Dobrich v. General Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat Div.

• Decision Date: 19 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:96 CV 1672(GLG).,3:96 CV 1672(GLG).
• Citation: 106 F.Supp.2d 386
• Parties: Judith DOBRICH, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP., ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Page 386

106 F.Supp.2d 386

Judith DOBRICH, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP., ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION, Defendant.

No. 3:96 CV 1672(GLG).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 19, 2000.

Robert B. Muchinsky, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Rodger W. Lehr, Jr., Douglas McClain Peachey, General Dynamics/Electric Boat Division, Groton, CT, David L. Metzger, Metzger & Richters, Hartford, CT, Neal J. McNamara, Holland & Knight, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Following a jury trial at which the jury awarded the Plaintiff $750,000 ($650,000 compensatory damages and $100,000 punitive damages), the Defendant has filed the following motions:

(1) for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively a new trial,

(2) for a remittitur, or

(3) alternatively, for a reduction in the damage award to the statutory cap.

Plaintiff has cross-moved for an award of prejudgment interest on her compensatory damage award.

This is an employment discrimination action brought by the Plaintiff, Judith Dobrich, against her former employer, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, in which she claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, age, and disability, and retaliated against and discharged because of her objection to these practices. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), as well as pendent state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision. On a motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed Counts Two through Seven, leaving only Count One, Plaintiff's claim under Title VII for sexual harassment by her co-workers, in which she sought both compensatory and punitive damages. See Dobrich v. General Dynamics Corp., Electric Boat Div., 40 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.Conn.1999).

FACTS

Plaintiff was hired by Electric Boat on June 9, 1994, as a laborer at the Windsor Site Office. She was fifty years old at the time of hire. Electric Boat is the division of General Dynamics that designs and builds nuclear submarines for the United States Navy. The Windsor Site Office, where the Plaintiff worked, was designed about forty-five years ago to house a prototype nuclear reactor for a particular class of submarines. The site was operated until approximately 1991, when it was closed. In 1993, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, which had been operating the facility, contracted with Electric Boat to stabilize the plant and, then in 1995, to completely deactivate and dismantle the reactor and demolish all structures on the site. Because this was a demolition project, the structures and activities on the Windsor Site continually decreased and, accordingly, the type of work being done on the job site and the types of craftsmen needed for this work also changed. At the beginning of the project, there were sixteen buildings. By January 1996, when the Plaintiff was laid off, only three of them remained.

In 1993, when Electric Boat accepted the contract for the Windsor Site project, it executed an industry-wide craft labor agreement, the General Presidents' Project Maintenance Agreement ("GPPMA"), which governed all union-represented employees on the job site regardless of their trade union affiliation. Under the GPPMA, Electric Boat was required to hire from the local union hiring halls and to designate a working leader (foreman) for each local union.

In June 1994, the Plaintiff was hired out of the local laborers' hiring hall along with three other individuals to move furniture from the buildings being demolished at Windsor Site. This work proved too physically demanding for her, and she was reassigned to lighter duty work including janitorial work and "High Rad Watch" work, monitoring access to high radiation areas, for which there was a significant need at the beginning of the Plaintiff's employment. For two and one-half months in 1995, Plaintiff was away from work because of sick leave. By late 1995 the project had run over budget and in January 1996, with only three buildings remaining, Electric Boat decided to lay off eleven craft workers, including seven laborers. Plaintiff was one of the individuals chosen for lay-off.

The two other laborers who performed primarily janitorial work were also chosen for lay-off, and, after January 1996, no laborer was assigned primarily to do cleaning work. (The union collective bargaining agreement, the GPPMA, did not require lay-offs to be based upon seniority.)

On May 12, 1995, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO"), alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her age, gender, and disability. On June 16, 1995, Plaintiff filed a supplement with the CCHRO, adding a number of additional incidents, and on January 30, 1996, she filed a second supplementary complaint. All told, Plaintiff has listed a score of complaints in support of her hostile environment claim. Most of these are recited in the Court's earlier opinion referred to above and are set forth at some length in the papers of both parties submitted on these motions. They will not, therefore, be described again in individual detail.

LAW

In order to prevail on a hostile environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff who is harassed by a co-worker must establish two elements: (1) a hostile work environment; and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile work environment to the employer. See, e.g., Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir.1998); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997). An employer who has notice of a hostile work environment has a duty to take reasonable steps to eliminate it. Distasio, 157 F.3d at 62.

To establish the first element — the existence of a hostile work environment — Plaintiff must prove that the workplace was permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" that was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). The hostile environment must be one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and that the victim did, in fact, perceive to be so. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367. The Supreme Court in Harris held that the courts should look to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance. Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. The incidents "must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n. 1, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "[O]ne of the critical inquiries in a hostile environment claim must be the environment. Evidence of a general work atmosphere ... — as well as evidence of specific hostility directed toward the plaintiff — is an important factor in evaluating the claim." Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.1987)) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Thus, to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the Plaintiff must show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir.1998); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995).

Second, the Plaintiff must show that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. Perry v. Ethan Allen, 115 F.3d at 149; Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1995). That is a critical issue in this case.

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Legal Standard

Defendant has filed a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. On such a motion "the district court is required to deny the motion unless, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached." Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has also held that a motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted only when:

(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or

(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].

Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875 (2d Cir.1994) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808, 116 S.Ct. 53, 133 L.Ed.2d 18 (1995).

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