Day v. Dep't of Env't
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 358689 |
| Parties | JONES DAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ENERGY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Court of Claims LC No. 21-000123-MZ
Before: Letica, P.J., and Redford and Rick, JJ.
In this dispute involving an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., plaintiff appeals as of right the Court of Claims order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition and denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and denying defendant's motion for summary disposition.
In January 2020, Michigan Attorney General, Dana Nessel, and the State of Michigan filed a lawsuit in Washtenaw Circuit Court against chemical companies alleging that they improperly released toxic synthetic chemicals called per - and polyfluoroalkyl substances (collectively PFAS) and that the PFAS had entered into 10% of our state's public water supplies. Daikin Industries, Ltd (Daikin), is a named defendant in that litigation. This complaint brought by Attorney General Nessel delineated the state's efforts to determine the presence of PFAS in drinking water sources by creating a PFAS response team known as the Michigan PFAS Action Response Team (MPART). MPART was designated as an advisory body within the State Department of Environmental Quality, now known as the Department of Environment, Great Lakes and Energy (EGLE).
This state action was transferred to federal court and combined with similar cases from other jurisdictions. Plaintiff, a law firm, represents Daikin in the combined federal litigation. The federal court entered a case management order or fact sheet that precluded participation in discovery.
Thereafter plaintiff filed a state FOIA request with EGLE seeking a wide-range of documentation pertaining to MPART documents addressing PFAS. EGLE denied the request by letter, citing MCL 15.243(1)(v) which exempts from disclosure information pertaining "to a civil action in which the requesting party and the public body are parties." Unable to obtain the documentation from EGLE, plaintiff filed the underlying FOIA complaint in the Court of Claims. Both parties moved for summary disposition. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of defendant EGLE, concluding that the caselaw cited by plaintiff was distinguishable, the exemption applied to parties or their agents, the requested information would be exempt if the federal FOIA was applied, and EGLE constituted a party for purposes of the exemption. From this ruling, plaintiff appeals.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Houston v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich.App. 545, 557; 968 N.W.2d 9 (2021). Summary disposition is appropriate when the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8). In a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the legal sufficiency of the complaint is tested solely on the basis of the pleadings. Nyman v Thomas Reuters Holdings, Inc, 329 Mich.App. 539, 543; 942 N.W.2d 696 (2019). A motion premised on subrule (C)(8) should only be granted when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could conceivably justify a right of recovery. Id.
Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." MCR 2.116(C)(10). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition challenged under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other admissible documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(4), (G)(5); Buhl v City of Oak Park, 507 Mich. 236, 242; 968 N.W.2d 348 (2021).
An issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo. Buhl, 507 Mich. at 242. When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Ricks v State of Mich, 507 Mich. 387, 397; 968 N.W.2d 428 (2021). The most reliable evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass'n, Inc v Dep't of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich. 349, 360-361; 917 N.W.2d 603 (2018). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed in the statute. Gardner v Dep't of Treasury, 498 Mich. 1, 6; 869 N.W.2d 199 (2015). "In construing a legislative enactment we are not at liberty to choose a construction that implements any rational purpose but, rather, must choose the construction which implements the legislative purpose perceived from the language and the context in which it is used." Le Gassick v Univ of Mich. Regents, 330 Mich.App. 487, 495-496; 948 N.W.2d 452 (2019) (citation omitted).
Once the intention of the Legislature is discovered, this intent prevails regardless of any conflicting rule of statutory construction. Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there. The omission of a provision should be construed as intentional. It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws. The Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of judicial statutory interpretations. When statutory provisions are construed by the court and the Legislature reenacts the statute, it is assumed that the Legislature acquiesced to the judicial interpretation. Similarly, when a judicial decision is released and the Legislature acts to change the language of the statute, it is strong evidence of the disapproval of the judicial interpretation. Every word of a statute should be given meaning and no words should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible. [GMAC LLC v Dep't of Treasury, 286 Mich.App. 365, 372-373; 781 N.W.2d 310 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted).]
"[I]t is the province of the Legislature to acquiesce in the judicial interpretation of a statute or to amend the legislation to obviate a judicial interpretation." Id. at 380.
"This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the FOIA." Mich Open Carry, Inc v Dep't of State Police, 330 Mich.App. 614, 621; 950 N.W.2d 484 (2019). The trial court's factual findings underlying its application of the FOIA are reviewed for clear error. Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." Id. Whether a public record is exempt from disclosure under FOIA is also reviewed de novo. Id. at 625.
Michigan's FOIA is modeled after the federal FOIA. Bradley v Saranac Community Sch Bd of Ed, 455 Mich. 285, 299; 565 N.W.2d 650 (1997), mod on other grounds Mich Fed of Teachers v Univ of Mich, 481 Mich. 657; 753 N.W.2d 28 (2008). However, specific language from the federal version pertaining to exemptions was not adopted, and therefore, we must examine what our Legislature intended in Michigan's FOIA where the language is not identical. See id.
Because Michigan's FOIA is a prodisclosure act, full disclosure of all public records should occur unless they are clearly exempt. Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich. 558, 572-573; 719 N.W.2d 73 (2006). "A FOIA request must be fulfilled unless MCL 15.243 lists an applicable specific exemption." Id. at 573. Generally, the identity of the party seeking the disclosure, the party's motive, and the initial and future uses of the information requested under FOIA are irrelevant to determine whether the information falls within an exemption. Rataj v City of Romulus, 306 Mich.App. 735, 752; 858 N.W.2d 116 (2014). "The fact that another body of law potentially gives an additional basis for access to such [public] records does not limit the applicability of the FOIA[.]" Kent Co Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich. 353, 362; 616 N.W.2d 677 (2000).
In the present case, defendant asserted that the information requested by plaintiff was exempt as "[r]ecords or information relating to a civil action in which the requesting party and the public body are parties." MCL 15.243(1)(v). We determine that Taylor v Lansing Bd of Water & Light, 272 Mich.App. 200; 725 N.W.2d 84 (2006), controls this litigation and the conclusion that the exemption does not apply. In Taylor, the plaintiff Joni Taylor, filed an action seeking an order to compel the defendant, a public body, to produce documents she requested under the FOIA pertaining to Virginia Cluley's personnel files, e-mails, correspondence, and expense information. The defendant had denied the request...
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