Eaton, Matter of
| Decision Date | 07 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 54359-3,54359-3 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Residence of Daniel EATON, a minor. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Petitioner, v. Larry EATON, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Wendy Bohlke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bellingham, for petitioner.
Joan H. McPherson, Coupeville, for respondents.
Petitioner Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming an Island County Superior Court order that required (1) DSHS to place respondent Daniel Eaton (Eaton) at a specific group home and (2) DSHS to pay for the placement. We reverse.
On October 2, 1985, Barbara Eaton filed a petition for alternative residential placement (ARP) under RCW 13.32A, Procedures for Families in Conflict, in Island County Superior Court. The petition was in regard to her son, Daniel Eaton, then 15 years old. DSHS was not a named party to the action.
On December 11, 1985, the juvenile court entered an order on ARP stating that Eaton be temporarily placed with Olympic Center, an alcohol and drug treatment facility in Bellingham.
On January 29, 1986, at a review hearing of the ARP, the juvenile court ordered that Eaton's placement be changed. The juvenile court made its decision after reviewing Eaton's case file and hearing testimony from John Henderson of DSHS and Barbara Eaton. (The testimony itself was not transcribed.) The order read, in part:
Child shall be placed at Secret Harbor School by DSHS as soon as Secret Harbor has an available spot. Visitation efforts shall be continued. Interim placement to be with child's relatives, as arranged by parents. If child leaves residence of interim placement without permission, he shall be held in contempt of court and punished accordingly.
On February 11, 1986, Eaton's parents moved for contempt against DSHS and several named DSHS employees after it refused to comply with the order that Eaton be placed at Secret Harbor. DSHS responded and claimed that the January 29, 1986 order was void for want of personal jurisdiction since DSHS was not a party to Eaton's ARP action. DSHS also asserted that the juvenile court lacked the statutory authority to make a specific placement.
On February 20, 1986, pursuant to RCW 13.32A.250 and RCW 7.20.040 et seq., the juvenile court found DSHS in contempt for violating the order that it place Eaton at Secret Harbor. The juvenile court imposed a penalty of $100 per day on DSHS until it complied with the order. The juvenile court also ordered DSHS to pay Eaton's parents' costs and disbursements in the amount of $500 as well as Eaton's court appointed attorney costs and disbursements in the amount of $140.
DSHS placed Eaton at Secret Harbor and subsequently appealed. Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court but reversed the contempt order to the extent of attorney fees. In re Eaton, 48 Wash.App. 806, 740 P.2d 907 (1987). DSHS seeks review of that decision. We accepted discretionary review.
Initially, we note that this case is moot. After DSHS was found in contempt it placed Eaton at Secret Harbor. Also, Eaton has reached 18 years of age and is no longer at Secret Harbor, having successfully completed treatment.
Generally, this court will dismiss an appeal if the issues presented are moot. In re Myers, 105 Wash.2d 257, 261, 714 P.2d 303 (1986); Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). However, the court will make an exception to this rule and address a moot case "when it can be said that matters of continuing and substantial public interest are involved." Sorenson, at 558, 496 P.2d 512. Three criteria must be considered when
determining whether the requisite degree of public interest exists: (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the need for a judicial determination for future guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrences of the issue.
Myers, 105 Wash.2d at 261, 714 P.2d 303.
In the present case all three criteria are met. It is a continuing question of public importance whether the juvenile court or DSHS has the right to select the placement of juveniles under RCW 13.32A. This issue has recurred since Eaton's placement, so there is a need for this court to answer the question. Therefore, we hold that the present case is reviewable despite its mootness because it raises an issue of continuing and substantial public interest.
DSHS contends that the juvenile court has no authority to order DSHS to place Eaton at Secret Harbor. DSHS asserts that it should have been allowed to go through its own procedures to determine the proper placement for Eaton.
The conflict arose at the juvenile court hearing to review Eaton's ARP. At that time, Eaton's parents wanted Eaton to be transferred from Olympic Center to Secret Harbor and they had arranged with Secret Harbor for such placement. DSHS does not contend that Secret Harbor was an incorrect placement for Eaton. Rather, it objects to being ordered to place Eaton specifically at Secret Harbor. DSHS argues that it should be allowed to follow its procedures in determining the specific placement location. Thus, DSHS can consider all the children that need placement before determining what children have the greatest need of particular services at any given time. If DSHS is ordered to make a specific ARP, then it is prevented from carrying out its duties and responsibilities to all the children in its custody. DSHS asserts that this important step of considering all children is bypassed if the juvenile court makes the placement.
