Craig v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 19 December 1979
• Citation: 161 Cal.Rptr. 19,100 Cal.App.3d 69
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Glendon CRAIG, as Commissioner, etc., Plaintiff Respondent, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the INGLEWOOD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent; Steven GREGORY, Real Party in Interest and Appellant. Civ. 55930.

Page 19

161 Cal.Rptr. 19

100 Cal.App.3d 69

Glendon CRAIG, as Commissioner, etc., Plaintiff Respondent, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the INGLEWOOD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent;

Steven GREGORY, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Civ. 55930.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 19, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1980.

Hearing Denied Mar. 13, 1980.

Floyd A. Zagorsky, Los Angeles, Greater Watts Justice Center, for appellant Steven Gregory.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Richard M. Radosh, Deputy Atty. Gen., for petitioner and respondent.

No appearance for respondent Municipal Court.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Steven Gregory, a defendant in a pending misdemeanor prosecution for resisting arrest and battery upon officers of the California Highway Patrol, obtained a discovery order in the municipal court for production of the names and addresses of all persons arrested by the officers for similar charges during the preceding two years.

The Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate directing the municipal court to vacate the discovery order. The superior court determined that the usefulness to defendant of arrestees' names and addresses was of minimal, speculative and remote value and violated the privacy of the arrestees. A peremptory writ of mandate was issued. The defendant, who is the real party in interest, has appealed. We affirm.

A defendant's right to a fair trial and the preparation of an effective and intelligent defense entitles him to pretrial discovery of all relevant and Reasonably accessible information. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 346 P.2d 407.) The request for discovery must describe the information with reasonable specificity and present a plausible justification for production of the items requested. (Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 812, 112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353; Joe Z. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 797, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26.)

" 'A showing . . . that defendant cannot readily obtain the information through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information that might lead to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that such knowledge will assist him in preparing for his defense.' " (Lemelle v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.App.3d 148, at 162, 143 Cal.Rptr. 450, at 459.) Although the defendant need not demonstrate that the evidence he seeks would be admissible at trial, he must make a showing that the requested information will facilitate ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.

In the final analysis a motion for discovery by an accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the inherent power to order discovery in the interests of justice. (People v. Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985; Hill v. Superior Court, supra; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 312 P.2d 698.)

Our review here is of the superior court's action in issuing its writ of mandate. The trial court's discretion has been overtaken by the action of the superior court. The question before us is whether there was an abuse of discretion by the superior court. (Mellinger v. Municipal Court, 265 Cal.App.2d 843, 71 Cal.Rptr. 535; 5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed.) Extraordinary Writs, § 178, pp. 3938-3939; 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed.) Appeal, §§ 242, 243, pp. 4234-4235; also compare the principles of Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 196 P.2d 20, and Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553.)

Initially, defendant, inter alia, sought copies of the arrest reports on all arrests made by the officers during the preceding two years for charges similar to those lodged against defendant. The request was modified to simply include the names and addresses of the arrestees.

The defendant asserts that he cannot procure the requested information through his own efforts and his position is that there is a possibility that other persons arrested by the same officers would testify to a pattern of violent conduct which would be relevant to his defense. (Evid.Code, § 1103; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 823, at 828, 133 Cal.Rptr. 325.)

Defendant does have the benefit of an order which requires disclosure of all material concerning complaints that have been made against these officers for the excessive use of force. What he seeks additionally is the names and addresses of persons arrested by these officers over a two-year period for charges similar to those lodged against defendant in the outside chance that there are persons among that group who were mistreated but failed to complain. It must be emphasized that this group includes, in addition to persons arrested and convicted, persons Who were arrested but not prosecuted or if prosecuted not convicted.

The currently popular practice of defendants seeking discovery of information concerning the past conduct of the arresting officers had its genesis in Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra. Thus, it is appropriate to commence our discussion with a brief analysis of that case.

In Pitchess, the defendant was charged with battery against several deputy sheriffs. He served a subpoena duces tecum on the sheriff for production of certain records. He asserted that he intended to rely on a defense of self-defense. Implicit in that statement is an admission that he in fact used force on the deputies but claimed justification therefor.

An affidavit in support of the subpoena duces tecum named two persons who had previously filed complaints against the deputies in question but who were unavailable for interview. Also named were two other persons who had reported misconduct of the deputies to the sheriff but who could not presently recall the details of the events. In each instance then a specific need for the subpoenaed records was demonstrated and, as the court in Pitchess stated, the documents which defendant sought were described with sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a "fishing expedition." The court refused to quash the subpoena duces tecum.

The court there observed, however, that the right of discovery by an accused is not absolute and that the trial court has discretion to balance the value to the accused of the information sought against other legitimate Governmental interests.

In contrast to the factual situation in Pitchess is Lemelle v. Superior Court, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 143 Cal.Rptr. 450. There a defendant charged with a number of narcotics offenses, as well as battery on a police officer and resisting arrest, sought a pretrial discovery order that he be furnished, inter alia, with all crime and arrest reports in which the principal charge was battery or resisting arrest, filed by the arresting officers during the preceding ten years.

There the defendant filed a declaration in support of his motion in which he alleged on information and belief that the specific officers in question had "individually and in furtherance of a conspiracy filed baseless charges against persons (accused of committing violations of Penal Code sections 148, 242, 243)" in order to conceal the fact that they, the officers, were guilty of using excessive force. (Lemelle, at p. 163, 143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 459.)

The Court of Appeal in Lemelle noted that the defendant, as here, had been provided with all records concerning complaints against the officers for using excessive force, and opined that those records were more likely to lead to the type of evidence which defendant sought than were the arrest reports of third parties.

Finally, the Lemelle court concluded that the value to the defendant of the arrest reports was remote, speculative and minimal, and when that fact was balanced against the burden of winnowing the information from the files of the employing police agency, denial of the discovery motion was proper.

In the case at bench a declaration in support of the discovery motion was filed by defendant's Counsel. It differs from the showing made in Pitchess in several respects and from the declaration filed in Lemelle in one major respect.

The declaration here does not assert that the defendant will offer a defense of self-defense. It only vaguely describes the theory of defense as "the incident giving rise to the charge in this case was due solely to the Aggressive acts of the (officers)." (Emphasis added.)

Next, as distinguished from Pitchess, the defendant seeks the names of third party Arrestees rather than other complainants. Further, the declaration does not identify any specific arrestee or arrests.

In contrast to Lemelle, the declaration does not allege, even on information and belief, that the officers in question here have been guilty of or accused of improper conduct at any time in the past. The declaration simply recites, what is a matter of common knowledge, that from time to time persons do complain about the conduct of highway patrol officers and that that department has machinery for investigating said complaints. Finally, the declaration states, on information and belief,...