Eaton, Matter of
| Decision Date | 19 October 1969 |
| Citation | 740 P.2d 907,48 Wn.App. 806 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Residence of Daniel William EATON, A Minor. STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Appellant, v. ISLAND COUNTY JUVENILE COURT, Judge Richard L. Pitt, Larry and Barbara Eaton, husband and wife, and Daniel William Eaton, d.o.b |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Wendy Bolhke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bellingham, for appellant.
Christon Skinner, Zylstra, Beeksma, Waller & Skinner, Oak Harbor, for Larry and Barbara Eaton.
Joan H. McPherson, Coupeville, for Daniel William Eaton, a minor.
This is an action under RCW 13.32A, Procedures for Families in Conflict. The Washington Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) appeals an order requiring it to place Daniel Eaton at a specific treatment facility and a contempt order. DSHS contends the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority both in ordering the placement and in awarding the parents and child their attorney fees. We affirm the placement but reverse the attorney fee award.
In October 1985, Daniel Eaton's mother petitioned for an alternative residential placement (ARP) pursuant to RCW 13.32A.150. 1 An agreed order on that petition was entered in December 1985, placing Daniel in in-patient alcoholism treatment at Olympic Center in Bellingham. See RCW 13.32A.170, .180. 2 A review hearing was held pursuant to RCW 13.32A.190 3. The record of that hearing is not before us, but apparently Daniel's parents put on expert testimony recommending Secret Harbor as the best place for him, because he had run away from Olympic Center and it is almost impossible to run away from Secret Harbor since it is on an island. A DSHS caseworker appeared at that hearing and stated DSHS should process Daniel through its usual channels in order to decide whether he should go to Secret Harbor. The court entered an order on January 29, 1986, requiring DSHS to place Daniel at Secret Harbor as soon as there was an opening. The order also required a financial hearing (presumably to determine the parents' ability to pay for Secret Harbor) to be held within 6 months. See RCW 13.32A.175. 4
DSHS did not appeal the January 29 order, but instead simply failed to comply with it. Daniel and his parents determined that Secret Harbor had a place available and would hold it open for Daniel for a limited time, provided 1 month's advance payment could be made. Daniel and his parents then moved for a hearing to show cause why DSHS should not be held in contempt. DSHS responded with a motion for relief from the January 29 order. The 2 motions were both heard February 20, 1986.
The notice to DSHS of the show cause hearing was 1 day short of the 5-working-day notice required by CR 6. The court denied DSHS's request for a continuance, apparently on the ground DSHS had failed to show prejudice. The court ruled DSHS was in contempt, imposed sanctions and attorney fees, and denied DSHS's motion for relief.
DSHS then placed Daniel at Secret Harbor but filed a motion for discretionary review, which a court commissioner ruled would be treated as a notice of appeal. The only respondent appearing on this appeal is Daniel.
The parties agree the placement issue is moot, but DSHS urges us to address its appeal as a matter of substantial public interest. The assistant attorney general advised us at oral argument that, approximately twice a year, the courts of Whatcom, Skagit and Island Counties order DSHS to make a specific placement contrary to DSHS's wishes in an ARP proceeding.
This is a case of first impression and we believe there is a substantial public interest in resolving the issue.
The [appellate] court may, in its discretion, retain and decide an appeal which has otherwise become moot when it can be said that matters of continuing and substantial public interest are involved. Criteria to be considered in determining the "requisite degree of public interest are the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question." This exception to the general rule obtains only where the real merits of the controversy are unsettled and a continuing question of great public importance exists.
(Citations omitted.) Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). We therefore choose to address DSHS's contentions.
DSHS argues there is no statutory authority for the court to order a specific placement. It contends it is in the best position to know the best interests of all the children of a particular region so as to allocate the limited resources available among those children most in need.
The meaning of an act is to be gleaned from reading the entire statute as a whole. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 558 P.2d 155 (1976); State v. Leek, 26 Wash.App. 651, 614 P.2d 209 (1980). If a statute is not ambiguous, there is no room for judicial interpretation. State v. Leek, supra. There is no need for deference to an agency's interpretation if the statute is not ambiguous. Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Department of Labor and Indus., 88 Wash.2d 925, 568 P.2d 775 (1977).
