Farabee v. Board of Trustees, Lee County Law Library, No. 40635

• Decision Date: 28 October 1971
• Docket Number: No. 40635
• Citation: 254 So.2d 1
• Parties: D. T. FARABEE, as Clerk of the Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, LEE COUNTY LAW LIBRARY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1

254 So.2d 1

D. T. FARABEE, as Clerk of the Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, LEE COUNTY LAW LIBRARY, Appellee.

No. 40635.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 28, 1971.

Earl Drayton Farr, Jr., Punta Gorda, for appellant.

Julian D. Clarkson, Fort Myers, for appellee.

McCAIN, Justice.

This direct appeal involves a dispute between the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lee County and the Lee County Law Library over the allocation of fees as between the Clerk and the Library. Our jurisdiction derives from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Lee County, holding Chapter 59--1492, Laws of Florida, constitutional. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In 1957, Fla.Stat. § 28.241(1), F.S.A., enacted as Chapter 57--322, Laws of Florida, the general law setting filing fees to be paid to clerks of circuit courts in civil actions, was amended to provide in part:

'The party instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in the circuit court shall pay to the clerk of said court a fee of ten dollars ($10.00) * * * Fees in excess of those herein fixed may be imposed by special or local law, and such excess, together with not more than twenty per centum of the fees herein fixed, shall be expended as provided by any special or local law, now or hereafter in force, in providing and maintaining facilities, including a law library, for the use of the courts of the county wherein the fees are collected.'

Pursuant to this enabling legislation, a special act of the Legislature, Chapter 59--1492, Laws of Florida, was passed in 1959, providing for an excess fee of $3.00 for the Lee County Law Library. Under the statutory formula the Law Library received $3.00 plus 20% Of $10.00 or a total allocation of $5.00 out of each filing fee paid to the Clerk. the Clerk did not contest the allocation, but funded the Library pursuant to the statutory scheme until 1963, at which time Fla.Stat. § 28.241(1), F.S.A. was amended to increase the base fee from $10.00 to $12.00. Under the amended legislation the allocation to the Law Library increased to $5.40 ($3.00 plus 20% Of $12.00). Again, the Clerk did not contest the amendment, but continued to fund the Library until July 1, 1970, at which time the Clerk ceased payments to the Library altogether.

The catalyst which led the Clerk to cease payments to the Library was the passage of Chapter 70--134, Laws of Florida, which, among other things, extensively revised Fla.Stat, § 28.241, F.S.A. In part, the new enabling legislation provided:

'The party instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in the circuit court shall pay to the clerk of said court a service charge of fifteen dollars ($15) * * *. Service charges in excess of those herein fixed may be imposed by the governing authority of the county by ordinance or by special or local law, and such excess shall be expended as provided by such ordinance or any special or local law, now or hereafter in force, in providing and maintaining facilities, including a law library, for the use of the courts of the county wherein the service charges are collected.'

As a result of the cessation of funding to the Library, the Board of Trustees brought the instant declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the rights of the Library under Chapters 59--1492 and 70--134. By motion for summary judgment, the Clerk alleged that Chapter 59--1492 was unconstitutional because (1) the title of the act did not give fair notice of intent to legislate on the subject of filing fees in civil actions, and (2) the portion of the filing fee payable to the Law Library constituted an unconstitutional tax upon those persons required to bring their causes into court. In the alternative, the Clerk argued that Chapter 70--134, constituted a repealer of Chapter 59--1492. The Board of Trustees of the Law Library responded to these various arguments, and in addition, asserted that the Clerk was estopped from raising the unconstitutionality of Chapter 59--1492, because he had acted under it for some ten years.

The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees of the Law Library, specifically finding that Chapter 59--1492, was a valid exercise of the legislative power which did not violate the provisions of the Florida Constitution specified by the Clerk; that Chapter 70--134 did not constitute a repealer of Chapter 59--1492; and moreover, that the Clerk was estopped by his conduct from raising the constitutionality of Chapter 59--1492. The Clerk thereupon brought a timely appeal here.

Appellant first contends that Chapter 59--1492, was impliedly repealed by passage of Chapter 70--134. Our response to this contention is governed by Chapter 70--134 itself, which, in Section 40, provides:

'The fees herein shall supersede and repeal all laws in conflict herewith except as provided in section 28.241, Florida Statutes.'

