State ex rel. Atty.-Gen. v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1932 |
| Docket Number | 29667 |
| Citation | 161 Miss. 839,138 So. 567 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. ATTY.-GEN. v. MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
1 LICENSES.
Privilege tax laws are construed strictly in favor of citizen (Laws 1930, chapter 88, section 37).
2 LICENSES. Electric light and power company, keeping sample on hand and selling electric refrigerators under contract with general agent, having contract with manufacturer, held "subagent" for privilege tax purposes (Laws 1930 chapter 88, section 37). The agreed statement of facts disclosed that the light and power company had no direct dealing with manufacturer of refrigerators, but that its sole functions were controlled by contract between it and corporation having general agency or branch office and display room in state to which the power and light company and other subagents took prospective customers, and that power and light company did not employ any additional employees to sell electric refrigerators.
APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county HON. W. H. POTTER, Judge.
Suit by the state, on the relation of the attorney-general, against the Mississippi Power & Light Company. From the judgment, relator appeals. Affirmed.
Affirmed.
E. R. Holmes, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellant.
The legislature's primary intent in imposing the privilege taxes imposed by section 37, chapter 88, Laws of 1930, was to tax the place of business wherein the articles enumerated were sold.
Where the meaning of a statute is not plain, resort must be had to the real purpose and intention of the legislature in adopting the statute, which when ascertained, the court should give effect thereto, even though the letter of the statute be violated; that what is within the intention is within the meaning of the statute, though not within the letter and e converso.
Kennington v. Hemingway, 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 392; Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687; Bonds v. Greer, 56 Miss. 710; Adams v. Y. & M. V. R. Co., 75 Miss. 275, 22 So. 824.
The court in construing a statute will not impute an unjust and unwise purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such imputation.
Dunn v. Clinghan, 93 Miss. 310, 47 So. 503; Gunter v. City of Jackson, 130 Miss. 637, 94 So. 844.
The legislature intended to levy a tax of ten dollars upon each of the other agents employed by the person operating the general agency or branch office, calling them subagents. The term subagents also refers to soliciting agents or salesmen.
It is a principle too well settled to need the citation of authority that the contract between two parties does not control their legal relationship when the rights of third parties are involved.
Superior Oil Company v. State of Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390.
The classification suggested by appellant's contention is reasonable. The classification which would be made by appellee's contention would be arbitrary and unjust. Courts will construe taxing statutes, if possible, so that the result will not be discriminatory and void. A law is unconstitutional which is discriminatory or denies the equal protection of the law.
Miller v. Sherard, 157 Miss. 124, 126 So. 903; Smith, Tax Collector, v. Perkins, 112 Miss. 870, 73 So. 797; 12 C. J. 1155; 37 C. J., pp. 186, 190, 192, 193, 198 and 200; Rodge v. Kelley, 88 Miss. 209, 40 So. 552, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 635, 117 Am. St. Rep. 733; Adams v. Standard Oil Co., 97 Miss. 879, 53 So. 692; State v. Larence, 105 Miss. 58, 61 So. 975; Johnson v. Long Furniture Company, 113 Miss. 373, 74 So. 283.
Green, Green & Jackson, of Jackson, for appellee.
It is a well-recognized and fundamental rule of statutory construction that tax laws are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer, and the rule of strict construction in favor of the taxpayer prevails. As we understand the court will not extend and expand a statute, imposing a tax burden, to make it include either subjects or persons not within the terms of the statute. Laws imposing privilege taxes are to be construed favorable to the citizen, and no occupation is to be taxed, unless clearly within the provisions of such law.
Vicksburg & Meridian R. Co. v. State, 62 Miss. 105; Pan-American Petroleum Corp. v. Miller, 154 Miss. 565, 122 So. 393.
Laws imposing privilege taxes approximate an abridgment of the liberty of the citizen guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States, and should receive the strictest construction.
Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 767, 47 So. 465, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677.
Laws imposing taxes are not to be construed as imposing burdens upon doubtful interpretation.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Harbison, 123 Miss. 674, 86 So. 455.
Tax laws are to be strictly construed against taxing power, and if right to tax is not plain, it cannot be implied; all doubts being resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
Miller v. Illinois C. R. Co., 146 Miss. 422, 111 So. 558.
On doubtful interpretation, privilege tax laws will not be construed as imposing burdens on citizens, and courts will not extend a statute imposing such tax beyond the clear meaning of the language imposed.
Board Levee Com'rs v. Howze Mercantile Co., 149 Miss. 843, 116 So. 92; McKenzie v. Adams-Banks Lumber Co., 128 So. 335, 157 Miss. 482; Miller v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 146 Miss. 422, 111 So. 558; Scott v. Hossley, 107 So. 760, 142 Miss. 611; Middleton v. Lincoln County, 84 So. 907, 122 Miss. 673; State v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co., 123 Miss. 191, 85 So. 137; Ex Parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 482, 36 Am. Rep. 336.
Laws imposing privilege taxes are to be liberally construed in favor of the citizen, and courts will not extend the statute imposing such taxes beyond the clear meaning of the language employed.
Railroad Co. v. Clark, 95 Miss. 689, 49 So. 177.
Then there is taxed each subagent on a basis of ten dollars, which does not apply to every place of business at which the subagent does business, but alone to the person of the subagent.
State v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co., 123 Miss. 191, 85 So. 137; Sperry v. Harbison, 123 Miss. 674, 86 So. 455.
The tax as to a distributor, whether it have agents or not, is at each place of business, then when it comes to a subagent, it is only exacted once.
If there is a doubt as to the liability of an instrument to taxation the construction is in favor of the exemption because a tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose.
Conroy v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas. 259; U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall 498, 21 L.Ed. 728; Weeks v. Sibley, 269 F. 157; Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 62 L.Ed. 211; Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 56; People v. Rhyne, 88 N.Y. 144.
Here the method of doing business is specific and definite, and involves the imposition of a tax on one who is a subagent, which subagency has a definite meaning in Mississippi.
Ross v. Morrimac Veneer Company, 92 So. 823, 129 Miss. 693; Johns v. Sergeant, 45 Miss. 337; 2 C. J. 688.
The attorney-general brought suit in the circuit court against the Mississippi Power & Light Company for alleged privilege tax due under section 37, chapter 88, Laws of 1930, contending that the defendant was due the privilege tax under said section. It was alleged that at a great many points in the state the defendant was conducting a business under said section, dealing in Frigidaires, Kelvinators, and machines of like character.
The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts, and the circuit court held that the defendant had paid all privilege taxes due; the case being tried by the circuit judge without a jury by consent of the parties.
The agreed statement of facts, briefly summarized, is as follows:
On March 31, 1930, a contract was entered into between the General Electric Company, a New York corporation, and A. G Riddick, Inc., a corporation of Delaware doing business in Mississippi, and under this contract Riddick had the disposal of Frigidaires, Kelvinators, and similar machines in the state of Mississippi and in certain other territory. Riddick carries a complete assortment of General Electric Refrigerators at its display room in the city of Jackson and pays the expense of operating said display room, employing the help, etc., and keeps employees at said place to wait on prospective customers from all over the state. This display room is maintained by Riddick for all persons having contractual relations with the said Riddick, including the Mississippi Power and Light Company, who may and do bring prospective customers to the display room to see the line there displayed. The Mississippi Power & Light Company in and about the operation of its divers functions employs many agents and employees...
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