86 Hawai'i 207, State v. Bautista

• Decision Date: 28 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 20383,20383
• Citation: 86 Hawaii 207,948 P.2d 1048
• Parties: 86 Hawai'i 207 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eryck A. BAUTISTA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1048

948 P.2d 1048

86 Hawai'i 207

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eryck A. BAUTISTA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20383.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Nov. 28, 1997.

Jon N. Ikenaga, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Artemio C. Baxa, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ.

NAKAYAMA, Judge.

Defendant-appellant Eryck A. Bautista appeals from his conviction on one count of theft in the first degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 708-830.5(1) (1993). Because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Bautista had the required intent to commit theft in the first degree, we reverse his conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 25, 1996, Bautista was indicted on one count of theft in the first degree in violation of HRS § 708-830.5(1) (1993). This indictment arose out of Bautista's temporary possession of a new Toyota 4-Runner vehicle.

On Wednesday, July 12, 1995, Bautista went to Maui Toyota and spoke with a salesperson, indicating that he was interested in purchasing a new truck. After taking a test drive, Bautista left the dealership without purchasing a vehicle. Bautista returned to Maui Toyota between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on Friday, July 14, 1995. He told the salesperson that he had decided to purchase a new 4-Runner. The 4-Runner that Bautista selected was prepped and ready to be driven off the lot that day. After negotiating the final selling price, Bautista wrote a check to Maui Toyota in the amount of $29,865.83. Maui Toyota did not contact Bautista's bank at that time to determine if there was adequate money in the account to cover the check. Bautista then took possession of the vehicle.

On Monday, July 17, 1995, Bautista brought the 4-Runner back to Maui Toyota in order to have optional running boards installed. Later that day, Cecilia Morris, Maui Toyota's financing and leasing manager, received a call from Maui Toyota's accounting office notifying her that Bautista's check had not been honored. She notified the salesperson, who then called Bautista, told him that the check had not cleared, and instructed him to bring the vehicle back. Bautista returned the 4-Runner that day. The vehicle had 592 miles on the odometer when it was returned. As a result of the mileage on the vehicle, it could no longer be sold as new. Bautista continued to have contact with Maui Toyota, claiming to be attempting to find a way to get the money to purchase the vehicle. Bautista did not actually apply for another loan, although he told the dealership that he had applied and that his application was denied. On July 26, 1995, Maui Toyota notified the police.

Evidence was presented at trial showing that the account upon which Bautista wrote his check was closed on February 9, 1995, over five months before Bautista wrote the check to Maui Toyota. The highest balance in that account prior to being closed was $200.

At trial, the prosecution produced two witnesses who testified that, subsequent to attempting to purchase the vehicle at Maui Toyota, Bautista went to two other car dealerships and purchased automobiles with checks written on closed accounts, returning the vehicles with large amounts of mileage as soon as it was determined that the checks were invalid.

In all of Bautista's dealings with Maui Toyota, he gave correct information as to his name, phone number and address. At trial, Bautista testified that he was unaware that Maui Toyota was going to cash his check and that he was surprised when they told him that he could take the 4-runner off the lot. Bautista stated that he gave Maui Toyota a deposit of $100 to hold the vehicle until he received financing. He claimed that he had applied for a loan with Norwest Financial, which was pending at the time he took possession of the vehicle. However, testimony from the manager of Norwest Financial revealed that Bautista never formally filed an application for a loan with that company. An investigating police officer testified that Bautista admitted that he knew the checking account was closed when he tendered the check for the vehicle.

Bautista was convicted of theft in the first degree and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. As a repeat offender, he was sentenced to serve a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of six years and eight months. Bautista timely appealed his conviction.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This case requires interpretation of the Hawai'i Penal Code's theft statute. We review statutes de novo. Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 79 Hawai'i 352, 357, 903 P.2d 48, 52 (1995). "The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself." State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai'i 280, 289, 933 P.2d 617, 626, reconsideration denied 84 Hawai'i 496, 936 P.2d 191 (1997). "[O]ur foremost obligation [when interpreting a statute] is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai'i 317, 320, 893 P.2d 168, 171 (1995) (citation omitted). We read statutory language in the context of the entire statute, "and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose." Mathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 82 Hawai'i 57, 71, 919 P.2d 969, 983 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A rational, sensible and practicable interpretation [of a statute] is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable." State v. Lobendahn, 71 Haw. 111, 112, 784 P.2d 872, 873 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original) "The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction[,] and illogicality." State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 19, 928 [86 Hawai'i 210] P.2d 843, 861 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a general rule, "[p]enal statutes are to be strictly construed." State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373, 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996) (citation omitted) (brackets in original). "[A]mbiguous penal statutes are to be construed in favor of the accused." State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai'i 317, 321, 893 P.2d 168, 172 (1995) (citing State v. Rodgers, 68 Haw. 438, 444, 718 P.2d 275, 278 (1986)).

B. Insufficient Evidence was Presented to Prove that Bautista Intended to Commit Theft in the First Degree

HRS § 708-830 (1993) provides that "A person commits theft if the person does any of the following: ... (2) A person obtains, or exerts control over, the property of another by deception with intent to deprive the other of the property." HRS § 708-800 (1993) defines "deprive" in pertinent part as "[t]o withhold property or cause it to be withheld from a person permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstance that a significant portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, is lost to the person." HRS § 708-830.5 (1993) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of theft in the first degree if the person commits theft ... [o]f property or services, the value of which exceeds $20,000."

Bautista challenges his conviction on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a finding that he acted with the intent to deprive Maui Toyota of property valued in excess of $20,000.

"[V]erdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the jury's findings." Tsugawa v. Reinartz, 56 Haw. 67, 71, 527 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1974). We have defined "substantial evidence" as "credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to support a conclusion." See, e.g., In re Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai'i 85, 93, 869 P.2d 1304, 1312 (1994) (citations omitted) (brackets in original).

Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai'i 230, 237, 891 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1995). "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is the province of the [trier of fact]." State v. Buch, 83 Hawai'i 308, 321, 926 P.2d 599, 612 (1996) (citation omitted). "We have long held that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction." State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992), reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992) (citations omitted).

The prosecution has the burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. HRS § 701-114 (1993). An individual cannot be convicted of a crime unless the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. HRS § 701-114(1)(b) (1993).

The dispositive issue under the unusual facts of this case is whether, viewed in the light most strongly favoring the prosecution, substantial evidence was presented to prove that Bautista intended to deprive Maui Toyota of property valued in excess of $20,000. The prosecution cites the following evidence to support a finding that Bautista intended to commit theft in the first degree: (a) Bautista was familiar with car sales procedures because he had previously worked at a dealership; (b) Bautista knew the difference between new and used car values; (c) Bautista knew that checks took several days to clear; (d) Bautista knew that new cars driven off the lot depreciated in value; (e) Bautista knew that he did not have sufficient funds in his account to cover the check; (f) he never filled out a loan application; and (g) Bautista knew that it was unwise for a car dealership to sell a car solely on the basis of a $100 deposit and an unverified check.

Under the statutory definition...