Doss v. State

• Decision Date: 06 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2012–0162.,2012–0162.
• Citation: 985 N.E.2d 1229,135 Ohio St.3d 211
• Parties: DOSS, Appellee, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

135 Ohio St.3d 211

985 N.E.2d 1229

DOSS, Appellee,

v.The STATE of Ohio, Appellant.

No. 2012–0162.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 26, 2012.

Decided Dec. 6, 2012.

[Ohio St.3d 211]Syllabus of the Court

1. One who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment.

2. A trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial.

Mancino, Mancino & Mancino and Paul Mancino Jr., Cleveland, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitor; and William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not entitled to summary judgment that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” eligible to sue the state for compensation pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 based solely on the appellate court's decision to reverse and vacate his conviction and order his immediate release from prison. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

{¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. He was classified as a sexually oriented offender, sentenced to four years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and a fine.

[Ohio St.3d 212]{¶ 3} On appeal, Doss challenged his rape and kidnapping convictions on several grounds, including a challenge to the evidence that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical condition and that Doss knew of that substantial impairment. The Eighth District, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the other party's capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss knew (or had reason to know) of the substantial impairment.State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2007-Ohio-6483, 2007 WL 4261628 (“ Doss I ”).

{¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449, 2008 WL 323168 (“DossII ”). The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶ 21–23. The court vacated the convictions and ordered Doss discharged from prison.

{¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we declined review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1025. After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. On July 2, 2010, he filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the decision in Doss II. The motion, which contained no attachments or exhibits, was two and a half pages long and cited only the appellate judgment in Doss II as a basis for finding eligibility. The state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were issues of fact and arguing that Doss had failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

{¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss's motion for summary judgment for the following reason: “The court of appeals' decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff Doss's conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.”

{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet another two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429, 2011 WL 6245473 (“ Doss III”). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had revealed that Doss's statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim's mental condition and that the state had presented no evidence that Doss knew, or should have known, that the alleged victim's ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15. The court of appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

{¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated,

[Ohio St.3d 213]Our holding in [ Doss II ] does not mean that Doss is innocent—merely that, based upon the evidence the state presented, Doss's guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably should not have known of the victim's incapacity.

Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).

{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state's propositions of law: (1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” and (2) “Under R.C. 2743.48 an inmate must prove actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a separate and distinct legal standard than whether [sic] the evidence in a criminal case is sufficient to convict a person beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Doss v. State, 131 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2012-Ohio-1501, 964 N.E.2d 439.

II. Analysis

{¶ 10} The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned. The first step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus. The wrongful-imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was added to the Revised Code in 1986 by Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil actions against the state, for specified monetary amounts, in the Court of Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned individuals.” 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351. The statute was designed to replace the former practice of compensating those wrongfully imprisoned by ad hoc moral-claims legislation. Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989). Under the statutory scheme, a claimant must be determined to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” by the court of common pleas before being permitted to file for compensation against the state of Ohio in the Court of Claims. R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48(B)(2); Griffith v. Cleveland, paragraph two of the syllabus.

[Ohio St.3d 214]The Wrongful–Imprisonment Statute

{¶ 11} R.C. 2743.48 provides:

(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each of the following:

(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.

(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.

(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.

(4) The individual's conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.

(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual's release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 12} Thus, a plaintiff in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must first prove that he or she is a “wrongfully imprisonedindividual.” In this case, proof of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (4) is undisputed. Doss was convicted of a felony to which he did not plead guilty, he was sentenced to a prison term, his conviction was vacated upon appeal, and he is not subject to further charges. The fifth factor of R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of two ways: (1) subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, “an error in procedure resulted in the individual's release” or (2) the charged offense (and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the individual or no crime was committed at all (actual innocence). R.C. 2743.48(A)(5).

[Ohio St.3d 215]{¶ 13} This court's decision in Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 N.E.2d 962, precludes a claimant from relying solely on a judgment of acquittal to establish actual innocence. In Walden, the state appealed determinations of wrongful imprisonment for two individuals. One of them, Linda Walden, had been acquitted of murder. When she...