In re Estate of Gervais

• Decision Date: 14 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-64-APPEAL.,2000-64-APPEAL.
• Citation: 770 A.2d 877
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Maurice A. GERVAIS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

770 A.2d 877

In re ESTATE of Maurice A. GERVAIS.

No. 2000-64-APPEAL.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 14, 2001.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Paul A. Baillargeon, North Smithfield, Richard H. Gregory, III, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Richard R. Ackerman, Woonsocket, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case comes before this Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. Jeanette Gervais (Jeanette) appeals from a Superior Court judgment reversing an order issued by the Probate Court of the City of Woonsocket (the Probate Court). After hearing counsels' arguments and considering the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and we will decide this appeal summarily.

In 1998, Maurice A. Gervais (the decedent) died and his will was duly filed for probate in the Woonsocket Probate Court. His daughter, Jeanette, was named executrix to the will. In accordance with G.L.1956 § 33-25-4, Lillian Gervais (Lillian), the decedent's widow, elected to waive and renounce the bequests made to her in the decedent's will; instead, pursuant to § 33-25-4, she claimed her right to a life estate interest in the decedent's real estate, namely, the marital domicile (the property).¹ Once her claim was granted, Lillian vacated the property and entered into a written lease with a third party for a period of two years, terminable immediately upon her death or by court order.

Meanwhile, Jeanette filed a motion in the Probate Court to "Enjoin and Restrain Widow from Leasing Premises." In support of her motion, Jeanette asserted that Lillian had "abandoned" the premises when she vacated it and that she had failed to pay her proportionate share of the real estate taxes assessed against the property. On April 5, 1999, the Probate Court granted Jeanette's motion and ordered that "[t]he interest of Lillian Gervais in the real estate * * * shall be valued and paid over to her in lieu of her interest in said property."² Lillian timely appealed to the Superior Court for a de novo review.

On appeal, a justice of the Superior Court, sitting without a jury, reversed the decision of the Probate Court. The trial justice determined that the common law rule permitting the holder of a life estate to rent his or her property is applicable because Lillian's statutory right to elect a life estate in the decedent's real estate was not conditioned upon her continued occupancy of the property. The trial justice then found that the Probate Court exceeded its statutory authority when it involuntarily terminated Lillian's life estate and ordered its value to be paid to her. Jeanette now appeals that Superior Court order.

In her appeal, Jeanette contends that "[h]istorically, a widow's right of election was provided to afford the surviving spouse a place to live after the passing of their spouse," and that the "statutory lifeestate was intended to and did replace rights of dower and curtesy as they existed on the effective date of this statute." She offers no decided authority that supports her position; instead, she simply observes that the Legislature did not specifically confer upon a surviving spouse the right to vacate and rent a premises in which he or she claimed a life estate. From this observation, she asserts that Lillian abandoned her life estate interest in the property when she vacated and attempted to rent it to a third party. Such an interpretation, we believe, would produce an absurd result .

"Statutory interpretations by a trial justice present questions of law that this Court reviews de novo." Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co., 742 A.2d 282, 290 (R.I.1999). "In construing statutes, this Court `adhere[s] to the basic proposition of establishing and effectuating the intent of the Legislature[, * * * which] is accomplished from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute.'" State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I.2001) (quoting Howard Union of Teachers v. State, 478 A.2d 563, 565 (R.I.1984)). "If the language of a statute is clear on its face, then its plain meaning must generally be given effect." Skaling, 742 A.2d at 290 (citing Gilbane Co. v. Poulas, 576 A.2d 1195, 1196 (R.I.1990)). However, "[i]t is a well-known maxim of statutory interpretation that this Court `will not construe a statute to reach an absurd [or unintended] result.'" Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I.2000) (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)).

In 1978 the Legislature abolished the common law and/or statutory rights to dower and curtesy. See § 33-25-1. In their place, the Legislature provided that:

"Whenever any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving, the real estate owned by the decedent in fee simple at his or her death shall descend and pass to the husband or wife for his or her natural life subject, however, to any encumbrances existing at death * * *." Section 33-25-2.

Accordingly, § 33-25-2 vests a life estate in "a surviving spouse in the real property owned in fee simple by his or her spouse at the time of his or her death * * *." Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 349 (R.I. 1997). In § 33-25-4, the Legislature also provided:

"If any estate, real or personal, be devised or bequeathed to a surviving spouse, the devise or bequest shall bar the life estate unless the surviving spouse shall, within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the qualifications of the fiduciary of the estate of the deceased spouse, file in the probate court granting probate a written statement waiving and renouncing the devise and bequest and claiming his or her life estate in the real estate of the decedent. If any of this real estate be located in any city or town other than that in which the will of the decedent is probated, the waiver and claim shall also be filed in the records of deeds in each city and town where the real estate is located." (Emphases added.)

Although § 33-25-4 does not specifically confer upon a surviving spouse the right to vacate and/or rent his or her real estate, a plain reading of the statute requires the conclusion that such a right exists. To begin with, although chapter 25 of title 33 abolishes the common law rights of dower and curtesy, nowhere in that statutory scheme does the Legislature ever suggest that it has abolished the common law rights long associated with life estates.³ Additionally, § 33-25-4 serves to grant a surviving spouse the right to waive any devise or bequest made to him or her by the decedent and to claim a life estate in all of the real estate owned in fee simple by the decedent. Real property or real estate is defined as "[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land." Black's Law Dictionary 1271, 1234 (7th ed.1999). Our Legislature also has defined the term real estate. See, e.g., G.L.1956 § 5-20.5-1(3) ("includes leaseholds as well as any and every interest or estate in land"); G.L.1956 § 33-5-1(2) ("lands, tenements, and...