Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 14–1405 RC
Decision Date | 19 February 2015 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 14–1405 RC |
Citation | 80 F.Supp.3d 90 |
Parties | Antonio Brown, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Alana Michelle Hecht, D.C. Disability Law Group, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Veronica A. Porter, Victoria Lynne Healy, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Antonio Brown is an eighteen-year-old student protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. Plaintiff initiated this action to request an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred while prosecuting administrative claims under the IDEA. Defendant, the District of Columbia, has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment disputing the reasonableness of Plaintiff's request. Because the Court determines that part, but not all, of Plaintiff's request is reasonable, the Court will grant in part and deny in part each party's motion and award fees and costs in the total amount of $31,340.75.
On September 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint against the District of Columbia Public Schools system (“DCPS”), alleging four violations of the IDEA. See Hr'g Officer's Decision (“HOD”), ECF No. 7–3, Ex. 1 at 1, 3. Plaintiff argued that DCPS denied him the free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that the IDEA guarantees him based on the following infractions: (1) DCPS failed to identify, locate, and evaluate Plaintiff for special education and related services beginning in November 2011 when Plaintiff's parent visited his school to discuss the student's lack of progress; (2) DCPS did not timely evaluate Plaintiff after his parent requested an assessment in May 2013; (3) DCPS failed to provide prior written notice to Plaintiff's parent of its decision not to evaluate Plaintiff on August 8, 2013; and, (4) DCPS did not render Plaintiff eligible on August 8, 2013, for special education and related services, though Plaintiff had a specific learning disability and experienced emotional disturbance. See Compl., ECF No. 1–2, Ex. B at 16, 20–21, 29 (“Due Process Complaint”); see also HOD at 3.
After an administrative hearing that lasted one-and-a-half days, the hearing officer submitted a written order granting Plaintiff funding for tuition, counseling services, and transportation for School C from the date of the hearing officer's decision until DCPS could complete an initial evaluation of Plaintiff's entitlement to special education and related services. See HOD at 19. The hearing officer additionally required DCPS to fund independent functional behavioral and psychiatric assessments of Plaintiff, as well as to conduct a speech-language evaluation, which the local educational agency recommended.See id. at 21–22.
Alana Hecht, Esq., represented Plaintiff throughout the administrative process.
See generally Hecht Invoice, ECF No. 7–4, Ex. 2. On August 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court, attaching an invoice for DCPS in the amount of $47,475.31 for attorneys' fees, paralegal fees, and costs. See Compl. ¶ 72. Plaintiff and Defendant then filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the reasonableness of Plaintiff's invoice. In particular, Defendant seeks a reduction in Plaintiff's requested fees on the bases that (1) Plaintiff has not proven that his attorney's rate is prevailing in the community, and Plaintiff therefore should receive 75% of the fee rates in the Laffey Matrix, which is reserved for complex cases; (2) Plaintiff achieved limited success at the administrative hearing; and (3) work spent on Plaintiff's proposed suspension was not part of the due process complaint. The Court now turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.
A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees must demonstrate prevailing party status and reasonableness of the fees requested, both in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. Briggs v. District of Columbia, No. 14–0002, 73 F.Supp.3d 59, 61, 2014 WL 5860358, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2014). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court will grant summary judgment if the movant shows that “ ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). On the other hand, a court will grant summary judgment against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A district court may reward “reasonable attorneys' fees” to a prevailing party under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In so doing, the Court follows a two-step inquiry: First, the Court must decide whether the party seeking attorneys' fees is the prevailing party;1 and second, the Court must establish whether the fees requested are reasonable. See, e.g., McAllister v. District of Columbia, 21 F.Supp.3d 94, 99 (D.D.C.2014) ; Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C.2010).
The fairness of a plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees is based upon the number of hours devoted to litigation multiplied by the hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that both of these factors are reasonable. In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995). A plaintiff can fulfill this duty by offering to the court the attorney's billing practices, skill, experience, and reputation, as well as the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. See McAllister, 21 F.Supp.3d at 100. If the plaintiff provides sufficient and convincing evidence on these matters, the number of hours billed and the attorney's hourly rates are deemed reasonable, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing. See Blackman v. District of Columbia, 677 F.Supp.2d 169, 172 (D.D.C.2010) ; see also Watkins v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004). If both parties, however, do not provide adequate evidence demonstrating that the hourly rates are reasonable, the Court has discretion to determine the amount of that rate by reference to the Laffey Matrix.2 See McAllister, 21 F.Supp.3d at 100 ; see also Santamaria v. District of Columbia, 875 F.Supp.2d 12, 20 (D.D.C.2012).
Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the Laffey Matrix when determining his attorney's hourly rate. See Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 7–1 at 15. The purpose of the Laffey Matrix is to determine the reasonableness of the fees sought. See McAllister, 21 F.Supp.3d at 108. Federal courts are not required to award Laffey rates but may rely on the complexity of the case to establish whether such fees are warranted. See Flores v. District of Columbia, 857 F.Supp.2d 15, 21 (D.D.C.2012). A plaintiff's burden in establishing a reasonable hourly rate requires a showing of at least three elements: “the attorneys' billing practices; the attorney's skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” McAllister, 21 F.Supp.3d at 108 ( ). Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit outlining his attorney's skill, experience, and reputation in special education law. See Hecht Aff., ECF No. 7–5, Ex. 3 ¶ 14 ( ). Plaintiff has not, however, adequately provided evidence showing that the Laffey amount is the prevailing market rate.
While Plaintiff argues that this Court has awarded his attorney full Laffey rates in other IDEA cases, see Hecht Aff. ¶ 37, there is no binding approach to determining what attorneys' fees are proper in IDEA litigation. See Sykes v. District of Columbia, 870 F.Supp.2d 86, 94 (D.D.C.2012) (). Plaintiff's attorney asserts in a supplemental affidavit that her clients have paid full Laffey rates in the past,3 see Hecht Suppl. Aff., ECF No. 10–3 at ¶¶ 1–2, but this fact alone is not sufficient to show prevailing market rates in the District of Columbia for IDEA cases. See Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 62 (D.D.C.2011) (). By failing to associate Laffey with the prevailing market rate, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's requested award should be reduced to 75% of the full Laffey rates due to the case's lack of complexity. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 9–1, at 9. Laffey rates represent presumptive maximum rates for complex federal litigation . See McAllister, 21 F.Supp.3d at...
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