Bradshaw v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 27 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. B041422,B041422
• Citation: 270 Cal.Rptr. 711,221 Cal.App.3d 908
• Parties: Patrick BRADSHAW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 711

270 Cal.Rptr. 711

221 Cal.App.3d 908

Patrick BRADSHAW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B041422.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

June 27, 1990.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

July 26, 1990.

Review Denied Oct. 30, 1990.

Marr & Marchant, Cecil Marr and Diane Marchant, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

James K. Hahn, City Atty., Frederick N. Merkin, Sr. Asst. City Atty., Christine C. Patterson, Asst. City Atty., Judith E. Reel, Deputy City Atty., De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, S. Robert Ambrose, Asst. County Counsel and Patrick T. Meyers, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.

BOREN, Associate Justice.

After a public Board of Rights disciplinary hearing, the Los Angeles Police Department suspended plaintiff Patrick Bradshaw from his duties as a police officer of the City of Los Angeles for five days without pay because plaintiff and a fellow officer had detained two uniformed sheriff's deputies at gunpoint for approximately half an hour. The trial court sustained demurrers to causes of action which alleged that defendants had violated privileges of confidentiality and privacy by releasing to the public the results of the officer's disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff has appealed, ¹ but we find that no statutory right of confidentiality or constitutional right of privacy applies. We affirm.

FACTS

At approximately midnight on September 15, 1987, plaintiff and his partner were on patrol in their police vehicle. Plaintiff had been advised of "shake downs" either by persons impersonating police officers or by peace officers acting improperly. Plaintiff was also aware that two weeks previously a deputy sheriff's car, containing uniforms, a badge and guns, had been stolen.

While plaintiff and his partner were on patrol, they saw a plain, unmarked vehicle with its headlights out, two people wearing sheriff's uniforms and one wearing civilian clothes. Soon thereafter, they saw the same vehicle traveling on the street and still with its headlights out. Plaintiff radioed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Communications Division, indicated his location and stated that "we got a possible [robbery] suspects['] vehicle." Plaintiff and his partner stopped the vehicle and detained the two occupants, who were, in fact, on-duty and uniformed sheriff's deputies.

Plaintiff and his partner drew their weapons and ordered the deputies to lie face down on the pavement. The deputies complied but protested that they were sheriff's deputies. They were detained for approximately half an hour while plaintiff radioed LAPD Communications Division to attempt to verify the identity of, as plaintiff explained on the radio, " 'two perturbed Sheriff's Deputies.' " Eventually, an LAPD sergeant arrived at the scene, and one of the deputies was permitted to get up from the pavement and call his field supervisor from the radio in his own vehicle. The field supervisor for the sheriff's deputies arrived and obtained their release.

An LAPD internal investigation ensued. Plaintiff was subsequently charged by the Chief of Police with one count of misconduct in that he "unnecessarily" took the two on-duty uniformed sheriff's deputies "into custody at gunpoint and forced them to lie prone on the street." Plaintiff had a hearing before the Board of Rights which was open to the public and news media although no members of the press or public attended. After the hearing, the Board of Rights determined that while there may have been sufficient cause to stop the deputies' vehicle, there was insufficient probable cause after seeing their badges to place them in a "felony-prone position." Pursuant to the recommendation of the Board of Rights, plaintiff was suspended by the department for five days without pay.

On February 1, 1988, the same day as plaintiff's suspension, Police Chief Daryl Gates and the City of Los Angeles provided Sheriff Sherman Block, the County of Los Angeles and news media representatives with a portion of the transcript of the Board of Rights hearing and other information regarding the investigation of the incident, the hearing and the suspension order. The information disseminated had been obtained during the confidential internal investigation Thereafter, plaintiff filed his complaint in superior court. The second cause of action, against all defendants, alleged negligence per se as a result of violating a statutory right of confidentiality (Pen.Code, § 832.7) ² regarding peace officer personnel records. The third cause of action, against the city defendants, and the fourth cause of action, against the county defendants, alleged violations of the constitutional right to privacy. (Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.)

for the purpose of "discovering and correcting weaknesses and failures in [LAPD] practices, procedures and personnel," but then the information was released to placate the Sheriff's Department and humiliate plaintiff. On February 5, 1988, Sheriff Block and the County also forwarded to news media representatives essentially the same information received from Chief Gates and the City regarding the incident for the alleged purpose of humiliating plaintiff. The information was disseminated to the general public in print and by the electronic news media.

After it sustained demurrers without leave to amend as to these causes of action, the trial court dismissed them. In its written ruling, the trial court stated that, as to the second cause of action alleging negligence per se from a violation of Penal Code section 832.7, the statute applies only to discovery requests by litigants for information in police officer personnel records, and that the statute was not intended to prohibit public officials from disseminating to the public information about agency disciplinary procedures. As to the third and fourth causes of action, the court ruled that, while in some instances there may be statutory privileges or nondisclosure provisions, no constitutional right prevents disclosure of records which reflect the conduct of the public's business.

DISCUSSION

I. NO NEGLIGENT BREACH OF A STATUTORY RIGHT OF CONFIDENTIALITY

Does Penal Code section 832.7 prohibit law enforcement agencies from disclosing the findings and conclusions of a Board of Rights hearing to the public? We hold that under the circumstances of this case it does not.

A. Interpretation of Penal Code Section 832.7

Plaintiff contends that several related statutes, in particular Penal Code section 832.7, make the information disclosed by the defendants confidential, and that the statutory violation by the defendants establishes negligence per se. The contention hinges on the word "confidential" as it appears in that portion of Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) which provides that "Peace officer personnel records ... are confidential and shall not be disclosed In determining the meaning of statutory language, the basic guidelines are well established. As explained in People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154, "Our analysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40 [127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].) In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves. (Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.) When the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. (Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473].) When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307 [162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859]; Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 156 [118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 P.2d 46]; Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 273 .)" (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1007-1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.)

in any criminal or civil proceeding except by [appropriate judicial] discovery...."

With respect to the wording of the statute at issue here, the operative word, "confidential," in Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) is in its context susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. Plaintiff urges that, since the word "confidential" is followed by the word "and," the notion of confidentiality is a separate, independent concept which makes the personnel records privileged material. On the other hand, viewing the word "confidential" as descriptive and prefatory to the specific legislative dictate which follows right after the word, it is reasonable to conclude, as did the trial court, that the peace officer personnel records are confidential only in the sense that, as stated in the ensuing statutory language, such records, "shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by [appropriate judicial] discovery...." Since the statute specifically refers only to restrictions on disclosure in "criminal or civil proceedings," the statute thus does not prohibit a public agency from disclosing the records to the public.

Because the language in the statute itself provides no definitive answer, we must look to extrinsic aids to place the statute in its proper context and ascertain the legislative intent. The statute must be viewed in its proper context and...