Doss v. State, 2012–0162.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 985 N.E.2d 1229,135 Ohio St.3d 211
• Docket Number: No. 2012–0162.,2012–0162.
• Parties: DOSS, Appellee, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 06 December 2012

135 Ohio St.3d 211
985 N.E.2d 1229

DOSS, Appellee,
v.
The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.

No. 2012–0162.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 26, 2012.
Decided Dec. 6, 2012.

[985 N.E.2d 1230]

[Ohio St.3d 211]Syllabus of the Court

1. One who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment.

2. A trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial.

Mancino, Mancino & Mancino and Paul Mancino Jr., Cleveland, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitor; and William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not entitled to summary judgment that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” eligible to sue the state for compensation pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 based solely on the appellate court's decision to reverse and vacate his conviction and order his immediate release from prison. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

{¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. He was classified as a sexually oriented offender, sentenced to four years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and a fine.

[Ohio St.3d 212]{¶ 3} On appeal, Doss challenged his rape and kidnapping convictions on several grounds, including a challenge to the evidence that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical condition and that Doss knew of that substantial impairment. The Eighth District, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the other party's capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss knew (or had reason to know) of the substantial impairment.

[985 N.E.2d 1231]

State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2007-Ohio-6483, 2007 WL 4261628 (“ Doss I ”).

{¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449, 2008 WL 323168 (“DossII ”). The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶ 21–23. The court vacated the convictions and ordered Doss discharged from prison.

{¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we declined review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1025. After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. On July 2, 2010, he filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the decision in Doss II. The motion, which contained no attachments or exhibits, was two and a half pages long and cited only the appellate judgment in Doss II as a basis for finding eligibility. The state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were issues of fact and arguing that Doss had failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

{¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss's motion for summary judgment for the following reason: “The court of appeals' decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff Doss's conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.”

{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet another two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429, 2011 WL 6245473 (“ Doss III”). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had revealed that Doss's statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim's mental condition and that the state had presented no evidence that Doss knew, or should have known, that the alleged victim's ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15. The court of appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

{¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated,

[Ohio St.3d 213]Our holding in [ Doss II ] does not mean that Doss is innocent—merely that, based upon the evidence the state presented, Doss's guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably should not have known of the victim's incapacity.

Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).

{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state's propositions of law: (1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” and (2) “Under R.C. 2743.48 an inmate must prove actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a separate and distinct legal standard than whether [sic] the evidence in a criminal case is sufficient to

[985 N.E.2d 1232]

convict a person beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Doss v. State, 131 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2012-Ohio-1501, 964 N.E.2d 439.

II. Analysis

{¶ 10} The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned. The first step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus. The wrongful-imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was added to the Revised Code in 1986 by Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil actions against the state, for specified monetary amounts, in the Court of Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned individuals.” 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351. The statute was designed to replace the former practice of compensating those wrongfully imprisoned by ad hoc moral-claims legislation. Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989). Under the statutory scheme, a claimant must be determined to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” by the court of common pleas before being permitted to file for compensation against...