Crist v. Ervin, s. SC10–1317
| Decision Date | 04 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | SC10–1319.,Nos. SC10–1317,s. SC10–1317 |
| Citation | 56 So.3d 745 |
| Parties | Charlie CRIST, et al., Appellants,v.Robert M. ERVIN, et al., Appellees.Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer, etc., Appellant,v.Robert M. ERVIN, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Courtney Brewer, Deputy Solicitor General, Jon A. Glogau, Chief, Complex Litigation, Tallahassee, FL; Richard T. Donelan, Jr., Chief Counsel, and Kate M. Pingolt, Florida Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants.Sidney L. Matthew of Sidney L. Matthew, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, and Davisson F. Dunlap, Jr. of Dunlap and Shipman, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees.Kimberly A. Ashby of Akerman Senterfitt, Orlando, FL, and Clifford C. Higby of Bryant and Higby, Panama City, FL, on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section of The Florida Bar; and C. Howard Hunter and Landis V. Curry of Hill Ward Henderson, P.A., Tampa, FL, on behalf of the Florida Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates, as Amici Curiae.POLSTON, J.
Appellants (collectively referred to as the State) argue that the trial court erred by ruling that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the general revenue fund are unconstitutional.1 We agree and reverse the trial court as explained below.
On June 3, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment and declared unconstitutional sections of the Florida Statutes that direct portions of civil action filing fees to the general revenue fund. Specifically, the trial court ruled that provisions of sections 28.24(1)(a), 28.241(a)(2)(d), 28.241(2), 34.041(1)(b), and 28.2455, Florida Statutes (2009), are unconstitutional and void.
The trial court concluded that, through these statutes, the Legislature has imposed an unconstitutional tax because litigants' filing fees are sent to the general revenue fund to be spent on unrelated government activities. The trial court stated that it is of no consequence that the Legislature appropriates to the courts an amount greater than the amount generated by the first $80.00 of the filing fees. The trial court explained that “[t]he Legislature is simply taxing one group of citizens and spending the money on unrelated governmental activities, which is illegal and unconstitutional.” Citing Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 95 Fla. 1003, 117 So. 385 (1928), and Farabee v. Board of Trustees, 254 So.2d 1 (Fla.1971), the trial court determined that depositing a portion of the filing fees into the general revenue fund denies access to the courts. The trial court order also stated that the provisions at issue “deny the citizens of this state the right to have their courts adequately funded, in violation of Article V, Section 14 and the due process, equal protection, [and] right to jury trial guarantees ... accorded under the Florida Constitution.” The trial court severed the offending provisions, enjoined the State from enforcing them, and ordered the State to “ensure that the injunction is reflected in the financial operations of this state.”
The trial court ruled that statutes directing portions of civil filing fees to the general revenue fund are an unconstitutional tax denying access to courts. The Appellees argue that the trial court's ruling is correct because the statutes are unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The State asserts that the statutes are facially constitutional because there is a set of circumstances whereby the statutes can be constitutional, namely if the Legislature appropriates more to the costs of the administration of justice than the amount of civil filing fees deposited into the general revenue fund. Moreover, the State argues that the statutes are constitutional as applied because the Legislature has in fact appropriated more to support the administration of justice than the amount of fees deposited into the general revenue fund. We agree with the State. Directing a portion of the filing fees to the general revenue fund for further appropriation is an accounting mechanism reasonably related to the governmental purpose of funding the administration of justice. See Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla.1997) .
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla.2002). “While we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.” Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005)). Further, “in a facial constitutional challenge, we determine only whether there is any set of circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld.” Id. at 265. “If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends.” State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1977).
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.” The statutory provisions at issue transfer a portion of civil filing fees paid by litigants in circuit courts, county courts, and appellate courts into the general revenue fund. See §§ 28.241(1)(a) 1.a.; 28.241(1)(a)2.d.; 28.241(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (); § 34.041(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009) (); § 28.2455, Fla. Stat. (2009) ().
In State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1994) (citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25 (Fla.1992)), this Court defined a tax as “an enforced burden imposed by sovereign right for the support of the government, the administration of law, and the exercise of various functions the sovereign is called on to perform.” In contrast, we defined user fees as
they are charged in exchange for a particular governmental service which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by other members of society; and they are paid by choice, in that the party paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the charge.
Port Orange, 650 So.2d at 3 (citations omitted).
In Flood, we addressed whether a statute establishing a docket fee to be used for a law library and other general county purposes was an invalid tax on litigants. The statute provided that each plaintiff in a circuit court had to pay a docket fee of $10, which was to be deposited into a special fund for establishing and maintaining a law library in the county. Flood, 117 So. at 386. The statute also provided that “any balance remaining thereafter [was] to be used and applied as said board [of county commissioners] may from time to time deem best for general county purposes.” Id. (quoting ch. 12004, Laws of Fla. (1927)). We concluded that the fee was a tax repugnant to the right of access to courts contained in Florida's Constitution, reasoning as follows:
It is clear that to call this a fee is a misnomer. It is a tax levied and collected for a county purpose, if the establishment of a law library may be considered a county purpose. No part of the so-called fee is appropriated for the payment of any services rendered by the clerk rendering the service in the case.
....
... The act is clearly an attempt to levy a tax on those who must bring their causes into court and to require the payment of such tax for the benefit of the public treasury, and is an abrogation of the administration of right and justice.
Thereafter, in Farabee, we addressed a challenge to a statute allocating a portion of a new $10 filing fee to the Lee County Law Library. “Under the statutory formula the Law Library received $3.00 plus 20% of $10.00 or a total allocation of $5.00 out of each filing fee paid to the Clerk.” Farabee, 254 So.2d at 3. This Court in Farabee rejected the Clerk's argument, which was based upon Flood, that the portion of the filing fee payable to the law library was an unconstitutional tax on litigants. Id. at 5. We concluded that the law library was “essential to the administration of justice today, and it is appropriate that its cost be assessed against those who make use of the court systems of our state.” Id. We distinguished Farabee from our prior decision in Flood by pointing out in particular that Flood involved a fee that was used to fund general county purposes:
We deem it especially significant in Flood, that the balance of the funds remaining after adequate provision for the law library were to be used for “general county purposes” as directed by the board of county commissioners. Since at least part of the fee was available to the county for the building of roads, schools, and so on, it could not be said that the fee levied was a cost of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Enoch v. State
...874.03(5).STANDARD OF REVIEW Constitutional challenges to statutes are pure questions of law, subject to de novo review. Crist v. Ervin, 56 So.3d 745, 747 (Fla.2010). Generally, a statute is presumed constitutional and the challenging party has the burden to establish the statute's invalidi......
-
Norman v. State
...8, of the Florida Constitution. The constitutional validity of a law is a legal issue subject to de novo review. See Crist v. Ervin , 56 So.3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010). In determining whether Florida's Open Carry Law is constitutional under both the Florida and the United States Constitutions, ......
-
State v. Adkins, SC11–1878.
...893.101 do not violate due process. “The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Crist v. Ervin, 56 So.3d 745, 747 (Fla.2011). In considering a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, this Court is “obligated to accord legislative acts a pres......
-
Camm v. Scott
...in the state's general revenue fund, making them available for general government purposes. Plaintiffs respond that Crist v. Ervin, 56 So.3d 745 (Fla.2010) held that the contested filing fee is not a tax, and that defendants have asserted an inconsistent position in an unrelated pending cas......