We hold RCW 13.32A unambiguously states the legislature's intent to require the court to order a specific placement. The court is vested with discretion to modify the dispositional plan recommended by DSHS. RCW 13.32A.180(1). The order approving the dispositional plan "shall specify the person or agency with whom the child shall be placed." RCW 13.32A.180(1). "Shall" in a statute is an imperative and has the effect of creating a duty. Emwright v. King County, 96 Wash.2d 538, 637 P.2d 656 (1981). "Person" in a statute includes a public or private corporation as well as an individual. RCW 1.16.080. If the legislature intended the child simply to be placed with DSHS, it could have so specified by using the term "department," as it does throughout RCW 13.32A when referring to DSHS, rather than "person or agency." 5
At the 3-month review hearing held pursuant RCW 13.32A.190, the court is again vested with discretion to modify the dispositional plan. Nothing in the statute bars the court from ordering a specific placement based upon the review hearing. Rather, it is only logical that if the court must order a specific placement in the first instance, it must also order a specific placement if the ARP is to be continued.
The purpose of an ARP is to nurture families in conflict, RCW 13.32A.010, 6 by having DSHS assist families. See RCW 13.32A.150, 13.32A.170. In effectuating that purpose, the legislature did not grant DSHS the ultimate decision making authority over families in conflict. Rather, DSHS's function is to present recommendations o the court. RCW 13.32A.170, .180. The statute does not require a court to be bound by these recommendations. The court enters a dispositional order. RCW 13.32A.180. The court holds a review hearing. RCW 13.32A.190(1). The court may modify DSHS's proposed dispositional plan either at the initial hearing or at the review hearing. RCW 13.32A.180, .190. Judicial discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would have taken the action of the trial court. State v. Pascal, 108 Wash.2d 125, 139, 736 P.2d 1065 (1987); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986).
Assuming arguendo RCW 13.32A is ambiguous, we would still hold the legislature intended the juvenile court to have authority to order a specific placement. If 2 interpretations are possible, that which best serves the legislature's purpose will be adopted. Anderson v. Morris, supra. Even though an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to great weight, the ultimate authority for interpreting a statute nevertheless rests with the courts. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Meyering, 102 Wash.2d 385, 687 P.2d 195 (1984); Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wash.2d 821, 479 P.2d 919 (1971); McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 26 Wash.App. 195, 613 P.2d 146 (1980).
DSHS objects not only to the order requiring a specific placement, but also to the fact it was ordered to pay for Daniel's placement at Secret Harbor. Daniel's parents desired DSHS's assistance because Secret Harbor would not accept Daniel unless it could be assured of one month's advance payment (approximately $3200).
DSHS argues it is not liable to pay for any ARP, because custody by DSHS is a prerequisite to payment under RCW 74.13.080, and DSHS does not assume custody in an ARP situation. However, RCW 13.32A.175 specifically requires the court to determine the extent of the parents' ability to pay. By implication, DSHS pays if the parents cannot. See Rosell v. Department of Social and Health Services, 33 Wash.App. 153, 652 P.2d 1360 (1982). Here, the January 29 order stated a financial hearing would be held. RCW 74.08.090 and WAC 388-44 provide the means for DSHS to recover any overpayments, including payments made pending a hearing. Nothing in RCW 13.32A prevents DSHS from assuming custody of a child if that is in fact needed in order to qualify for state aid. In fact, RCW 13.32A.180(1) directs the court to specify in a dispositional order which parental powers will be awarded to the person or agency with whom the child is to be placed.
In summary, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion to modify the dispositional plan on January 29, 1986, in light of the facts expert testimony supported the placement and Secret Harbor was actually willing to hold a place for Daniel for a limited time. Therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in denying DSHS's motion for relief from the January 29 order.
DSHS next contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to grant DSHS a continuance. This issue is moot and not a matter of substantial public interest. Nevertheless, we note that the...
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Joseph v. Household Finance Corporation, No. 54667-8-I (WA 10/31/2005)
...ground in equity. Bowles v. Washington Dep't of Ret. Sys., 121 Wn.2d 52, 70, 847 P.2d 440 (1993); Eaton v. Island County Juvenile Court, 48 Wn. App. 806, 814, 740 P.2d 907 (1987) (`Attorney fee awards are not favored in this state, and will not be granted absent contract, statute, or recogn......
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Skimming v. Boxer
... ... Accordingly, former RCW 4.24.510 simply does not apply as a matter of law ... We affirm the decision of the trial judge and deny any fees on appeal ... WE CONCUR: BROWN, C.J. and ... Chamberlin, 100 Wash.2d 643, 649, 673 P.2d 610 (1983) (observing that under "American Rule," parties should pay their own attorney fees); In re Eaton, 48 Wash.App. 806, 814, 740 P.2d 907 (1987) ("Attorney fee awards are not favored in this state, and will not be granted absent contract, statute, or ... ...
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Eaton, Matter of
...One of the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court but reversed the contempt order to the extent of attorney fees. In re Eaton, 48 Wash.App. 806, 740 P.2d 907 (1987). DSHS seeks review of that decision. We accepted discretionary review. II Initially, we note that this case is moot. Aft......