Com. v. Mongardi, 87-847

• Decision Date: 29 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-847,87-847
• Citation: 522 N.E.2d 984,26 Mass.App.Ct. 5
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. John A. MONGARDI.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 984

522 N.E.2d 984

26 Mass.App.Ct. 5

COMMONWEALTH v. John A. MONGARDI.

No. 87-847.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued March 22, 1988.

Decided May 5, 1988.

Further Appellate Review Denied June 29, 1988.

John A. Mongardi, pro se.

Before GREANEY, C.J., and PERRETTA and FINE, JJ.

GREANEY, Chief Justice.

The defendant was given a citation by a police officer under G.L. c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3, for following too closely, failing to use seatbelts (prior to the repeal of the law requiring their use), and speeding. The citation stated that the allegations were to be treated as civil motor vehicle infractions. A clerk-magistrate of the District Court in Westborough found the defendant responsible on the three allegations, and the defendant appealed for a de novo hearing before a District Court judge. Prior to that hearing, the defendant moved "for a civil jury trial of the allegations contained in ... [the] citation...." The judge denied the motion. After a de novo hearing, the judge found the defendant responsible and ordered an assessment of $85, which the defendant paid. The Appellate Division upheld the order of the District Court. The defendant appealed to this court. He contends that the denial of his motion for a jury trial violates art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. We affirm.

The proceedings in which the defendant was involved were the result of legislation (St. 1985, c. 794, and St. 1986, c. 35, both effective July 1, 1986), which significantly revised G.L. c. 90C to provide that certain minor automobile law violations be made totally and permanently noncriminal. As provided by St. 1986, c. 35, § 10, violations within the defined category ¹ "shall be deemed civil motor vehicle infractions and not criminal offenses, and all statutes, ordinances, by-laws or regulations heretofore providing for such automobile law violations shall be so interpreted."

The procedure for the handling of civil motor vehicle infractions in the District Courts is set forth in c. 90C, §§ 2 and 3. In broad outline, that procedure is as follows. The alleged infraction is recorded by a law enforcement officer on a citation which is given to the motor vehicle operator. The operator can either pay a prescribed assessment or seek a hearing before a clerk-magistrate. ² If he requests a hearing before a clerk-magistrate and is found responsible for the motor vehicle infraction ³ the operator can appeal to a District Court judge, "who shall hear the case de novo." G.L. c. 90C, § 3(A), sixth par., inserted by St. 1986, c. 35, § 1. The third sentence of the sixth paragraph of § 3(A) provides that "[t]here shall be no right of jury trial for civil motor vehicle infractions." An appeal from the judge's finding can be taken to the Appellate Division of the District Courts, and the Appellate Division's order can thereafter be appealed to this court.

The defendant does not challenge the authority of the Legislature to denominate minor violations of certain motor vehicle laws as entirely civil matters. In particular, he does not argue that the Legislature lacked the authority to change the classification of certain minor violations of the motor vehicle laws to noncriminal even though previously, as criminal offenses, the violations carried the right to a jury trial. See Commonwealth v. Germano, 379 Mass. 268, 397 N.E.2d 663 (1979); Commonwealth v. Curtin, 386 Mass. 587, 436 N.E.2d 1200 (1982). See also Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. 877, 885, 271 N.E.2d 335 (1971); Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 818-819, 376 N.E.2d 810 (1978); Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 142-143 n. 5, 402 N.E.2d 124 (1980). He contends only that the Legislature's denial of a jury trial to an operator who seeks to dispute responsibility for a civil motor vehicle infraction violates art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights. In pertinent part, art. 15 reads as follows:

"In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury...."

Determining responsibility for a civil motor vehicle infraction involves a proceeding between the State and a motor vehicle operator. The proceeding does not involve a suit between two or more persons in the sense provided for by art. 15.

Additionally, the proceeding does not involve a controversy concerning property as that phrase is used in art. 15. A party who is ordered by a judgment to pay money or otherwise part with property is not necessarily involved in a controversy concerning property which requires a jury trial under art. 15. Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 351-355, 62 N.E. 401 (1902). Resolving the question of entitlement to a jury trial under art. 15 involves consideration whether analogous civil proceedings existed at common law which required a jury trial. See Parker v. Simpson, supra; Stockbridge v. Mixer, 215 Mass. 415, 418, 102 N.E. 646 (1913), S.C., 227 Mass. 501, 116 N.E. 877 (1917). Article 15 incorporates the experience of its drafters, who sought to retain the ordinary forms and administration of the English common law (with which they were most familiar), while allowing future generations to create new forms of actions and proceedings which, for practical reasons, might not require, or be appropriate for, decision by a jury. Parker v. Simpson, supra. See, e.g., Nei v. Burley, 388 Mass. 307, 313-315, 446 N.E.2d 674 (1983). The procedure specified in c. 90C for the handling of civil motor vehicle infractions is essentially sui generis, and does not express a civil claim, right or remedy which was recognized at common law as requiring a jury trial.

In enacting c. 90C, the Legislature was cognizant of Supreme Judicial Court decisions addressing previous statutes dealing with minor motor vehicle violations. Those statutes allowed an operator to choose between treatment of the allegation in a noncriminal manner and contesting the validity of the allegation by submitting to criminal prosecution. The decisions that considered the criminal alternative held, based on the language of the prior statutes, that an operator who chose to be charged criminally had a right to a jury trial. See Commonwealth v. Germano, 379 Mass. 268, 397 N.E.2d 663 (1979); Commonwealth v. Curtin, 386 Mass. 587, 436 N.E.2d 1200 (1982). By eliminating the criminal option, the Legislature sought to fashion a nonjury civil procedure which would give an operator the protection of an informal judicial hearing, while ensuring that the overburdened court system would not be involved in lengthy trials of matters that no longer carried criminal penalties. As was said about the noncriminal disposition of parking violations by a municipal...