Director v. Freedom Info. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 17 July 2001
• Citation: 256 Conn. 764,775 A.2d 981
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: (Conn. 2001) DIRECTOR, RETIREMENT AND BENEFITS SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL. SC 16462

775 A.2d 981 (Conn. 2001)

DIRECTOR, RETIREMENT AND BENEFITS SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.

SC 16462

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued March 16, 2001

July 17, 2001

Laurie Adler, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Charles A. Overend, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Victor R. Perpetua, appellate attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).

Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Norcott, J.

Opinion

The issue before this court is whether the trial court properly determined that the disclosure of the home addresses of five state employees would not constitute an invasion of privacy and, therefore, that the information was not exempt from disclosure under General Statutes §§ 1-210 (b) (2)¹ of the Freedom of Information Act (act). This appeal arose from a decision of the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), ordering the plaintiff, the director of retirement and benefit services division, office of the comptroller, to disclose the home addresses of certain employees of the state department of banking (department), to the defendant, Eric Youngquist. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes §§ 4-183 (a),² and the act, General Statutes §§ 1206 (d),³ formerly §§ 1-21i (d). The trial court affirmed the commission's decision ordering the disclosure of the addresses. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book §§ 65-1 and General Statutes §§ 51-199 (c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. Youngquist had been the subject of an investigation conducted by the department that resulted in the revocation of his registration as an agent engaged in the sale of securities.⁴ In March, 1996, Youngquist submitted a request under the act that the plaintiff disclose the home addresses of thirty-eight employees of the department. Prior to this request, Youngquist had requested the disclosure of the home addresses of seventy-three employees of the department, including eighteen of the thirty-eight addresses regarding which Youngquist presently was seeking disclosure. The plaintiff denied Youngquist's request, informing him that the home addresses he requested were identical to those previously requested by him in a pending Superior Court case; Youngquist v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 950554601 (October 29, 1996) (18 Conn. L. Rptr. 2); and that a stay of the commission's decision ordering disclosure had been granted pending Youngquist's appeal in that case.⁵ The letter further stated that the request was denied on this ground. Youngquist appealed from the plaintiff's denial of his request to the commission.

Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-214 (b) and (c),⁶ the department distributed notices to the thirty-eight employees subject to Youngquist's disclosure request, advising them that their home addresses had been requested and that they could file written objections to their disclosure. The notice informed the employees that in order to claim exemption of their addresses, they would have to demonstrate that they had taken significant efforts to keep their addresses private. Subsequently, the department received eleven objections to the disclosure of employees' addresses. The Administrative and Residual Employees Union, which represented all thirty-eight employees, also objected. Three employees did not object to disclosure of their addresses and those addresses were provided to Youngquist by the plaintiff.

Because certain employees were contesting the disclosure request, hearings were conducted before a commission hearing officer. The plaintiff argued that the addresses of these employees were exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§ 1-210 (b) (2). Specifically, the plaintiff relied on West Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 218 Conn. 256, 265, 588 A.2d 1368 (1991), which held that addresses of public employees who had taken significant steps to keep these addresses private could be found exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§ 1-210 (b) (2). At the hearing, it was established that five employees not only had objected to the disclosure of their addresses, but had taken significant steps to keep their addresses private. These efforts included the exclusion of each employee's telephone number and address from telephone directories. Specifically, one employee testified that she refused all junk mail and responded to such mail by requesting that her name be removed from all mailing lists. Another employee used a post office box as his address, kept his name off mailing lists, and took other security measures as a result of his concern for his personal safety and that of his family. Two employees testified that they had substantial security concerns regarding their addresses based on previous incidents involving their families.⁷ Another employee testified that, because he was the lead investigator in the investigation that had resulted in Youngquist's registration being revoked and subsequent arrest, he had some fear of retaliation.

The commission held that the requested home addresses were not exempt pursuant to §§ 1-210 (b) (2), and ordered the plaintiff to disclose the requested home addresses of the department employees, excluding those addresses that the plaintiff already had provided to Youngquist. The decision relied largely on the ruling of the court, McWeeny, J., in the appeal concerning Youngquist's first request, which had ordered the release of the addresses in question and had concluded that employees do not have a privacy interest in their home addresses under §§ 1-210 (b) (2) even if they have taken steps to keep their addresses private.⁸ The commission also ordered the plaintiff to "'strictly comply' " with the provisions of the act in the future.

The plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court.⁹ The trial court, Hartmere, J., dismissed the appeal, concluding that all of the addresses requested were required to be disclosed pursuant to the §§ 1-210 (b) (2). Applying the test set forth in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 175, 635 A.2d 783 (1993), the trial court held that state employees' addresses are a matter of legitimate public concern because the public is "legitimately interested in ascertaining" the addresses, town, and street where state employees reside. The court also held that it would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person to disclose the addresses of the five employees who had taken significant steps to keep their addresses private. The court stated " 'as the majority of persons freely disclose their addresses, the disclosure of an address is not generally highly offensive to a reasonable person.' " The court reasoned that allowing an exemption for the five employees would be to rely on " 'their purely subjective desires' " for privacy.

This appeal followed. The issue before this court is whether the trial court properly determined that the disclosure of the addresses of the five state employees would not constitute an invasion of privacy and, therefore, that the information was not exempt from disclosure under §§ 1-210 (b) (2). We conclude that disclosure in this case would constitute an invasion of privacy and that the information was exempt from disclosure.

I.

Before addressing this issue, we briefly set forth the applicable standard of judicial review. Ordinarily, "[o]ur resolution of this [appeal] is guided by the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes §§ 4-166 et seq.; to the determinations made by an administrative agency. [W]e must decide, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 397, 604 A.2d 351 (1992).... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.... New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.... Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S. Ct. 781, 93 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1986); see also New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 773±n74; Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 342±n43, 435 A.2d 353 (1980)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 164±n65.

A reviewing court, however, is not required to defer to an improper application of the law. Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 153, 159, 585 A.2d 82 (1991); Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 133, 140, 509 A.2d 1050 (1986). It is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law. National Labor Relations Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S. Ct. 980, 13 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1965); Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra, 140. We previously have...