Young appealed from the enhanced sentences arguing, among other things, that (1) the trial court improperly imposed written conditions of probation that were not orally announced at sentencing, and (2) the trial court lacked authority to initiate habitual offender proceedings against him. 636 So.2d at 1376. As to the validity of the unannounced conditions of probation, the Fifth District noted that it had certified this identical issue for our review in Justice v. State, 658 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), which was pending in this Court when Young was decided, and again certified the same question. The district court rejected Young's second claim that pursuant to the scheme for habitual offender prosecution set out in section 775.08401, Florida Statutes (1993), only the state attorney, and not the trial court, may properly initiate habitual offender proceedings against a defendant. Id. at 1377.

THE CERTIFIED QUESTION

As the district court below correctly noted, the certified question here is the same question certified for our review in Justice. We expressly answered this question in Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996), holding that "where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon resentencing." Consistent with our opinion in Justice, the special condition of probation which was not orally announced at sentencing and struck by the district court on appeal may not be reimposed.

PROSECUTION AS HABITUAL OFFENDER

Although not part of the certified question, we also exercise our discretion to review the issue of whether under the latest amendment to Florida's habitual offender statute, section 775.08401, Florida Statutes (1995), a trial judge, as opposed to the state attorney, may sua sponte initiate habitual offender proceedings against an eligible defendant. Young specifically raised this issue in the trial court and on appeal to the district court and it is properly before us for review. 2 We reject the holding of the majority below that trial courts may initiate the prosecution of a defendant as an habitual offender. 663 So.2d at 1377-78.

Initially, we are persuaded by Judge Harris's analysis as to the effect of the express statutory scheme for habitual offender prosecution:

[E]ffective June 17, 1993, the legislature enacted section 775.08401:

Habitual offenders and habitual violent felony offenders; eligibility criteria. The state attorney in each judicial circuit shall adopt uniform criteria to be used in determining if an offender is eligible to be sentenced as a habitual offender or a habitual violent felony offender. The criteria shall be designed to insure fair and impartial application of the habitual offender statute. A deviation from this criteria must be explained in writing, signed by the state attorney, and placed in the case file maintained by the state attorney. A deviation from the adopted criteria is not subject to appellate review.

By the enactment of the statute, the legislature recognized that since every felon who has a record that would otherwise qualify for habitual treatment will not, and should not, be habitualized, there must be some standard (at least within any particular circuit) on which to base a sentencing decision. By placing the obligation on the state attorney to develop and maintain the appropriate criteria, in my view, the legislature has now expressed an intent that the separate proceedings required by section 775.084(3) must be invoked by, and only by, the office of the state attorney. Otherwise the purpose of such section can be avoided by merely deferring to the sentencing philosophy of each individual judge. Did the legislature intend that a judge could sentence one as an habitual offender who would not be so qualified under the criteria established by the state attorney?

663 So.2d at 1379 (Harris, J., specially concurring). Because, as Judge Harris explains, the statutory obligation to develop and maintain specific criteria for pursuing habitual offender status has been placed solely in the hands of state attorneys, we conclude that habitual offender proceedings must be initiated by the prosecution and not the trial court. Id. at 1378-79.

The statutory scheme contemplates the development of "fair and impartial" criteria for determining whether a prosecutor may invoke the enhanced punishment provisions provided under the habitual offender statute. In fact, deviation from these criteria must be supported by a written explanation. Trial courts play no role in the development and application of the habitualization criteria developed by the individual state attorneys under the legislature's scheme. Allowing trial courts to independently initiate habitual offender proceedings sua sponte would allow them to habitualize defendants who otherwise would not be subject to habitualization under the state attorney's criteria. This in turn would lead to the inconsistency the legislature obviously was attempting to avoid.

In addition, we are concerned that by declaring an intent to initiate habitualization proceedings against a defendant, the trial court, in essence, would become an arm of the prosecution, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine. We have held, for example: "Under Florida's constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute." State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla.1986). Under our adversary system very clear and distinct lines have been drawn between the court and the parties. To permit a court to initiate proceedings for enhanced punishment against a defendant would blur the lines between the prosecution and the independent role of the court as a fair and unbiased adjudicator and referee of the disputes between the parties.

This separation of powers issue was recognized recently in a separate opinion by Justice Overton in State v. Booth, 672 So.2d 35 (Fla.1996). In Booth, this Court summarily quashed the district court's decision below and remanded for proceedings consistent with our recent decision in State v. Blackwell, 661 So.2d 282, 284 (Fla.1995) (holding the requirement that defendant be given notice of intent to habitualize is satisfied where defendant receives written notice of possibility of habitualization before his or her plea is accepted). Although the majority in Booth declined to address the issue sub judice because it had not been raised in the trial court or district court, Justice Overton, in dissent, expressed his concerns that section 775.08401

authorizes only the state attorney to initiate the habitualization process. To broaden that authority ... by judicial fiat effectively places the judge in a prosecutorial role. This would allow the judge to both initiate the habitual offender sentencing process and adjudicate whether the defendant meets the statutory criteria.

672 So.2d at 36 (Overton, J., dissenting). We agree.

We must also be concerned about fairness and the appearance of fairness. How fair could a court that has initiated the prosecution on its own then be in deciding whether to impose habitual offender sanctions? At the very least, the appearance of fairness may be questioned in such a situation. Similarly, consistent with the concerns for "fair and impartial" criteria that motivated the legislature, what criteria, other than the minimum technical standards of the statute, would a trial court utilize in deciding to initiate a prosecution in one case but not in another? One judge may decide to uniformly seek habitualization while another may decide to stay away from the issue altogether. The fate of a defendant will simply turn upon the luck of the draw.

Now that this issue is squarely before us, we adopt the reasoning set out in Justice Overton's dissent in Booth and Judge Harris's special concurrence in Young and find that, based on section 775.08401...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • State v. Cotton
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 15, 2000
    ...sentencing discretion"). The same logical disjuncture undermines Woods' attempt to distinguish this Court's decision in Young v. State, 699 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla.1997)(holding that "the decision to prosecute a defendant as an habitual offender is a prosecutorial function to be initiated at th......
  • McKnight v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 1999
    ...in the nature of a charging decision, which is solely within the discretion of the executive or state attorney. See Young v. State, 699 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1997); State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla.1986)(a court cannot decide whether the state can seek the death penalty); Cleveland v. Stat......
  • Gray v. State, 98-1789.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 9, 1999
    ...and complete discretion to decide whether to charge and to prosecute a crime, but it cannot impose a sentence. Young v. State, 699 So.2d 624 (Fla.1997); State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2 (Fla.1986). Under the statutory scheme, the prosecution has the sole discretion to seek imposition of the mini......
  • Burk v. Washington
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1998
    ...has complete discretion in making the decision to charge and prosecute"); nor may it initiate habitual offender proceedings, Young v. State, 699 So.2d 624 (Fla.1997); or decide if the State can seek the death penalty. State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2 (Fla.1986). Our entire criminal justice syste......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Tough times in the sunshine state.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 73 No. 10, November 1999
    • November 1, 1999
    ...(Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1998). Fairness and separation of powers dictate that proceedings be initiated by the prosecution. See Young v. State, 699 So. 2d 624 (Fla. (27) The defendant must be personally and timely served with the notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence, See FLA. STAT. [section......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT