Blundon v. Taylor

• Citation: 770 A.2d 658,364 Md. App. 1,364 Md. 1
• Decision Date: 17 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 33,33
• Parties: Montague BLUNDON, III v. Shirley TAYLOR.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

770 A.2d 658

364 Md. 1

364 Md. App. 1

Montague BLUNDON, III v. Shirley TAYLOR.

No. 33, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 17, 2001.

M. Natalie McSherry (Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Barry J. Nace (Paulson & Nace, on brief), Washington, DC, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY,¹ RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, and HARRELL, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The issue this case presents involves the validity of "faxing"—transmitting by facsimile—a pleading or paper to the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office. The respondent, Shirley Taylor, filed, pursuant to the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (the "Act"), Maryland Code (1974,1995 Repl.Vol), §§ 3-2A-01 through 3-2A-09 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,² a medical malpractice claim against the petitioner, Montague Blundon, III, M.D., in the Health Claims Arbitration Office (the "HCAO"). The panel that heard the claim issued an award in favor of the respondent, and the petitioner sought its modification, transmitting the request both by facsimile, which was timely received and docketed by the HCAO, and by regular mail, which arrived in the office one day late. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County having dismissed his challenge to the panel's award, albeit on other grounds,³ the petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, that court affirmed the trial court's judgment, but on the basis that the petitioner's transmission of his request to modify the panel award via facsimile did not constitute a timely filing of that request. We granted the petitioner's Petition for Certiorari to review that holding. See Blundon v. Taylor, 354 Md. 330, 731 A.2d 439 (1999). We shall affirm.

I.

Judicial review of Health Claims Arbitration awards are controlled by § 3-2A-06. In pertinent part, it provides:

"(a) A party may reject an award or the assessment of costs under an award for any reason. A notice of rejection must be filed with the Director and the arbitration panel and served on the other parties or their counsel within 30 days after the award is served upon the rejecting party, or, if a timely application for modification or correction has been filed within 10 days after a disposition of the application by the panel, whichever is greater.

"(b) (1) At or before the time specified in subsection (a) of this section for filing and serving a notice of rejection, the party rejecting the award shall file an action in court to nullify the award or the assessment of costs under the award and shall file a copy of the action with the Director. Failure to file this action timely in court shall constitute a withdrawal of the notice of rejection. Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the procedures applicable to the action including the form and necessary allegations in the initial pleading shall be governed by the Maryland Rules. The Director need not be named a party to any action under this section."

Thus, for judicial review to occur, there must be a rejection of the arbitration award, notice of which is timely filed on the Director of the HCAO, the arbitration panel and the other parties or their counsel and a timely filed court action to nullify the award, a copy of which is also filed with the Director. Notice of rejection, like the action to nullify, is timely if filed and served within 30 days after service of the award on the party rejecting it or within 10 days after the decision rendered in response to a timely filed application to modify or correct the award.

Section 3-2A-05(h) addresses the procedure for filing applications for modification or correction of an award. It provides, as pertinent, that "[a] party may apply to the arbitration panel to modify or correct an award as to liability, damages, or costs in accordance with § 3-222 of this article." Section 3-222, of the Arbitration and Award Subtitle of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in turn, provides in pertinent part: "(a) Application.—A party may apply to the arbitrators to modify or correct an award within 20 days after the delivery of the award to the applicant."

A written copy of the panel's award in favor of the respondent was served on the petitioner on April 9, 1997. The petitioner then had 20 days, or until April 29th, to seek modification of that award and, foregoing the right to seek modification, 30 days, or until May 9th, to seek judicial review. On the other hand, if, as the petitioner did in this case, modification was sought, the petition for judicial review could be filed within 10 days after the decision on the application. In this case, the Panel Chair, in an order dated May 14, 1997, and received by the petitioner on May 16, 1997, denied the requested modification. Thus, if his application for modification were to be timely, the petitioner had until May 27, 1997⁴ to reject the award and file an action to nullify.

On April 28th, the petitioner "faxed" to the HCAO his Request For Modification of Arbitration Award. It was received that same day, and was so stamped by the HCAO. The petitioner, on the same day, also mailed the same paper to the HCAO, by regular mail. The mailed copy was received in the Health Claims office on April 30, 1997, one day after the deadline for filing the request for modification, a matter that is not in dispute.

II.

A.

Inasmuch as the request for modification that was mailed was received untimely, but the copy that was "faxed" was timely received, the question we must address is the propriety of docketing that copy, whether, in other words, its receipt and docketing were valid. Because "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the Maryland Rules shall apply to all practice and procedure issues arising under [the Health Claims Arbitration Act]," § 3-2A-02 (d), we seek the answer in Maryland Rule 1-322, which provides:

"(a) Generally. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that a judge of that court may accept the filing, in which event the judge shall note on the papers the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. No filing of a pleading or paper may be made by transmitting it directly to the court by electronic transmission, except pursuant to an electronic filing system approved under Rule 16-307.

"(b) Photocopies; Facsimile Copies. A photocopy or facsimile copy of a pleading or paper, once filed with the court, shall be treated as an original for all court purposes. The attorney or party filing the copy shall retain the original from which the filed copy was made for production to the court upon the request of the court or any party."

The inquiry is one involving the interpretation of the rule.

"To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same canons and principles of construction used to interpret statutes." State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274, 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993). See Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 526, 740 A.2d 1004, 1011 (1999)

("the canons of statutory construction ... are also generally applicable in respect to rule construction"); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998); State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997) ("In construing a rule, we apply principles of interpretation similar to those used to construe a statute."); In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994) ("We have repeatedly stated that the canons and principles we follow in construing statutes apply equally to an interpretation of our rules."); State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 24, 637 A.2d 1193, 1195 (1994) ("The canons and rules of construction that guide the interpretation of statutes apply equally when interpreting rules of procedure."). See also Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 563, 611 A.2d 581, 583 (1992); State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 533, 555 A.2d 494, 496 (1989); O'Donnell v. McGann, 310 Md. 342, 350, 529 A.2d 372, 376 (1987); In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 481, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986); Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980).

We stated some of the applicable canons and rules of construction in Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75, 627 A.2d at 1057:

"In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to the words of the rule. When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further.... Only when the language of the rule is ambiguous is it necessary that we look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.... We are also to give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.... Finally, we seek to give the rule a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense...." (Citations omitted). See also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000)

; Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578-79, 683 A.2d 512, 517-18 (1996).

B.

Applying these rules, the petitioner reaches a different interpretation of Rule 1-322 than does the Court of Special Appeals. According to the petitioner, giving "meaning to all relevant provisions [of the rule] results in a finding that, though the mere transmission by facsimile is not filing, where a paper received by HCAO through facsimile is docketed, it should thereafter be treated as an original document properly filed." He reasons:

"The plain words of Rule 1-322(a) provide only that the `filing' may not be made by `transmitting it directly to the court by electronic transmission.' The ordinary meaning of such a provision would lead to the result that the transmission itself is not filing and that the risk of transmission remains with the sender. Thus, unlike service by mail, which Rule

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