Delta Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. PPF Gin & Warehouse, LLC
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-20-00063-CV,06-20-00063-CV |
| Citation | 632 S.W.3d 637 |
| Parties | DELTA COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant v. PPF GIN & WAREHOUSE, LLC, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Judith A. Hargrove, Austin, for Appellant.
Brandy R. Manning, Fort Worth, John Brusniak Jr., Tracy Turner, Dallas, for Appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
This case arises out of an ad valorem property-tax dispute regarding seven cotton module trucks owned by PPF Gin & Warehouse, LLC (PPF Gin). In two points of error, Delta County Appraisal District (DCAD) contends that the trial court erred (1) when it granted PPF Gin's motion for summary judgment and denied DCAD's motion for summary judgment1 and (2) when it granted PPF Gin's motion for summary judgment despite the existence of an issue of material fact.2 For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
During a cotton harvest, cotton farmers use harvesting machines to remove cotton bolls from cotton plants. Specially equipped machinery gathers the raw cotton bolls into large "modules." In their harvested state, the modules contain both cotton fiber and other debris that must be "ginned" out of the cotton so it can be used by the textile industry. The modules are left in the field to be picked up by cotton module trucks and transported to the gin. At the gin, the modules are placed on a conveyor where the harvested cotton is unwrapped and taken through a filtering process, removing any debris from the cotton fiber. The "ginned" cotton is then sold.
PPF Gin was founded in 2014 and is a Texas limited liability company located in Delta County. PPF Gin grows and harvests its own cotton. In 2018 and 2019, PPF Gin owned seven cotton module trucks that were registered with the State of Texas as cotton vehicles. The module trucks are designed to load the cotton modules in the field and transport them to the gin for processing, and PPF Gin uses them in that manner. When it is not cotton harvesting season, the module trucks are parked and not used.
On May 15, 2018, PPF Gin received a notice from DCAD containing the appraised value of its personal property for the 2018 tax year. The seven cotton module trucks were appraised at $1,096,640.00. PPF Gin subsequently filed a protest with the Delta County Appraisal Review Board (the Board) on the grounds that the market value was incorrect and unequal and that the module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Texas Tax Code. Following a hearing before the Board, PPF Gin received a written order on July 6, 2018, denying PPF Gin's protest. On August 28, 2018, PPF Gin filed an original petition against DCAD, asking the district court to review the Board's order denying PPF Gin's claims (1) that the 2018 appraisal of its cotton module trucks was excessive under Section 42.25 of the Texas Tax Code3 and (2) unequal under Section 42.26 of the Texas Tax Code4 and (3) that the cotton module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation.
On May 10, 2019, PPF Gin received a 2019 tax appraisal notice appraising the same seven cotton module trucks at $1,008,920.00. PPF Gin filed another protest with the Board on the grounds that its 2019 tax value was excessive and unequal and that the tax exemption had again been denied. On July 2, 2019, the Board issued a written order denying PPF Gin's protest regarding the 2019 tax appraisal. On August 29, 2019, PPF Gin filed an amended petition against DCAD, adding a complaint regarding the Board's 2019 tax appraisal of the cotton module trucks and alleging the same bases as those contained in its original petition. On February 13, 2020, PPF Gin filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to find, as a matter of law, that its seven cotton module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation as implements of husbandry for tax years 2018 and 2019.
On May 28, 2020, DCAD filed a response to PPF Gin's motion and its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because PPF Gin's cotton module trucks were not implements of husbandry, they were not exempt from ad valorem taxation. On July 7, 2020, the trial court entered an order finding that PPF Gin's seven cotton module trucks were exempt, granting PPF Gin's summary judgment motion, and denying DCAD's motion. It further ordered "that [DCAD] correct its appraisal roll for tax years 2018 and 2019 and exempt from property taxation the [seven cotton module trucks] as constituting implements of husbandry." Finally, the trial court ordered DCAD "to inform the appropriate taxing unit of this correction as required by the Texas Tax Code." This appeal followed.
"A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, Inc. , 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018) (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture , 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (2004) ). "To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). "The evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the summary judgment evidence." Lam v. Phuong Nguyen , 335 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes , 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) ). We consider the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion." City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). As in this case, when the trial court's order granting a party's summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied upon, an appellate court must affirm if any of the summary judgment grounds are meritorious. Cunningham v. Tarski , 365 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
The summary judgment evidence in this case establishes that the module trucks in question are equipped with cotton module retriever beds, which are designed to load and haul harvested cotton modules to the gin, where they will be unloaded and filtered. The trucks are equipped with bed chains and tracks to guide the modules when they are being loaded. The beds have sidewalls, bows, and a tarp to enclose the cotton modules during transportation. The truck manufacturer, Stover Equipment Company, Inc. (Stover), markets, sells, repairs, and services the trucks in all cotton-producing states around the United States to cotton gins, independent cotton producers, and custom cotton haulers. Customers select the type of chassis they want, and then Stover will add or mount the module bed. Notably, to add the cotton module bed to the chassis, alterations are made to the plumbing, shafts, and cylinders, and oil tanks can be added. These additions or alterations make PPF Gin's cotton module trucks specific to the cotton-farming industry. When the trucks are not being used during the harvesting season, they are "parked" and not used for any other reason.
The trial court ruled that the module trucks were exempt from ad valorem taxation under Section 11.161 of the Tax Code, which states: "Machinery and equipment items that are used in the production of farm or ranch products or of timber, regardless of their primary design, are considered implements of husbandry and are exempt from ad valorem taxation." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.161. Resolution of this case turns on the correct interpretation of Section 11.161.
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton , 329 S.W.3d 475, 500 (Tex. 2010). Our primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc. , 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999) ; Pilgrim's Pride Corp. v. Cernat , 205 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet denied). "Where text is clear, text is determinative of that intent." Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009) (); see also Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., LP v. Johnson , 209 S.W.3d 644, 651–52 (Tex. 2006). This is because "the Legislature expresses its intent by the words it enacts and declares to be law." Bosque Disposal Sys., LLC v. Parker County Appraisal Dist. , 555 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Molinet v. Kimbrell , 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011) ).
We begin with the "plain and common meaning of the statute's words." Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors , 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998) ). We construe the statute according to its plain language if the language is unambiguous. McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) ; Fitzgerald , 996 S.W.2d at 865–66. "This general rule applies unless enforcing the plain language of the statute as written would produce absurd results." Summers , 282 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander , 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999) ).
Further, in determining legislative intent, we look at the statute as a whole and not isolated portions. In re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008). "We also presume that the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose, see Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. Calvert , 156 Tex. 587, 298 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1957), and that words not included were purposefully omitted." Id. (citing Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. , 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) ). When a statutory term is undefined, we will not find "a meaning that is out...
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