Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Mo.

• Citation: 327 S.W.2d 487
• Decision Date: 15 September 1959
• Docket Number: No. 30187,30187
• Parties: BUSSMANN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a corporation (Petitioner), Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Stephen J. Millett, W. E. Freeland, Charles Cates, being members of and constituting the Industrial Commission of Missouri, Division of Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, a public quasi corporation of the State of Missouri; and Ora F. Abbott, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 487

327 S.W.2d 487

BUSSMANN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a corporation (Petitioner), Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Stephen J. Millett, W. E.

Freeland, Charles Cates, being members of and constituting

the Industrial Commission of Missouri, Division of

Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industrial

Relations, a public quasi corporation of the State of

Missouri; and Ora F. Abbott, Respondents.

No. 30187.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Sept. 15, 1959.

David E. Horn, St. Louis, for appellant.

George Schwartz, Jefferson City, for Division of Employment Security.

Lloyd G. Poole, Jefferson City, for Industrial Commission of Missouri.

BRADY, Commissioner.

Respondent Abbott's claim for benefits was filed with the Commission on April 3, 1956, and was duly assigned to a claims deputy for determination. The claims deputy determined that the respondent Abbott quit 'with good cause attributable to work.' Appellant filed its appeal and a hearing was had before an Appeals Tribunal as provided by Section 288.190 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which entered its decision affirming the claims deputy. Appellant then applied to the Commission for leave to appeal from the determination of the Appeals Tribunal as provided by Section 288.200, supra, but the application was denied by the Commission on the grounds that the 'findings of fact of the Appeals Tribunal are supported by competent and substantial evidence and that the decision of the Appeals Tribunal was made in accordance with the law.' Appellant then filed its petition for review in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis as provided by Section 288.210, supra, and that court found the decision supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record and affirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission. This appeal follows an unsuccessful motion by appellant for judgment as prayed in its petition or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

The facts are agreed to by the parties and show that respondent Abbott had worked for appellant for three years and two months prior to March 2, 1956, and that on that date she took a leave of absence for one month because of sickness and returned to appellant's factory on April 2, 1956. Upon her return she was offered the same job she had upon leaving, but refused it. No other work was offered to respondent and she left the factory and the next day filed her claim for unemployment compensation. Respondent had been operating a solder cutting machine which had a quota and her refusal to return to that work was based upon her doctor's advice that at her age she should not operate any machine because it made her too nervous. Respondent was 49 years of age when she gave testimony and stated that while she had made her quota on the solder cutting machine, it tired her and pushed her to do it, and made her nervous. She had not been in good health for five years and was under doctor's care at the time of this occurrence due to menopause, and had been going to the doctor twice a week for shots.

Section 288.050 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., as amended, Laws of 1957, p. 531, section 1, V.A.M.S., provides:

'1. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, a claimant shall be disqualified for waiting week credit or benefits until after he has earned wages equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount if the deputy finds

'(1) that he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer; * * *'

The parties concede that this is a case of first impression in this State, there being no statutory definition of the language, 'good cause attributable to his work or to his employer,' and no previous decision where the courts of this State have had an occasion to interpret that language.

It is appellant's position that respondent Abbott left her work voluntarily due to her menopause difficulties and that these difficulties were not attributable to her work. Appellant further urges that respondent Abbott had the burden of proving her entitlement to benefits and that she failed to sustain this burden, and thus the trial court erred in finding that the decision of the Commission upholding her freedom from disqualification was supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. The respondents contend that the issue at hand is an ultimate question of fact for the Commission to determine, and that under the law, its decision respecting that finding cannot be disturbed on review, because there was substantial evidence to support it and because the Commission, upon the whole record, could reasonably have reached its conclusion. Constitution of Missouri, 1945, Art. V, Sec. 22, V.A.M.S.; Meyer v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 240 Mo.App. 1022, 223 S.W.2d 835.

We cannot agree with respondents that our function in this case is so limited. As this court said in Kroger Co. v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 314 S.W.2d 250, 254, where the same contention was made:

'We do not so consider the nature of the issue. Where, as here, the facts are agreed upon, the question 'of the award to be entered is one of law in which the conclusions of the Compensation Commission will not be binding upon the appellate court.' Horrell v. Chase Hotel, Mo.App., 174 S.W.2d 881, 886; Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77, 80. An interpretation of a statute by an administrative body does not preclude, restrict or control the right of a complete review of such issue by the appellate court.'

The primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain the lawmakers' intent from the words used, if possible, and to put upon the statutory language, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning to promote the object of the Act. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77, 80. The question thus presented for our decision is the meaning of the words, 'good cause attributable to his work or to his employer,' as that language is used in Section 288.050, supra, of the Missouri Employment Security Law. However, it is not upon the lack of 'good cause' that appellant places its main reliance, but it strenuously urges that the cause, however good it might be, does not meet the requirement of being 'attributable to her work or her employer.'

In this connection, the claims deputy found:

'The claimant had been on sick leave due to high blood pressure and returned on 3-2-56 but refused reassignment to her former job as solder cutter operator, because her doctor advised her not to do machine work. She quit with good cause attributable to work.'

The ultimate finding of the Appeals Tribunal, affirmed by the Commission and the circuit court was,

'The Referee finds that the claimant left her work voluntarily with good cause attributable to such work. As a result of illness and on the advice of her doctor the claimant's former type of work was no longer suitable for her. If she had continued to perform this type of work her health would have been endangered.'

The doctor's letter was presented and admitted into evidence and states:

'May 2, 1956

'To whom it may concern:----

'I have treated Mrs. Ora Abbott for a hypertension for which I suggested rest. The hypertension is now under control.

/s/Karl J. Balazs, M.D.'

The rule is clearly established that the burden of proving a claimant's right to benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law rests upon the claimant, Haynes v. Unemployment Service Commission, supra; Producers' Produce Co. v....