We need look no further than RCW 13.32A to find our answer. The Legislature enacted RCW 13.32A to help families who have conflict in their family relationships. In doing so, the Legislature commented in part:
The legislature reaffirms its position stated in RCW 13.34.020 that the family unit is the fundamental resource of American life which should be nurtured and that it should remain intact in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary.
RCW 13.32A.010. With this directive in mind, the Legislature's first priority throughout RCW 13.32A is to try to resolve the conflict so that the family unit can be kept intact.
If every effort at reconciliation has failed, however, then either the parent or child may petition the juvenile court for an ARP. RCW 13.32A.150. The petition asks only that the court approve the placement of the child outside of the parent's home. RCW 13.32A.150. If approved, the ARP is for a limited period of time. RCW 13.32A.180(1). Furthermore, services are made available to the parents and child in an attempt to reunify the family throughout the placement. RCW 13.32A.100.
Once the petition has been filed, DSHS may place the child "in a crisis residential center, foster family home, group home facility licensed under chapter 74.15 RCW, or any other suitable residence to be determined by the department." RCW 13.32A.160(2).
The juvenile court then holds a fact-finding hearing to consider whether the ARP petition should be granted. If the juvenile court approves the petition, the order approving the ARP
shall direct [DSHS] to submit a disposition plan for a three-month placement of the child that is designed to reunite the family and resolve the family conflict.... In making the order, the court shall further direct the department to make recommendations, as to which agency or person should have physical custody of the child, as to which parental powers should be awarded to such agency or person, and as to parental visitation rights.
RCW 13.32A.170(2).
Next, the disposition hearing is held and the juvenile court is required to consider DSHS' 3-month disposition plan. RCW 13.32A.180(1).
The court ... may modify such plan and shall make its dispositional order for a three-month out-of-home placement for the child. The court dispositional order shall specify the person or agency with whom the child shall be placed, those parental powers which will be temporarily awarded to such agency or person including but not limited to the right to authorize medical, dental, and optical treatment, and parental visitation rights.
(Italics ours). RCW 13.32A.180(1).
Finally, the court schedules another hearing to review the ARP within 3 months. RCW 13.32A.190. At that review hearing
the court shall approve or disapprove the continuation of the dispositional plan in accordance with the goal of resolving the conflict and reuniting the family which governed the initial approval. The court shall determine whether reasonable efforts have been made to reunify the family and make it possible for the child to return home. The court is authorized to discontinue the placement and order that the child return home if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the parents have displayed concerted efforts to utilize services and resolve the conflict and the court has reason to believe that the child's refusal to return home is capricious. If out-of-home placement is continued, the court may modify the dispositional plan.
(Italics ours). RCW 13.32A.190(2).
When construing a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Frank v. Fischer, 108 Wash.2d 468, 473-74, 739 P.2d 1145 (1987); Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986). If the statute is unambiguous, the meaning of the statute must be derived solely from the language of the statute. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 819, 822, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988); Frank, 108 Wash.2d at 474, 39 P.2d 1145; Stewart Carpet Serv., Inc. v. Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 353, 358, 715 P.2d 115 (1986).
Furthermore, where a statute designates a list of things whereupon the statute operates, the inference arises that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.
... ... MARTINEZ, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkts. # 20 and # 22. The parties seek judgments as a matter of law with respect ... Wright v. Engum, 124 Wash.2d 343, 351, 878 P.2d 1198 (1994) (quoting In re Eaton, 110 Wash.2d 892, 901, 757 P.2d 961 (1988) ). Without a more precise directive from the Legislature, it would be utterly fatuous to interpret RCW ... ...
-
City of Seattle v. Long
... ... Summary judgment is proper if the record shows "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the "moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). The parties do not appear to contest the facts in this case. I. The Homestead Act 10 A "uniquely American contribution" to real ... Pet'rs Reply Br. at 8-9 (citing In re Eaton , 110 Wash.2d 892, 895, 757 P.2d 961 (1988) ). Long is correct that the excessive fines clause issue is public, arising in other jurisdictions, ... ...
-
Multicare Medical Center v. State, Dept. of Social and Health Services
... ... 15 Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 819, 822, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988). As a threshold matter, State v. Theilken, 102 Wash.2d 271, 684 P.2d 709 (1984), we note that the statute is not ambiguous. The Legislature specifically mentioned the ... Because RCW 74.09.120 is unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from its language alone. In re Eaton, 110 Wash.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988); Public Util. Dist. 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 110 Wash.2d 114, 118, 750 P.2d 1240 (1988); ... ...
-
Bercier v. Kiga
... ... 6. Waste Mgmt. v. WUTC, 123 Wash.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994); In re Eaton, 110 Wash.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988) ... 7. Children's Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Wash. State Dep't of Health, 95 ... ...