Croft v. State
Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-5109 |
Citation | 295 So.3d 307 |
Parties | David Dean CROFT, DOC #092628, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
David Dean Croft appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A) ; 9.141(b)(3). The postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to deny Mr. Croft's motion.1 Consequently, we reverse.
On May 29, 1983, six months shy of his eighteenth birthday, Mr. Croft and a juvenile confederate committed a murder. The State indicted each. The confederate went to trial first. He was found guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole eligibility for twenty-five years. Then, in exchange for the State's waiver of the death penalty, Mr. Croft pleaded guilty to the same disposition.
Years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), holding that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Applying Graham and Miller, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently held that a juvenile homicide offender's life with parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based largely upon a presumptive parole release date set far beyond the juvenile offender's life expectancy. See Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1048-50 (Fla. 2016).
Spurred on by this case law, Mr. Croft filed his rule 3.850 motion in August 2016. Noting that his "current presumptive parole release date is June 7, 2095," the State agreed that Mr. Croft "[wa]s entitled to be resentenced." In October 2016, the postconviction court granted Mr. Croft's rule 3.850 motion and directed the State to schedule a resentencing hearing.
Before a resentencing hearing could be completed, the State moved to reconsider the postconviction court's order, relying on State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018). See Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2018) .
After a December 2018 hearing, the postconviction court granted the State's motion for reconsideration, rescinded the October 2016 order, and denied Mr. Croft's rule 3.850 motion.
The October 2016 order granting Mr. Croft's rule 3.850 motion was a final appealable order. The State did not appeal. See Taylor v. State, 140 So. 3d 526, 528 (Fla. 2014) (); Cooper v. State, 667 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ().
Critically, Mr. Croft sought postconviction relief under rule 3.850, instead of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). This choice was significant. We have held that a rule 3.800(a) order finding that a movant is entitled to be resentenced, without imposing a new sentence, is a nonfinal nonappealable order. See State v. Rudolf, 821 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c) ( ).2 But under Taylor, the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to rescind its October 2016 order, more than two years later, on the basis of an untimely rehearing motion. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(j) () .
Accordingly, we must reverse the postconviction court's December 2018 order, reinstate the October 2016 order, and direct the postconviction court to conduct a resentencing hearing. We are mindful that Mr. Croft may have won a pyrrhic victory, see Franklin, 258 So. 3d at 1241 ; Michel, 257 So. 3d at 6, because "the decisional law effective at the time of the resentencing applies." State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2011). Hence, upon resentencing, Mr. Croft may yet receive the same sentence.
Reversed and remanded with...
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Rogers v. State
..., 61 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2011). Hence, upon resentencing, Mr. Croft may yet receive the same sentence. Croft v. State , No. 2D18-5109, 295 So.3d 307, 309 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 25, 2020).Trial courts have broad authority to reconsider prior rulings in pending cases, as this Court has recognize......
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