Morgan v. Town of East Haven

• Decision Date: 16 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13319,13319
• Citation: 546 A.2d 243,208 Conn. 576
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William J. MORGAN, Administrator (ESTATE of William T. MORGAN), et al. v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN.

Page 243

546 A.2d 243

208 Conn. 576

William J. MORGAN, Administrator (ESTATE of William T. MORGAN), et al. v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN.

No. 13319.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 31, 1988.

Decided Aug. 16, 1988.

Kenneth A. Votre, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Robert M. Ward, Northford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The issue on this appeal is whether an award made pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c ¹ for a permanent partial disability is an asset of a deceased recipient's estate. The plaintiffs, administrators of the recipients' estates, ² appeal from the judgment of the trial court, Fracasse, J., denying a motion for execution on an award issued to William T. Morgan by compensation commissioner Darius Spain (commissioner). We find no error.

The basic facts are not disputed. On or about April 15, 1955, Morgan became a uniformed employee of the East Haven fire department. Prior to his employment, Morgan underwent a physical examination that did not reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease. By the time of his retirement from the fire department, Morgan had attained the rank of chief.

On December 31, 1981, while in the employ of the East Haven fire department, Morgan suffered "congestive heart failure with underlying cardiomyopathy." Morgan retired from the fire department on January 15, 1982, at a salary of $21,700 per year. His pension benefits from the town were $931.40 per month.

Subsequent to his heart failure, Morgan applied to the town of East Haven for benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c. After a hearing, the commissioner issued a finding and award on January 26, 1983. On March 7 and 16, 1983, the commissioner issued supplemental findings and awards. On May 25, 1983, the commissioner issued a final amended finding and award. The May 25 finding stated that, as a result of his heart disease, Morgan was entitled to benefits pursuant to § 7-433c, that he had a 75 percent permanent partial impairment of his cardiovascular system and that maximum medical improvement had been attained on January 22, 1982. The commissioner ruled that Morgan was entitled to 585 weeks of benefits and that his compensation rate according to General Statutes § 31-308 was $278.33.

Morgan died on January 12, 1985, survived by his wife of forty-two years, Doris K. Morgan. Morgan had no minor children at the time of his death. After his death, the town of East Haven continued payments under the award to Doris K. Morgan until her death on March 2, 1986. No payments were made after that date. The parties stipulated that upon Doris Morgan's death there were no surviving dependents, but there were two surviving adult children. The defendant, the town of East Haven, had made a total payment of 233 weeks of benefits: twenty-three weeks at $203.37 per week; fifty-two weeks at $235.78 per week; 135 weeks at $278.33 per week; and forty-six weeks at $154.05 per week commuted to a lump sum of $7086.30.

Following the defendant's cessation of payments, the fiduciaries of the estates of William and Doris Morgan applied for an execution, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-300. ³ The trial court denied the motion for an execution and the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, whereupon, we transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The history of Connecticut's statute providing benefits for police and fire personnel who suffer from hypertension or heart disease has been "rather tumultuous." Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 667, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). The statute in its original form in 1951 established a rebuttable presumption that a uniformed firefighter of a paid municipal fire department who, prior to employment, passed a physical examination without evidence of hypertension or heart disease, and who later suffered from such disease, was presumed to have been injured in the line of duty for purposes of retirement benefits. General Statutes (Sup.1951) § 175b. ⁴ The statute was amended a number of times during the 1950s, including an amendment that made it applicable to paid police personnel as well as fire personnel. General Statutes (Sup.1953) § 308c. In 1961, the legislature amended the provision to make express reference to chapter 568 dealing with workers' compensation. The new hypertension and heart disease provision, General Statutes § 7-433b, provided a rebuttable presumption of injury in the line of duty for purposes of calculating benefits under chapter 568 for police and fire personnel. General Statutes (Sup.1961) § 433b.

The real turmoil regarding the statute began in 1969, when the legislature amended the provision to include a conclusive presumption of injury in the line of duty for those police or fire personnel who suffered from hypertension or heart disease. General Statutes (Sup.1969) § 7-433a. This court struck down the conclusive presumption as violative of due process under both the Connecticut and United States constitutions. Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143, 285 A.2d 318 (1971).

Following the Ducharme decision, the legislature passed the current hypertension and heart disease provision which has been amended only once. ⁵ To avoid the prior constitutional difficulties of the statute, the legislature did not include the benefits available under § 7-433c as compensation under the workers' compensation scheme, chapter 568. ⁶ Rather, the current provision is "separate and distinct legislation" from chapter 568. Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 67, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). It provides "an outright bonus" to those police and fire personnel who qualify and thus is not a taking of property without due process of law. Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S.Ct. 14, 46 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Chapter 568 is used only as a "procedural avenue" for administration of the benefits under § 7-433c so that a duplicate procedure would not have to be created solely for § 7-433c. Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra, 193 Conn. at 68, 475 A.2d 283, citing Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, 178 Conn. at 671-72, 425 A.2d 131.

General Statutes § 7-433c states that if a uniformed member of a paid municipal police or fire department, who successfully completed a physical examination prior to employment, suffers from hypertension or heart disease, on or off duty, and as a result dies or is disabled permanently or temporarily, partially or totally, "he or his dependents, as the case may be," shall receive compensation from the municipal employer in accordance with the procedures of chapter 568 as if the employee were injured in the course of employment. Despite this language, the plaintiffs suggest that this case should not be controlled by statutory interpretation, and that benefits under § 7-433c should not be limited to the employee and that person's dependents. They contend that once an award is made pursuant to § 7-433c, the rights of the parties should be controlled by an analysis of the award under principles of workers' compensation law. We are not persuaded by this argument.

"We have consistently held that if a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction." Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 33, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987), citing State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 222, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); Zimmer v. Essex, 38 Conn.Sup. 419, 421, 449 A.2d 1053 (1982) ("[w]hen applying this provision [7-433c], we are bound to effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed by the words contained within it; where the terms of the statute are, as here, unambiguous, we cannot speculate as to any unexpressed legislative intent"); see 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1984) § 46.04. The language of § 7-433c is clear and unambiguous. The statute has mandatory language requiring that the municipal employer compensate the afflicted police or fire department employee and that person's dependents. ⁷ The clarity of this requirement is illustrated by the fact that the legislature referred to the employee or that person's dependents three times in the compensation requirements of § 7-433c. The repetitive use of the term "dependents" indicates that the term was not used inadvertently but rather was used to delineate the class of the ultimate beneficiaries under § 7-433c. We cannot construe "dependents," as used in this statute, to include the estates of the recipients. See J. Asselin, Connecticut Workers' Compensation Practice Manual (1985) p. 26 (definition of dependents under workers' compensation law [General Statutes § 31-306]. ⁸ Thus, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute requires a municipal employer to provide compensation only to police and fire personnel who suffer from hypertension and heart disease and their dependents, not to the estates of the deceased recipients. ⁹

Even if we were persuaded that this issue could not be resolved solely by statutory interpretation, the alternative analysis proffered by the plaintiffs would not alter our result. The plaintiffs suggest that once the compensation is awarded under § 7-433c, there are vested property rights in that award that enable the deceased recipient's estate to receive the benefits upon the recipient's death. According to the plaintiffs, the award in this case vested in the recipients because it was a "specific" award, as opposed to a "special" award.

Specific benefits are benefits for the loss or loss of the use of specific body parts. See Everett v. Ingraham, 150 Conn. 153, 155, 186 A.2d 798 (1962). "These [specific] benefits ... are not paid as compensation for loss of earning power but to compensate the injured employee for the incapacity through life because of the loss...