Coffman v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1640-15-3
| Citation | 795 S.E.2d 178, 67 Va.App. 163 |
| Case Date | January 10, 2017 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Virginia |
67 Va.App. 163
795 S.E.2d 178
Michael Scott Coffman
v.
Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 1640-15-3
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Lexington.
January 10, 2017
Dirk B. Padgett (Dirk Padgett Law PLLC, on brief), Roanoke, for appellant.
Victoria Johnson, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Petty, Russell and Malveaux
OPINION BY JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY
Michael Scott Coffman was convicted of driving while under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2–266. Coffman argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the certificate of analysis from a blood sample that was obtained by a nurse who was not designated by an order of the circuit court to withdraw blood; he argues that such prior designation is required by Code § 18.2–268.5. For the following reason, we disagree and affirm Coffman's conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 11, 2015, during the investigation of a one-car accident in Roanoke County, Coffman was arrested for driving while under the influence. The arresting officer took Coffman to LewisGale Regional Hospital because he complained of shoulder pain. After the arresting officer informed Coffman of Virginia's implied consent law,1 Coffman consented to a blood test. A registered nurse at the hospital drew a sample of Coffman's blood.
At trial, Coffman objected to admission into evidence of the certificate of analysis from the blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .208%. He argued that the certificate was not admissible because the registered nurse had not been designated by court order to withdraw blood for purposes of determining alcohol content and that such prior designation was required by Code § 18.2–268.5.2 The trial court overruled his objection, admitted the certificate of analysis into evidence, and convicted Coffman of driving while under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2–266. Coffman now appeals his conviction, challenging the trial court's decision to admit the certificate of analysis into evidence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's evidentiary ruling is reviewed "under an abuse of discretion standard." Boyce v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 644, 649, 691 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2010). Furthermore,
[a] trial court "by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.... The abuse-of-discretion standard
includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions." Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260, 661 S.E.2d 415, 445 (2008) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 [116 S.Ct. 2035, 2047, 135 L.Ed.2d 392] (1996) ). To the extent that determinations ... involve the interpretation of a statute or the common law, such an interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. See
Woodard v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 276, 280, 754 S.E.2d 309, 311 (2014) ; Country Vintner, Inc. v. Louis Latour, Inc., 272 Va. 402, 410, 634 S.E.2d 745, 750 (2006).
Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va.App. 561, 568, 760 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014).
III. ANALYSIS
Code § 18.2–268.5 lists those persons authorized to withdraw blood for purposes of determining the blood alcohol level of a person charged with driving while intoxicated. The statute provides, in relevant part,
For purposes of this article, only a physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, phlebotomist, graduate laboratory technician or a technician or nurse designated by order of a circuit court acting upon the recommendation of a licensed physician ... shall withdraw blood for the purposes of determining its alcohol ... content.
Code § 18.2–268.5. Coffman argues that by including the word "nurse" in the list of individuals required to be designated by court order, the General Assembly intended for all nurses withdrawing blood to be "designated by order of a circuit court acting upon the recommendation of a licensed physician." We disagree.
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, we must
apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.
Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349–50, 706 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) ). Furthermore, "[w]e consider the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1147, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). In doing so, we often employ "intrinsic" aids for interpretation.
"Intrinsic" aids for interpretation relate to the language of a statute itself. Courts have called intrinsic aids "technical rules of statutory construction," and aids which "arise from the composition and structure of [an] act." ... These "intrinsic" aids for construction focus attention on a statute's text, and properly reflect the primacy of the legislature's own use of language.
2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction§ 47.1 (7th rev. ed. 2014) (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted). One such aid is the rule of the last antecedent.
A. THE RULE OF THE LAST ANTECEDENT
The rule of the last antecedent is the "preferred procedure for clarifying whether modifying language is intended to modify all preceding antecedents or only the final one." Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cty., 285 Va. 604, 615 n.4, 740 S.E.2d 548, 554 n.4 (2013). Under the rule of the last antecedent, "qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 144 (2012). Absent a contrary intent, a qualifying word or phrase should be read as modifying only the last noun or phrase that immediately
precedes it, i.e., the last antecedent.3 Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590...
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