Denison v. Dawes

• Citation: 117 A. 314
• Parties: DENISON et al. v. DAWES.
• Decision Date: 10 June 1922
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

117 A. 314

DENISON et al.

v. DAWES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 10, 1922.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County, in Equity.

Suit by Cora M. Denison and others against Isabella A. Dawes to compel defendant to perform antenuptial agreement. Decree for complainants, and respondent appeals. Appeal sustained, decree reversed, and bill dismissed.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PHILBROOK, MORRILL, and WILSON, JJ.

Gerry L. Brooks, of Portland, and Edgar F. Corliss, of Bridgton, for appellant.

Harry R. Virgin, of Portland, for appellees.

WILSON, J. A bill in equity to compel the defendant to perform a certain antenuptial agreement entered into between her and her husband, the late Samuel H. Dawes, prior to their marriage in 1906, and to restrain her from enforcing her rights as his widow to an allowance from his estate, or from claiming any part of his estate under the statutes of this state, she having waived the provisions of his will which provided for her in accordance with the terms of the alleged antenuptial agreement.

The defendant in her answer denied having entered into such an agreement. No copy of it was found among the papers of the deceased, but notice to produce a copy alleged to have been delivered to her at the time of the execution, and, its execution having been proved to the satisfaction of the sitting justice, oral evidence of its contents was properly received. Camden v. Belgrade, 78 Me. 204, 209, 3 Atl. 652.

The defendant's counsel, however, contends that, admitting the existence of such an agreement, the provisions for the defendant were disproportionate to the wealth of the husband, and inadequate, and good faith was not exercised by him toward her, in that under the confidential relations then existing between them she was not fully apprised of the extent of his wealth, or of her rights in the same as his survivor, or to what extent and in what manner her rights therein were affected by the proposed agreement; that the agreement was therefore tainted with either actual or constructive fraud and should not be enforced in favor of his representative in a court of equity.

The sitting justice made no specific findings of fact bearing upon these contentions, simply holding that the bill should be sustained.

Such a conclusion, however, must have been based upon a finding that no actual or constructive fraud was shown, and that mere inadequacy of the provisions, if entered into in good faith, was not sufficient to invalidate such an agreement, or that, if there was a lack of good faith and actual or constructive fraud at the time of the execution of the agreement, the defendant later was fully apprised of the conditions, and of any such fraud, and, not having taken any steps to avoid such agreement during the lifetime of her husband, must now be held to have acquiesced in the agreement, and waived the fraud, or to be estopped from avoiding it upon this ground.

Parties to an antenuptial agreement, especially if the agreement to marry has already been entered into, occupy a confidential relation to each other. After betrothal a woman is presumed to be subject in such matters to the influence of her prospective husband, and has the right to repose the fullest confidence in him, and, without seeking outside advice rely on him to deal fairly with her in an agreement of this nature. If the husband's estate benefits thereby, there should in good faith on his part be a full disclosure of the nature and amount of his property, and the wife be fully advised of her rights in the premises. Where the provision for the wife as the survivor is clearly disproportionate to the amount of the husband's wealth, it raises a presumption of designed concealment, and places the burden on those claiming under it in his right to show that there was a full knowledge and understanding on the part of the wife at the time of execution of all the facts materially affecting her interests, viz. the extent of his wealth and her rights in his property as his survivor, and how modified by the proposed agreement. Achilles v. Achilles, 151 Ill. 136, 139, 37 N. E. 693; Mines v. Phee, 254 Ill. 60, 98 N. E. 260; Spurlock v. Brown, 91 Tenn. 241, 258, 261, 18 S. W. 868; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154, 158, 27 Am. Rep. 22; Graham v. Graham, 143 N. Y. 573, 580, 38 N. E. 722.

In the case at bar the provisions for defendant were clearly disproportionate to the wealth of her husband. At the time of the execution of this agreement he possessed approximately $50,000, and at his death left an estate of over $65,000. The present worth of an annuity of $400, the sum provided for her in the agreement, during the remainder of her life after his decease, based upon their relative expectancy of life according to the Mortuary Tables, was approximately $2,500, and at his death was only worth about $1,500, or perhaps slightly more, owing to the higher rates of interest prevailing at that time.

Even if the disproportion is not so great as to ipso facto render the agreement unenforceable in equity, if entered into in good faith it is sufficient to throw the burden on the plaintiffs who seek to benefit by the agreement of showing that it was entered into with a full understanding on the part of her who is adversely affected, not only of its provisions, but its effect upon her as the survivor of her prospective husband. Upon this point we think the plaintiff's evidence manifestly fails.

Mr. Dawes, the husband, at the time of the marriage in 1906 was 78 years of age, and the defendant 65. They had known each other since childhood. He had been twice married. She was a spinster. He sought by letter in the spring of 1906 to renew their early acquaintance, evidently with the purpose on his part of a prospective marriage.

It is a fair inference from the testimony that his plans did not always meet with the approval of his family, and at times, as appears in his letters in the case, he resented the interference; but that finally the marriage was not opposed, but was looked upon with some favor, presumably upon the condition that an agreement of the nature of the one executed should be entered into. So far as the evidence discloses, the defendant faithfully performed the duties as companion and helpmate during the 15 years of their married life, the last three of which the husband was in a state of almost helpless senility. The agreement was prepared by the daughter's brother-in-law, a practicing attorney in Boston, and by him forwarded to an attorney in Maine, who later brought it to the home of Mr. Dawes for execution on the morning of their marriage.

The case, however, is barren of evidence that it was ever mentioned to the defendant that such an agreement was to be made a preliminary to the marriage, or that she was in any way apprised of the fact that one was being prepared.

On the morning of the marriage, without previous notice to her, the attorney to whom the agreement was forwarded from Boston, appeared at the...