Cooper v. Muccitelli
| Decision Date | 10 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 85840,85840 |
| Citation | 682 So.2d 77 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly S428 Sandra COOPER, etc., Petitioner, v. Karin MUCCITELLI, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Lon Worth Crow, IV of Kelly & Crow, Avon Park, for Petitioner.
Kurt Erlenbach of Erlenbach & Erlenbach, P.A., Titusville, for Respondent.
We have for review Cooper v. Muccitelli, 661 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), wherein the district court certified conflict with Davis v. Davis, 301 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. White, 242 So.2d 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); and Raggio v. Richardson, 218 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3rd DCA), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 917 (Fla.1969). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We approve the result in Cooper as explained below.
Thomas Pasquino and Karin Muccitelli were married in 1984, and during the course of the marriage Thomas bought two life insurance policies, one from Academy Life Insurance Company ("Academy"), which is in Thomas and Karin were divorced in July 1992 and the separation agreement mutually released each party from all claims of the other. The agreement did not mention the insurance policies. Karin remarried in August 1992 and moved to Germany. In December 1992, Thomas changed the primary beneficiary on the Serviceman's policy to his step-daughter by Karin, his two children by a prior marriage, and his parents. He left the Academy policy unchanged.
issue here, and one from Serviceman's Group Life Insurance ("Serviceman's"). Thomas named Karin primary beneficiary on both policies, named his sister, Sandra Cooper, secondary beneficiary on the Academy policy, and failed to name a secondary beneficiary on the Serviceman's policy.
Thomas committed suicide in January 1993 and Karin and Sandra both filed for the proceeds of the Academy policy. Academy filed an interpleader naming Karin and Sandra as defendants, and the trial court granted Karin's motion for summary judgment, ruling that she was entitled to the proceeds (totaling nearly $100,000). The district court affirmed, holding that "without specific reference in a property settlement agreement to life insurance proceeds, the beneficiary of the proceeds is determined by looking only to the insurance contract." Cooper, 661 So.2d at 54. The court recognized conflict with Davis, Aetna, and Raggio, wherein the courts looked beyond the life insurance policies to the settlement agreements.
Sandra contends that because the present separation agreement does not mention the Academy policy, a material question of fact exists as to whether the parties intended that the agreement apply to the policy proceeds. Summary judgment, she claims, was improper. We disagree.
The separation agreement contains the following provisions governing the mutual release of claims:
Whereas, the parties desire to settle their financial, property and other rights and obligations arising out to the marriage and otherwise.
....
6. Mutual Release and Discharge of Claims in Estates. Each party shall have the right to dispose of the property of such party by last will and testament in such manner as such party may deem proper in the sole discretion of such party, with the same force and effect as if the other party had died. Each party, individually and for his or her heirs, personal representatives, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and relinquishes any and all claims, rights or interests as a surviving spouse in or to any property, real or personal, which the other party owns or possesses at death, or to which the other party or his or her estate may be entitled.
7. Mutual Release of General Claims. Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, each party hereby waives, releases and discharges all claims, causes of action, rights or demands, known or unknown, past, present or future, which he or she now or hereafter has, might have, or could claim to have against the other by reason of any matter, thing or cause whatever, prior to the date of this Agreement. Nothing in this Article 6 shall be deemed to prevent either party from enforcing the terms of this Agreement or from asserting any rights or claims expressly reserved to either party in this Agreement. Nothing herein shall impair or waive any cause of action which either party may have against the other for a dissolution of the marriage or any defenses either may have to any such cause of action.
....
11. General Provisions. This Agreement is entire and complete and embodies all understandings and agreements between the parties. No oral statement or prior written matter outside this Agreement shall have any force or effect.
The Academy...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Crawford v. Barker
...expectancy interests or her beneficiary rights. Thus, she contended, under this Court's decision in Cooper v. Muccitelli ( Cooper II ), 682 So.2d 77 (Fla.1996), and the Fifth District's decision in Smith v. Smith, 919 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), in the absence of specific reference in th......
-
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc. V. Dunn, 6:02-CV-217-ORL-18DA.
...of law to invalidate Irma's beneficiary status. Cooper v. Muccitelli, 661 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ("Cooper I"), aff'd 682 So.2d 77, 79 (Fla.1996) ("Cooper II)". Pursuant to the Agreement and the Policy itself, Albert possessed the exclusive right to change the Policy's beneficiary. ......
-
Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Jones
...415 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966): see also Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77, 79 n.1 (Fla. 1996) ("a settlement agreement that specifically requires one of the parties to maintain a named individual as beneficiary will co......
-
Luszcz v. Lavoie
...above the $11,165 he was to receive pursuant to the dissolution judgment. The trial court properly denied the motion. See Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So.2d 77 (Fla.1996). In Cooper, the parties' marriage was dissolved pursuant to a separation agreement which did not mention two life insurance......
-
The top five things practitioners need to know about IRAs now: a discussion of state law, case law, and other considerations.
...Tables; Table 1 (Single Life Expectancy) (For Use by Beneficiaries). (8) FLA. STAT. [section]744.307(2). (9) Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996). (10) See also Vaughan v. Vaughan, 741 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1999); In re Estate of Dellinger, 760 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th D.C......