Armstrong v. Logan
| Decision Date | 02 May 1893 |
| Citation | 22 S.W. 384,115 Mo. 465 |
| Parties | Armstrong v. Logan, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court. -- Hon. Chas. W. Sloan, Judge.
Affirmed.
James W. Suddath, for appellant.
(1) One who seeks relief in equity on the ground of fraud in procuring his signature to an instrument must prove the fraud alleged by substantial evidence, and the evidence must be clear and convincing. Jackson v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76; Shields v. Hickey, 26 Mo.App. 194. (2) Where actual fraud is charged, as in this case, it must be proved, not conjectured. Facts which give rise only to suspicion of its existence do not establish it. Priest v. Way, 87 Mo 16. (3) While fraud may be inferred, this does not mean that it may be assumed. Funkhouser v. Lay, 78 Mo. 458. (4) Where on a charge of fraud the evidence is as consistent with honesty as with dishonesty, it will be construed in favor of the former, and in such case it will be presumed to be honest. Webb v. Darby, 94 Mo. 621; Shinnabarger v. Shelton, 41 Mo.App. 147; Rumbolds v. Parr, 51 Mo. 592; Ames v Gilmore, 59 Mo. 537; Chapman v. McIlrath, 77 Mo. 38. (5) Instead of the conduct of defendant and his father and his mother toward plaintiff being subject to criticism for fraud or unfairness, it is due them to say this charge is wholly unfounded, and in the light of the rule above announced, their conduct is characterized by fairness and kindness to plaintiff throughout. Mateer v. Railroad, 105 Mo. loc. cit. 354. (6) It was not incumbent on the officer taking her acknowledgment to this deed to read it to her or to explain the contents; she told the officer she knew what it was; she acknowledged it as her deed. The full design of the law was accomplished by the officer. Drew v. Arnold, 85 Mo. loc. cit. 131. (7) There is no inadequacy of consideration so as to be a ground for setting aside this deed. It is to the situation at the time, and as matters then stood, that the court should look and that regard must be had. McClure v. Lewis, supra, p. 559.
O. L. Houts for respondent.
(1) This transaction amounted to a gift from respondent to appellant, who stood in a confidential relation to respondent, and is presumptively void. Gay v. Gilliland, 92 Mo. 250; Hall v. Nappenberger, 97 Mo. 509. (2) It is not confined to parent and child, client and attorney, principal and agent, patient and medical adviser. Street v. Gross, 62 Mo. 226. (3) The burden then rested upon appellant to show adequate consideration and the utmost fairness. Street v. Gross, supra. (4) Actual fraud need not be proven. All presumptions are against the conveyance, though grantees testified everything was fair. Yosti v. Langbran, 49 Mo. 594. (5) Non-intervention of a disinterested adviser and improvidence in the transaction are circumstances which show undue influence. Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483; Hall v. Nappenberger, 97 Mo. 509. (6) Fact that Glen Logan may not have participated in the fraud does not make the gift good. Yosti v. Langbran, 49 Mo. 594; Rankin v. Patten, 65 Mo. 378. (7) Persons who receive benefits when confidential relations exist must show that the grantor acted from independent and disinterested advice, or the deed is void. Rankin v. Patten, 65 Mo. 378 and 410; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 228; Caspari v. Church, 12 Mo.App. 13.
Since this cause came to this court, and before its submission, the plaintiff has died and by consent the cause has been revived in the name of B. F. McCluney, administrator, and Fannie Morris, devisee of the former plaintiff.
By this proceeding in equity it is sought to set aside a deed made by Jemima Armstrong to the defendant, whereby, after reserving to herself a life-estate therein, the grantor conveyed to defendant by general warranty lot number 2 in Solomon's south addition to the town of Warrensburg.
This conveyance was made upon the expressed consideration of $ 1, never paid, and the deed further says: "This deed is made, executed, acknowledged and delivered by the party named as grantor herein and accepted by the grantee upon the express condition and agreement that the said grantor, Jemima Armstrong, is to have the full, free and absolute possession and control of all the above named premises for and during her natural life, with the right and privilege to lease, sub-lease or let such premises in such manner as she may choose, and in all respects to do and exercise all such control and management of the same, as fully as though this deed had not been made, saving and excepting, that she shall have no right to sell, alien or incumber, or bind the same for any lease for longer than her natural life.
"As part consideration for the execution and delivery of this deed, the said Glen H. Logan covenants and agrees to pay Jemima Armstrong the sum of $ 4 per month, until the now existing lien on such premises, held by the Johnson County Building and Loan Association is fully paid off and discharged, which lien is not covered by the covenants...
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