Arroyo–pÉrez v. Demir Group Int'l Aka Dgi Group
Decision Date | 11 January 2011 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 09–2231 (JA). |
Citation | 762 F.Supp.2d 374 |
Parties | Eunice ARROYO–PÉREZ, Plaintiffv.DEMIR GROUP INTERNATIONAL aka DGI Group, Haygo Demir aka Haygo Demirian, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Judith Berkan, Mary Jo Mendez–Vilella, Berkan & Mendez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Maria J. Marchand–Sanchez, Juan R. Rivera–Font, Ferraiuoli–Torres, Marchand & Rovira PSC, San Juan, PR, Michael L. Cotzen, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff and defendants have filed motions for summary judgment on three of the remaining twenty affirmative defenses raised by the defendants. 1 (Docket Nos. 46 & 66.) For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her Title VII claim is GRANTED, and her motion for summary judgment on her Law 80 claim is DENIED. (Docket No. 46.) Conversely, defendants' cross motion for summary judgment on their Title VII affirmative defense is DENIED, and their cross motion for summary judgment on the Law 80 claim is also DENIED. (Docket No. 66.)
Plaintiff Eunice Arroyo–Perez (“Arroyo”) filed a motion for partial summary judgment on October 23, 2010. (Docket No. 46.) The plaintiff addresses defendants' Demir Group International and Haygo Demir (collectively, “DGI”) third affirmative defense, that DGI adhered to the Title VII numerosity requirement. Additionally, the plaintiff requests summary judgment on defendants' Law 80 affirmative defense, that they complied with the statute's seniority requirement. The defendants filed their response in opposition on November 22, 2010, as well as cross-motion for summary judgment on the same counts. (Docket No. 66.) The defendants claim that Title VII does not apply to them, as they do not have the requisite fifteen employees necessary to be considered ‘employers' under the statute. They additionally claim that the plaintiff was justifiably terminated under Law 80, as fluctuating economic conditions is an acceptable reason under Puerto Rican law. The plaintiff filed their opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment on December 9, 2010. (Docket No. 70.)
Additionally, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the inclusion of several exhibits included by defendants in their response in opposition. (Docket No. 71.) Plaintiff claims that several of the motions either lacked authenticity under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, were incomplete, or were not properly translated. Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike the errata sheet to Demir's deposition, included in its cross motion for summary judgment, as improperly timed. (Docket Nos. 68 & 69.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). The intention of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which [it] has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor.” Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997)).
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236–37 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996)) (“ ‘[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”). The nonmoving party must produce “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also López–Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir.2000).
“A genuine issue exists when there is evidence sufficient to support rational resolution of the point in favor of either party.” Nereida–González v. Tirado–Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992)). “In this context, ‘genuine’ means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party....” Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d at 204). Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
However, a moving party “may move for summary judgment ‘ with or without supporting affidavits.’ ” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Rules 56(a) and (b)). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); see also Patterson v. Patterson, 306 F.3d 1156, 1157 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990)) (“[the court] must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.”).
In the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(b), previously Local Rule 311(12), imposes additional requirements on the party filing for summary judgment as well as the party opposing the motion. A motion for summary judgment has to be accompanied by Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Local Rule 56(b) (2009). When filing a motion in opposition the opposing party must include a separate, short, and concise statement admitting, denying or qualifying each fact set out by the moving party. Local Rules 56(c); see Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 27–28 (1st Cir.2000); Domínguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.P.R.1997); see also Corrada Betances v. Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir.2001).
These facts must be supported by specific reference to the record, thereby pointing out to the court any genuine issues of material fact and eliminating the problem of the court having “to ferret through the Record.” Domínguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. at 727; see Carmona Ríos v. Aramark Corp., 139 F.Supp.2d 210, 214–15 (D.P.R.2001) (quoting Stepanischen v. Merch. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930–31 (1st Cir.1983)); Velázquez Casillas v. Forest Lab., Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 161, 163 (D.P.R.2000). Any statement of fact provided by any party which is not supported by citation to the record may be disregarded by the court, and any supported statement which is not properly presented by the other party shall be deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56(e). Failure to comply with this rule may result, where appropriate, in judgment in favor of the opposing party. Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d at 33; Stepanischen v. Merch. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d at 932.
The plaintiff requests that I strike Exhibits V(a) and V(b), VII, IX(a) and IX(b), X, XI, XVI, XIV, and XVII(a), XVII(f), and IXIII(a) to (c), included in Docket No. 66. (Docket No. 71, at 3–4.) The plaintiff draws four arguments against these exhibits, which may be categorized as (i) improper authentication; (ii) improper editing; (iii) incomplete and irrelevant; and (iv) improper translation. I will consider each in turn.
Local Rule 56(e) requires record citations in both “statement[s] of material facts” to be cited to “the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.” Local Rule 56(e). “The court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation....” Local Rule 56(e). “Documents supporting or opposing summary judgment must be properly authenticated.” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
The plaintiff moves to strike Exhibits V, VII, IX, XVI, and XVII, in their entirety, for improper authentication. Exhibits must be properly authenticated under Fed.R.Evid. 901 or 902. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). See, e.g., Godoy v. Maplehurst Bakeries, Inc., 747 F.Supp.2d 298, 305-06, Civil 09–1696(MEL), 2010 WL 4027822, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 13, 2010). Exhibits V(a) and V(b), appear to be spreadsheets of DGI's employees for the years 2007 and 2008. (Docket No. 66–5.) The defendants provide no context for this compilation of data. Worse, “employees 2007” and “employees 2008” is handwritten...
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