Belvedere at Bristol Master Condo. Ass'n v. 423 Hope St. Redevelopment
| Docket Number | PC-2023-01337 |
| Decision Date | 23 April 2024 |
| Parties | BELVEDERE AT BRISTOL MASTER CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. 423 HOPE STREET REDEVELOPMENT, LLC and TAS DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Edmund A. Allcock, Esq.
For Defendant: Alexandra A. Briggs, Esq.; Seta Accaoui, Esq. Mitchell Edwards, Esq.; Thomas W. Madonna, Jr.,; Mackenzie C McBurney, Esq.; John P. Connelly, Esq.
DECISION
Both Plaintiff, Belvedere at Bristol Master Condominium Association (Plaintiff), and Defendants, 423 Hope Street Redevelopment, LLC (423 Hope Street or Declarant) and TAS Development, LLC (TAS Development)-collectively, Defendants-have filed cross-motions for summary judgment in this condominium dispute over ownership of the lower level of a two-floor parking deck. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
Located along Hope, John, and Thames Streets in Bristol, Rhode Island, the Belvedere at Bristol Master Condominium (the Master Condominium) is a condominium complex created by declaration (the Declaration) on March 3, 2014. (Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.'s Mem.) Ex. A, at 2.) The Declaration is governed by Rhode Island law. Id. at 59. Declarant[1] established the Master Condominium through the Declaration pursuant to its ownership of the property. Id. At its creation, the Master Condominium contained four Master Units (Master Units), Master Units 1, 2, 3 and 4. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. A., at 15; Pl.'s Mem. Ex. B (Plats and Plans), at 2.) The Master Units are "air rights" units, "meaning that the Master Unit consists of all air space . . . that extends upward (i.e., into the air) from the land which is depicted as being the 'pad' for such Master Unit on the Master Condominium Plat." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. A., at 9.) Each "pad" is defined as "[t]he land that the Master Unit is situated over" and is not part of the Master Unit. Id. The pads are referred to as the "Master Common Limited Element Pad[s]" in the Declaration. Id.
On March 14, 2014, Belvedere at Hope Condominium (Hope Condominium) was created on Master Unit 1 and contained fourteen residential units and two commercial units. (Roiter Aff. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Mem. ¶ 6.[2]) On the same day, Belvedere Carriage House Condominium (Carriage House Condominium) was established on Master Unit 2. (Pl.'s Mem. ¶ 7.) It contained two residential units. Id. Master Unit 3, Belvedere at John Street Condominium (John Street Condominium), featuring two residential units, was established on March 3, 2014. Id. ¶ 8. To date, Master Unit 4 has not been subject to the development of any buildings or structures. Id. ¶ 9.
Identified in the Declaration as a Master Limited Common Element, a two-story, uncovered parking deck is located on the property. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. A., at 10.) The upper level of the parking deck contains twenty-eight assigned parking spaces for unit owners of Hope Condominium and Carriage House Condominium. Id. The ground level contains no assigned spaces. Id. The ground level of the parking facility is identified in the Declaration as "Master Common Element[.]" Id. James Roiter (Mr. Roiter), a real estate developer who serves as managing member of 423 Hope Street, avers that parking never was permitted for the Master Condominium residents on the lower level of the deck, absent his express approval. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Obj. to Mot. Summ. J. (Defs.' Mem.) Ex. A (Roiter Aff.), ¶¶ 42-50.)
Years later, on October 8, 2021, Declarant amended the Declaration a fourth time, withdrawing Master Unit 4 and its Master Limited Common Elements from the Master Condominium. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. C (Fourth Amendment), at 2; Roiter Aff. ¶ 55.) Mr. Roiter indicates that this was undertaken to attract another developer to create a mixed-use residential and commercial space. (Roiter Aff. ¶¶ 23-26, 32-35.) On the same day, Declarant conveyed Master Unit 4 to TAS Development. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. D (TAS Warranty Deed), at 2.) The Master Condominium's resident association (the Association), through counsel, sent a series of e-mails and letters to Declarant objecting to any purported withdrawal of the lower level of the parking deck from the plot. See generally Pl.'s Mem. Ex. F (Correspondence).
On March 4, 2023, while discussions between Plaintiff and Declarant were ongoing, Declarant executed a Fifth Amendment to the Declaration, conveying Master Unit 4 back to Declarant and creating a new Master Unit 4 (Master Unit 4.2) to the Master Condominium. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. G (Unit 4 Deed), at 1; Pl.'s Mem. Ex. H (The Amendments), at 1-2). The Fifth Amendment designated Master Unit 4.2 as withdrawable. (The Amendments 1-2.)
The same day, Declarant recorded the Sixth Amendment to the Declaration. Id. at 8-9. This designated the ground level of the parking structure as a Master Limited Common Element appurtenant to Master Unit 4.2. Id. The Declaration notes that the individual parking spaces on the parking deck are Master Limited Common Elements. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. A, at 66.)
Likewise, on the same day as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Declarant executed a Seventh Amendment to the Declaration. (The Amendments 14-16.) This amendment withdrew Master Unit 4.2 and the Master Limited Common Elements appurtenant to Master Unit 4.2 from the Master Condominium. Id. Declarant simultaneously granted the Association an easement to access the lower level of the parking deck, allowing it to make repairs to the structure and the deck's sprinkler and draining systems. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. E (Grant of Easement), at 1-4.)
On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a declaratory judgment (1) that it holds title to the land located underneath the parking deck and (2) that an easement by necessity or implication exists concerning the land under the deck. See generally Compl. Plaintiff also asks for an award of attorneys' fees and punitive damages for Declarant's actions. Id. ¶¶ 41-45. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all counts of its Complaint on September 29, 2023. (Docket.) Defendants responded with an Objection to Plaintiff's Motion and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of its own. Id.
A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when '"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law."' Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I. 2003)).
'"[A] party who opposes a motion for summary judgment carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions."' National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996)). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the Court '"conclude[s], after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]"' DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 129 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Pereira v. Fitzgerald, 21 A.3d 369, 372 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Resolution of this dispute centers on the Court's interpretation of the Rhode Island Condominium Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 36.1 of title 34 (the Act). Under Plaintiff's reading of the statute, Declarant improperly revoked the lower level of the parking deck from the residents' ownership through a series of amendments. See generally Pl.'s Mem Declarant counters that they always retained ownership of the ground floor, and the amendments were simply a means of effectuating Declarant's development intent. See generally Defs.' Mem.
As the Court analyzes the Act, it bears noting that, "[w]hen construing a statute '[the Court's] ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.'" Interstate Navigation Co. v Division of Public Utilities, 824 A.2d 1282, 1287 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I. 2002)). During its inquiry, the Court must "adhere to the basic proposition of establishing and effectuating the intent of the Legislature[, . . . which] is accomplished from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute." In re Estate of Gervais, 770 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I. 2001)). '"If the language of a statute is clear on its face, then its plain meaning must generally be given effect."' In re Estate of Gervais, 770 A.2d at 880 (quoting Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co., 742 A.2d 282, 290 (R.I. 1999)). "It is a well-known maxim of statutory interpretation that [the] Court 'will not construe a statute to reach an absurd [or unintended] result."' Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I. 1996)).
Enacted in 1982 and incorporating most of the language of the Uniform Condominium Act, the Act became the governing legislation for all condominiums established in Rhode Island after July 1 1982. Section 34-36.1-1.02. America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 127 (R.I. 2004) (citing § 34-36.1-1.02(a)(1)), decision clarified on reargument, America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 870 A.2d 434 (R.I. 2005) "'The Act as a whole contains...
To continue reading
Request your trial