Com. v. Neiman

• Decision Date: 08 September 2010
• Citation: 5 A.3d 353
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James Howard NEIMAN, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

5 A.3d 353

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.James Howard NEIMAN, Jr., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 11, 2010.

Filed Sept. 8, 2010.

Jeffrey B. Engle, Millersburg, for appellant.

Douglas Taglieri, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., STEVENS, GANTMAN, PANELLA, DONOHUE, SHOGAN, ALLEN, LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.:

Appellant, James Howard Neiman, Jr., challenges the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions for numerous sexual offenses against two child victims. We affirm the judgment of sentence.

On March 8, 2007, a jury convicted appellant of one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and multiple counts of aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, and indecent exposure.¹ The charges against appellant arose from the ongoing sexual molestation of his ten-year-old granddaughter and seven-year-old grandniece over a two-year period of time. On September 27, 2007, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 13 1/2 to 27 years' imprisonment. The court also found that appellant was a sexually violent predator and imposed the lifetime registration obligations under Pennsylvania's version of the statutory scheme popularly known as "Megan's Law," 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791- 9799.9.

On October 11, 2007, appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. On October 17, 2007, the trial court directed appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal by November 7, 2007, and on that date appellant timely complied. Appellant's concise statement raised a multitude of issues. Because one of the issues that was raised presented a serious constitutional challenge to Megan's Law, this court certified the appeal for en banc review on November 24, 2009.

We write today to specifically address appellant's contention that Pennsylvania's current version of Megan's Law runs afoul of a provision in Pennsylvania's Constitution, found at Article III, Section 3, knownas the "single subject rule." ² As to all of appellant's remaining issues, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's thorough, 15-page opinion that presents the factual background and procedural history of this case, and correctly addresses the remaining issues raised by appellant. We, therefore, adopt that opinion as our own and affirm each of appellant's remaining issues on the respective bases stated in the trial court's opinion. We now turn to the issue of Megan's Law and the single subject rule.

Appellant contends that Senate Bill 92 of the 2003 Session of the Legislature, by which the current Megan's Law provisions were enacted, was constitutionally unsound in that it violated the single subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution:

§ 3. Form of bills

No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.

Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, Section 3.

According to appellant, Senate Bill 92 violated this precept by addressing wholly disparate topics such as Megan's Law, the Deficiency Judgment Act, and other unrelated matters. We find that the Megan's Law provisions of Senate Bill 92 can pass constitutional muster.

We begin our analysis by noting that our supreme court requires a very deferential standard in reviewing constitutional challenges to statutes:

Since the Complaint is based on challenges to the constitutionality of the statute, we must begin by considering the standard by which we resolve constitutional challenges to legislative actions. First, our case law makes clear that there is a strong presumption in the law that legislative enactments do not violate our Constitution. See Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n., Inc. et al. v. Commonwealth Ass'n. of School Administrators, 569 Pa. 436, 805 A.2d 476, 479 (2002). This includes the manner by which legislation is enacted. Id. Accordingly, a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. Id. (emphasis supplied). All doubts are to be resolved in favor of finding that the legislative enactment passes constitutional muster. Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 555 Pa. 277, 724 A.2d 315, 317 (1999). Thus, there is a very heavy burden of persuasion upon one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute. Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). It is with this burden and the extremely deferential standard by which we view constitutional challenges in mind that we turn to the arguments of the parties.

Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 583 Pa. 275, 292-293, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (2005) (hereinafter referred to as " PAGE ").

It is also important to our analysis to recognize the reasons that the single subject rule was adopted, and the legislative problems that it avoids. First, the single subject rule curbs the legislative practice known as "logrolling," which is combining into one bill a variety of distinct subjects which could not obtain a majority on their own, but which can in their amalgamation.City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 575 Pa. 542, 574-575, 838 A.2d 566, 586 (2003). Second, the single subject rule prohibits hiding what might be unpopular legislation, by attaching a rider to an otherwise popular bill that is likely to pass. Id. Third, a bill addressing a single subject is more likely to receive a considered review than one covering many topics. Id.

Finally, our supreme court has also cautioned about the tension in these single subject challenges between interpreting the rule too narrowly and too broadly:

While recognizing the importance of Section 3, we acknowledged that bills are frequently subject to amendments as they proceed through the legislative process and not every supplementation of new material is violative of the Constitution. Thus, "where the provisions added during the legislative process assist in carrying out a bill's main objective or are otherwise 'germane' to the bill's subject as reflected in its title," the requirements of Article III, Section 3 are met. Id. Article III, Section 3 must have, however, some limits on germaneness, for otherwise virtually all legislation-no matter how diverse in substance-would meet the single-subject requirement, rendering the strictures of Section 3 nugatory. As stated by our Court in Payne v. School Dist. of Coudersport Borough, 168 Pa. 386, 31 A. 1072, 1074 (1895), "no two subjects are so wide apart that they may not be brought into a common focus, if the point of view be carried back far enough." Thus, defining the constitutionally-valid topic too broadly would render the safeguards of Section 3 inert. Conversely, the requirements of Section 3 must not become a license for the judiciary to "exercise a pedantic tyranny" over the efforts of the Legislature. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 588 (citing Estate of Rochez, 511 Pa. 620, 515 A.2d 899, 902 (1986)). Indeed, "[f]ew bills are so elementary in character that they may not be subdivided under several heads...." Payne, 31 A. at 1074.

PAGE, 583 Pa. at 296, 877 A.2d at 395-396.

A review of recent decisions, beginning with those we have already cited, may give us a better idea as to how broadly we should focus our inquiry. In PAGE, our supreme court examined House Bill 2330 of 2004, which began its legislative life at a single page in length and dealt solely with the State Police performing criminal history and fingerprint checks for the State Harness and Horse Racing Commission of applicants for licensure. Thereafter, the bill underwent substantial amendments. Subsequently, the bill:

included the creation of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board ("Gaming Control Board" or "Board"), the issuance of gambling licenses authorizing the creation of a variety of slot machine casinos, the generation and distribution of revenues from the licenses, the creation of numerous funds including the Gaming Fund, the Pennsylvania Horse Race Fund, the Gambling and Economic Development and Tourism Fund, the Property Tax Relief Fund as well as a Compulsive and Problem Gambling Treatment Fund. Additionally, the amended bill contained a chapter regarding administration and enforcement and provided for exclusive jurisdiction in our Court regarding disputes over the issuance of licenses and challenges to the Gaming Act.

Id., 583 Pa. at 289-290, 877 A.2d at 392. Ultimately, our supreme court held that such amendment did not violate the single subject rule because the disparate provisions of the bill were unified by the singleoverarching subject of the regulation of gaming.

In City of Philadelphia, however, the court reached a different conclusion in examining Senate Bill 1100 of 2002. The bill sought to amend Title 53 (Municipalities Generally) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. Although the bill concerned various problems of municipalities, it addressed such divergent topics as restricting the political activity of police officers, authorizing parking authorities to undertake mixed-use development projects, imposing citizenship requirements for board members of business improvement districts, and transferring authority over Philadelphia's taxis and limousines from the Public Utility Commission to the Philadelphia Parking Authority. The court found that the proposed unifying relationship that all provisions related to "municipalities" was overbroad to qualify for single subject status. The court also found that the fact that all of the provisions amended a single statutory Title, Title 53, was of little constitutional importance. Finally, the court ruled that the bill did not qualify for the Article III, Section 3 exception for a consolidation or codification of law, because the proposed changes went beyond...