Doyle v. King
| Decision Date | 01 October 1947 |
| Docket Number | 15993. |
| Citation | 44 S.E.2d 608,211 S.C. 247 |
| Parties | DOYLE v. KING et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, of Georgetown County; L. D Lide, Judge.
Action by Joseph A. Doyle against R. T. King and others, as members of and constituting the county board of education for Georgetown County, to have certain act declared unconstitutional, and for injunction to restrain its enforcement. From judgment dismissing complaint, the plaintiff appeals.
Order of Judge Lide follows:
The plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of Georgetown County. He has brought this action to obtain an adjudication that an Act entitled, 'An Act to Authorized the County Board of Education of Georgetown County, State of South Carolina, to Issue and Sell Not Exceeding Four Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand ($475,000.00) Dollars of Notes of Georgetown County, State Aforesaid, for the Purposes of Constructing and Equipping School Buildings in and for Georgetown County; Purchasing Lands for Suitable Sites for Such Structures and Buildings; and Any Suitable Building or Buildings with or without the Lands upon Which the Same May be Situate; Remodeling, Enlarging, Changing and Improving Any Such Building or Buildings That May Be Purchased or That May be Already Owned by Georgetown County; Employing Architects Engineers and Other Necessary Personnel to Prepare Plans and Specifications for Such Building Program and to Do Any and All Things Necessary and Reasonable to Carry Out the Purposes of This Act', which became effective upon its approval by the Governor on May 12th, 1947, is unconstitutional on the ground that the body of the Act whose Title I have set forth, does not contain all of the matters set forth in the Title.
It will be noted that the Title authorizes the County Board of Education to issue and sell Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand ($475,000.00) Dollars of Notes of Georgetown County whose proceeds should be used for the following purposes:
(1) constructing and equipping school buildings in Georgetown County;
(2) purchasing of land for suitable sites for such structures and buildings;
(3) purchasing of suitable buildings, with or without the lands upon which the same may be situate;
(4) remodeling, enlarging, changing and improving any such buildings that may be purchased;
(5) remodeling, enlarging, changing and improving any building that may be already owned by Georgetown County;
(6) employing architects, engineers and other necessary personnel to prepare plans and specifications for such program; and, finally,
(7) to do any and all things necessary and reasonable to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The body of the Act merely provides that the County Board of Education is authorized to issue Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand ($475,000.00) Dollars of Notes of Georgetown County, whose proceeds should be applied for the purpose of constructing and equipping school buildings in Georgetown County, and the buying of lands or buildings for school purposes. The resolutions which are alleged to have been adopted by the County Board of Education follow the provisions found in the body of the Act literally and provide that the proceeds of the Notes be applied for the purpose of constructing and equipping school buildings and the buying of lands or buildings for school purposes.
It will thus be seen that the body of the Act does not authorize the remodeling, enlarging, changing or improving of any buildings that might be purchased by Georgetown County, or the remodeling, enlarging, chaning or improving of any buildings that might already be owned by Georgetown County, unless it be held that the authorization to construct school buildings would include an authorization to remodel, enlarge, change and improve buildings that might be purchased or which may already be owned by the County. Furthermore, there is no reference at all in the body of the Act, which would permit the employment of architects, engineers or other necessary personnel to prepare plans and specifications for 'such building program', although here little doubt could arise but that the authorization to construct would carry with it the authorization to do all things necessary to effectuate the construction and which would, of necessity, include the right to employ persons skilled in construction work, such as architects and engineers.
Section 17 of Article III of the Constitution provides: 'Every Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.'
The question here for decision is whether the provisions of this Section of the Constitution render void the Act in litigation.
As the County Board of Education is not attempting to expend money to remodel, enlarge, change or improve any existing buildings that might be owned by the County, or that might be acquired by the County, it is unnecessary for me to consider whether the authorization to construct school buildings, as contained in the body of the Act, would carry with it these other purposes. But, for the purpose of this Decree I shall assume that there appear in the Title of the Act matters which are not found in the body of the Act. Put otherwise, does the surplusage in the Title render the Act void?
The provision in our Constitution, which I have just cited, is common to many States and would appear to be the cause of frequent challenges of the validity of legislation. There are countless cases in this jurisdiction, in which Acts have been challenged for the reason that they relate to more than one subject, and there have been countless challenges on the ground that the subject of the legislation does not appear in the Title of the Act. Illustrative of this type of litigation are:
DeLoach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409, and State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625. It is unnecessary to review those cases. Suffice it to say that our Court has held that this Section should be construed liberally and should not be employed to unnecessarily embarrass legislation.
We have also had litigation in this State in an instance where a typographical error occurred in the Title to legislation. Incidentally, I have been advised that a mistake on the desk of one of the two Houses in the General Assembly probably brought about the situation here, as it would seem that the body of this Act is an amendment to a Bill, whose Title is now the Title to this Act, and that an amendment has been proposed changing the Title in such a way that it would have conformed to the body of the Act as it was afterwards enacted. The amendment to the Title was unfortunately omitted. Our Court has held that it is beyond the province of the judicial branch of the government to correct error of this sort. Robinson v. City of Columbia, 116 S.C. 193, 107 S.E. 476.
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