Fla.Stat. § 28.241, F.S.A. provides that excess service charges for the purpose of maintaining facilities, including a law library, may be imposed by the 'governing authority of the county by ordinance or by special or local law, and such excess shall be expended as provided by such ordinance or any special or local law, Now or hereafter in force'. (Emphasis supplied) This savings clause appears to be expressly designed to retain special acts such as the one in contention here. Chapter 59--1492 was in force on the effective date of Chapter 70--134, and accordingly comes within the savings clause in Fla.Stat. § 28.241, F.S.A. We therefore reject the contention of appellant that Chapter 70--134 constituted an implicit repealer of Chapter 59--1492.

Appellant next argues that Chapter 59--1492, violates Fla.Const. Article III, Section 6, F.S.A., in that the title of the act ¹ does not give fair notice of intent to legislate on the subject of filing fees in civil actions. We are unable to agree with this contention. Where one general subject (here, the creation and funding of a law library) is expressed in the title of an act, the means and instrumentalities for effecting such subject need not be stated in the title and may be regarded as matters properly connected with the subject which may be properly embraced in the act. City of Hialeah v. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 128 Fla. 46, 174 So. 843 (1937). Accord, Spencer v. Hunt, 109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933); Williams v. Dormany, 99 Fla. 496, 126 So. 117 (1930).

Such a result comports with this Court's consistent refusal to resort to critical construction of the titles of acts to exclude parts of the acts as being in violation of the constitutional requirement that the subject should be briefly expressed in the title. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Hazel,43 Fla. 263, 31 So. 272 (1901); Town of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568, 23 So.2d 843 (1945). The Leiglsature is allowed wide latitude in the enactment of laws, and courts will strike down the title of an act only where the title is plainly violative of the Constitution. King Kole, Inc. v. Bryant, 178 So.2d 2 (Fla.1965); Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Sumter County, 48 So.2d 912 (Fla.1950); State ex rel. Crump v. Sullivan,99 Fla. 1070, 128 So. 478 (1930); City of Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm & Son,132 Fla. 334, 181 So. 153 (1938), rehearing denied, 133 Fla. 525, 182 So. 841; State ex rel. Oglesby v. Hand, 96 Fla. 799, 119 So. 376 (1928); City of Ocoee v. Bowness, 65 So.2d 7 (Fla.1953); Warren v. Pope, 64 So.2d 564 (Fla.1953). In fact, the majority of the cases stating this rule have declared that a presumption in favor of validity exists. State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, 94 So.2d 181 (Fla.1957); A. M. Klemm & Son v. City of Winter Haven, 141 Fla. 60, 192 So. 652 (1939); City of Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm & Son, Supra.

Moreover, it is well to keep in mind in any consideration of the sufficiency of the title of an act that the purpose of the constitutional provision is to prevent deception, surprise or fraud upon the Legislature, and to apprise the people of the subjects of legislation. Coldeway v. Board of Public Instruction of Gulf County, 189 So.2d 878 (Fla.1966); Knight & Wall Co. v. Bryant, 178 So.2d 5 (Fla.1965); State ex rel. Grodin v. Barns,119 Fla. 405, 161 So. 568 (1935). In the instant case this requirement is met. The enabling legislation (Fla.Stat. § 28.241, F.S.A.) setting up the basic filing fee for clerks, specifically contemplated such acts as the one in question here; and indeed, numerous such acts have been passed or amended subsequent to enactment of Fla.Stat. § 28.241, F.S.A. It is also significant that Chapter 70--134 again authorized passage of special acts imposing excess filing fees, making reference to legislation 'now or hereafter in force'. Plainly, the Legislature was aware of the existence and content of acts such as the disputed provision here, and approved them in its amendatory legislation. It is hardly creditable to suppose that any element of fraud or surprise on either the Legislature or the Clerk was or is inherent in the instant situation.

Next, appellant asserts that the portion of the filing fee payable to the Law Library levies an unconstitutional tax upon those persons required to bring their causes into court. In making this argument, appellant relies solely on this Court's decision in Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 95 Fla. 1003, 117 So. 385 (1928). The Flood case involved an attack upon a special act applicable to Dade County which imposed a $10.00 docket fee upon plaintiffs in the circuit court and the civil court of record and directed that the funds be used for the...