State v. Salavea

• Decision Date: 11 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 73642-1.,73642-1.
• Citation: 151 Wash.2d 133,86 P.3d 125
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dynamite SALAVEA a/k/a Pale Tuupo, Petitioner.

86 P.3d 125

151 Wash.2d 133

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dynamite SALAVEA a/k/a Pale Tuupo, Petitioner.

No. 73642-1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 11, 2004.

Mary Katherine Young High, Tacoma, for petitioner.

John Martin Neeb, Kathleen Proctor, Tacoma, for respondent.

OWENS, J.

Dynamite Salavea argues that intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay by the State caused him to lose juvenile court jurisdiction, prejudicing his defense on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree. Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of the proceedings. In light of previous case law, the plain language of the statute, and the legislative intent, we disagree and hold that age at the time of the proceedings is the controlling age. Based on the nature of the charges and Salavea's age at the earliest possible time of charging, Salavea would have been automatically declined. Therefore, Salavea fails to prove prejudice and his due process rights were not violated by any prosecutorial delay. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

Salavea was born on October 9, 1982. Between February 1996 and June 1998, when Salavea was 13-15 years of age, Salavea raped and molested his cousins, R.U.T. and R.K.T. No issue is raised that relates to the facts of the abuse elicited at trial, so the details of the abuse need not be related. In August 1998, an aunt told the boys' mother, Bonnie, that her son had been raped. Bonnie spoke with the boys and then reported the abuse to the police. The juvenile court's prosecutor's office received the investigative file on September 29, 1998. Salavea turned 16 on October 9, 1998. During October and November the prosecutor's office conducted interviews with the children and tried to contact Salavea, but could not find him. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 9-12; 4 VRP (trial, June 6, 2001) at 265-70; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 38 (Detective C. Pollard's written report dated Dec. 1, 1998).

On March 8, 1999, the prosecutor's office reviewed the file for charging and transferred the file to the Pierce County Superior Court division pursuant to the automatic decline statute. RCW 13.04.030; CP at 32. Around this same time, Salavea committed a parole violation, a bench warrant was issued based on the violation, and Salavea fled Washington for Utah. At the time Salavea fled, he lost contact with his mother and his family, he knew the bench warrant had been issued, and he knew about the allegations regarding R.U.T. and R.K.T. Salavea returned to Washington in July or August 2000, was picked up for robbery in Tacoma on September 14, 2000, and provided the police with false information. On October 9, 2000, Salavea turned 18.

Salavea was charged and arraigned as an adult on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree on October 25, 2000. VRP (arraignment, Oct. 25, 2000) at 3; CP at 3-5; State v. Salavea, 115 Wash.App. 52, 55, 60 P.3d 1230 (2003). In April 2001 Salavea filed a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial delay. CP at 24. Judge Frederick B. Hayes applied the prosecutorial delay three-prong test and found Salavea had been prejudiced, but denied the motion because the State's reasons for delay were reasonable: the State was thorough in its investigation, Salavea was absent from the jurisdiction, the State knew Salavea had a bench warrant out and delayed charging. VRP (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 17-19. Salavea was subsequently found guilty by a jury and sentenced. Salavea appealed the decision based on prosecutorial delay and argued that he should have been charged following the police investigation. Br. of Appellant at 15. The Court of Appeals applied the same three-prong test to the facts and concluded that Salavea did not show prejudice from the delay because at the conclusion of the investigation he was 16. Based on Salavea's age and the nature of the crimes committed, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(C) prevented juvenile court jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision because Salavea failed to show prejudice based on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction. Salavea, 115 Wash.App. at 55-57, 60 P.3d 1230. We now affirm the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES

1. Does the age prerequisite in RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) refer to the defendant's age at the time of the proceedings or the defendant's age during the commission of the crime?

2. If RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) does apply to Salavea, did the State violate Salavea's due process rights by intentionally or negligently delaying a charging decision?

ANALYSIS

Due process plays a limited role in protecting defendants against oppressive delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).¹ Absent intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay, where a defendant commits a crime before he is 18 but is not charged until after he is 18, there is not a violation of due process. State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 858-59, 792 P.2d 137 (1990) (holding that where a defendant committed the crime at age 16 but was not charged until he was 18, due process was not violated because prosecutorial delay was justified); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 349, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). Whether Salavea's due process rights were violated based on prosecutorial delay is a question we review de novo. See State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 883, 889 P.2d 479 (1995)

(reviewing prosecutorial delay de novo under the error of law standard and finding that circumvention of precedents applying the prosecutorial delay test constituted reversible error).

To decide if there is prosecutorial delay, a court must apply a three-prong test. First, the defendant must show the charging delay caused prejudice. If the defendant shows prejudice, the court then examines the State's reasons for the delay. Finally, the court balances the delay against the defendant's prejudice to decide if the delay violates the "fundamental conceptions of justice." If the delay is intentional, due process is violated, but if the delay only is negligent, due process may or may not be violated. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293; Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 865-66, 792 P.2d 137.

A. Prong One: Prejudice

1. Actual Prejudice

Salavea must show the State's delay caused actual prejudice to his defense in order to satisfy prong one of the prosecutorial delay test. State v. Norby, 122 Wash.2d 258, 264, 858 P.2d 210 (1993) (emphasizing that prejudice must be actual, not merely speculative). Salavea argues that his loss of juvenile court jurisdiction fulfills this burden. We have held that offenders fulfill their burden of proof when prosecutorial delay causes a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction because the loss results in a decrease of benefits available to a defendant.² Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860-61, 792 P.2d 137 (stating that two benefits lost to the defendant are the avoidance of the stigma attached to an adult conviction and the possibility for less harsh penalties); Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 (stating that loss of juvenile court jurisdiction results in the loss of juvenile adjudication or the opportunity to argue against a decline from juvenile court jurisdiction); State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d 602, 604, 746 P.2d 807 (1987).

However, the right to be tried in a juvenile court is not constitutional and the right attaches only if a court is given statutory discretion to assign juvenile or adult court jurisdiction. In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 570-71, 925 P.2d 964 (1996); Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 792 P.2d 137; State v. Sharon, 33 Wash.App. 491, 494-95, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982), aff'd, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983). Absent statutory discretion to assign jurisdiction, a defendant cannot suffer prejudice because his case was not adjudicated in juvenile court. Whether Salavea can prove loss of juvenile court jurisdiction, then, depends on whether the juvenile court had statutory discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction.

We must look to the appropriate statutory interpretation and application of the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, to determine this issue. The earliest the State could charge and try Salavea was after he turned 16. If the automatic decline statute refers to age at the time of the proceedings, then the court did not have discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction at the time of the charging and trial and Salavea cannot fulfill his proof of prejudice.

2. Statutory Interpretation of RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)

Statutory interpretation is a question of law and we review the interpretation of RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) de novo. See State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 449, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)

. RCW 13.04.030 allows the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile offenses unless certain circumstances arise. Here, we are only concerned with RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v). This section automatically transfers jurisdiction to the adult court if "[t]he juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and the alleged offense is" an enumerated crime. RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A)-(E). The statutory automatic transfer is an exception to the normal decline procedures and does not require or permit a decline hearing. See RCW 13.40.110 (explaining normal decline hearing process); Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 557,

925 P.2d 964 (interpreting what is now RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) and (B)). Therefore, if the statute applies to a defendant, the juvenile court does not have discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction and the defendant cannot be prejudiced based on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction.

The...