Brendan H, In re

• Decision Date: 03 September 1975
• Citation: 372 N.Y.S.2d 473,82 Misc.2d 1077
• Parties: In the Matter of a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, BRENDAN H, Respondent.
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 473

372 N.Y.S.2d 473

82 Misc.2d 1077

In the Matter of a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, BRENDAN H, Respondent.

Family Court, Schenectady County.

Sept. 3, 1975.

Daniel C. Houlihan, Watervliet, for respondent; Raymond Loucks, County Atty., Flagg Herrick, Schenectady, of counsel.

Eli I. Taub, Law Guardian, Schenectady.

DECISION

HOWARD A. LEVINE, Judge.

The respondent has been accused of committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of Criminal Mischief. The events leading to the filing of the petition against him took place during the evening of January 4, 1975, when a group of five Niskayuna High School students, who had been attending a school-sponsored athletic event, intentionally rolled over a 1974 Volkswagen in the school parking lot. The car received damage to its fenders, door handle and radio antenna and required extensive repairs although no competent evidence of the value thereof was introduced. The owner of the damaged vehicle happened also to have been dean of students at the school.

Respondent's participation in this incident was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the uncontradicted testimony of a witness who was one of the other boys involved and by an oral admission made to the same dean of students during an interview in his office at the school one month later. This was the only evidence introduced at the fact finding hearing, however, and since the witness and respondent were accomplices, the legal sufficiency of the petitioner's case rests on the admissibility of respondent's oral statement. Cf. Matter of Eric R., 34 A.D.2d 402, 312 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2nd Dept. 1970); and Matter of Steven B., 30 A.D.2d 442, 293 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1st Dept. 1968).

Respondent was given the opportunity for a full hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession but chose to limit the scope of that inquiry to cross-examination of the dean of students. Based upon his entire testimony, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that although the dean might have been forceful in putting questions to the respondent, the brevity of the interview, and the other circumstances described by him established that the statement was made voluntarily.

Concededly, however, respondent was not advised of his Constitutional rights before being questioned, and it is the contention of the law guardian that the holding of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974), and other cases, compel the exclusion of his confession. That case held that school authorities are agents of the State and therefore subject to the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution regarding unreasonable searches and seizures as to students under their control. Respondent argues that as agents of the State, school authorities are similarly constrained in questioning students by the Constitutional requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

In my view, respondent's statement is admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings, on two grounds. First, under the express language of the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda, the mandate to advise the subject of his rights only applies to Custodial interrogation. The test of whether a given interrogation is custodial, as adopted by the Court of Appeals in People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 232--233, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967), is an objective one, namely, was the subject physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, or led to believe, as a reasonable man, that he was so deprived? The test is not whether the police considered the subject to be a 'target' of their investigation, or what the suspect thought, but rather '* * * what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant's position * * *'. People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860, 256 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1969); People v. Rodney P., supra; People v. Lee, 33 A.D.2d 397, 308 N.Y.S.2d 412 (4th dept. 1970). Here, the interrogation took place at the school by a school official having no power of arrest, and following which respondent was permitted to leave, either upon the arrival of his parent, or to return to his classes following the questioning. Under these circumstances respondent could not reasonably have believed that he was in custody while being questioned alone by the dean of students.

Interrogation by non-police 'state agents', even at their official offices, generally has been held non-custodial in numerous cases. See United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471 (2nd Cir. 1969) (IRS agents); United States v. Stamp, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 458 F.2d 759 (1971) (IRS agents); United States v. Dalton, 465 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972) (Veterans Administration investigators); State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 291 A.2d (1972) (welfare fraud investigators); In Re Grand Jury, 362 F.Supp. 870 (M.D.Pa.1973) (asst. U.S. Attorneys) and People v. Accavallo, 57 Misc.2d 264, 291 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Cty.Ct.1968) (Labor Department agents). And the interrogation of a student by a school principal was held non-custodial in People v. Shipp,96 Ill.App.2d 364, 239 N.E.2d 296 (1968).

Apart from the factual issues of whether the interrogation conducted here was custodial, I further hold that school officials interrogating students concerning misconduct occurring within the precincts of the school are not subject to Miranda, at least when not acting in concert with or as agents of the police, neither of which is present here. Matter of Scott D., s...