Edwards v. State

• Decision Date: 23 October 2020
• Docket Number: A20A0919
• Citation: 357 Ga.App. 318,850 S.E.2d 797
• Parties: EDWARDS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

357 Ga.App. 318

850 S.E.2d 797

EDWARDS

v.The STATE.

A20A0919

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 23, 2020

Kathleen Strang, for Appellant.

Samuel H. Altman, District Attorney, Jessica Black Wilson, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

Markle, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Connie Edwards was convicted of child molestation ( OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) ), rape ( OCGA § 16-6-1 ), and incest ( OCGA § 16-6-22 ). On appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial, he (1) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his rape conviction; and (2) contends that the trial court erred by (a) denying his motion to suppress his custodial statements, and (b) admitting evidence of other acts of child molestation under OCGA § 24-4-414. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence shows that, in June 2015, Edwards babysat the victim, his then six-year-old granddaughter, at his home. Two weeks later, the victim's mother noticed that the victim was walking abnormally, and, after she inquired, the victim disclosed to her that Edwards "had took his thing out and he had put it between her legs." Her mother immediately took the victim to the emergency room where she was diagnosed and treated for a vaginal infection

, and the police were notified. But Edwards fled the jurisdiction before officers were able to contact him.

During a forensic interview, the victim disclosed that Edwards had put his penis inside her vagina, and that it hurt. Approximately one month after the disclosure, the victim was given a sexual assault exam, the results of which were normal.

Months later, Edwards was discovered in Missouri, where he had been arrested for allegedly molesting a nine-year-old girl, S. H., whom Edwards viewed as a granddaughter. Edwards submitted to two custodial interviews in Missouri – the first regarding S. H.’s allegations, and the second regarding the victim's – during which he admitted to the conduct alleged by both girls and wrote apology letters to them. S. H. tragically died from unrelated causes before Edwards could be tried in her case.

Prior to the trial in the present case, the State filed notice of its intent to submit to the jury evidence of Edwards's other acts of child molestation. After hearing argument, the trial court admitted the evidence regarding S. H.’s allegations, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-414 ("Rule 414"), and admitted Edwards's custodial statements after finding they were freely and knowingly given.

At trial, the victim's testimony was consistent with her prior disclosures. Her forensic interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The child advocate who conducted the interview opined that the victim's behavior and presentment were indicative of a child who suffered a traumatic event; the victim did not exhibit signs of coaching; and she was consistent in her descriptions of Edwards's penis penetrating her vagina. A medical expert, who reviewed the report from the victim's sexual assault exam, opined that the negative results could be attributed to the month-long delay before the victim was tested, and concluded that she could not say with certainty that the victim was not raped based on the results. Edwards did not testify, but his apology letters and his interviews with the Missouri detective were admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

The jury convicted Edwards on all counts. Edwards filed a motion for new trial, raising the grounds now enumerated on appeal. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.¹

1. Edwards first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for rape, arguing that the State failed to prove the essential element of penetration because the result of the sexual assault exam was negative, and the similar transaction evidence did not show S. H. was raped.² This argument is meritless.

In resolving [Edwards's] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the jury's verdict. Weighing the evidence and determining witness credibility are beyond the purview of this court. We simply assess whether the evidence was sufficient to find [Edwards] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Atkins v. State , 342 Ga. App. 849, 805 S.E.2d 612 (2017).

Pursuant to OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (2), "[a] person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of ... [a] female who is less than ten years of age." The statute defines "carnal knowledge" as "any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ." OCGA § 16-6-1 (a). As we have explained, "[t]he necessary penetration need be only slight and may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mayes v. State , 336 Ga. App. 55, 58 (1), 783 S.E.2d 659 (2016).

Here, the victim testified that Edwards put the part of his body that would be covered by a swimsuit inside the lower part of her body that would be covered by a swimsuit. This testimony alone was sufficient to prove the penetration element of the rape charge. See Garner v. State , 346 Ga. App. 351, 355 (1), 816 S.E.2d 368 (2018) (finding the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the rape conviction, and noting "corroborating evidence is not required"); see also Mack v. State , 338 Ga. App. 854, 856 (1), 792 S.E.2d 120 (2016) (victim's testimony that she did not consent to have sex with defendant was sufficient to sustain rape conviction); OCGA § 24-14-8 ("The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact."). And, although corroboration is not required under Georgia law, the forensic interviewer testified that the victim disclosed that Edwards penetrated her vagina with his penis. See Glaze v. State , 317 Ga. App. 679, 681 (1), 732 S.E.2d 771 (2012) (noting "the General Assembly long ago removed the corroboration requirement from the rape statute").

To the extent that there were inconsistencies in the evidence, such was for the jury to resolve.³ Seals v. State , 350 Ga. App. 787, 789-790 (1), 830 S.E.2d 315 (2019). On this record, the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction.

2. Edwards next argues that the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements because he did not freely and knowingly waive his Miranda⁴ rights. Specifically, Edwards contends the investigator improperly offered him an inducement to obtain the first waiver, and then ignored his request for an attorney when obtaining the second waiver. We discern no error.

A defendant may waive his rights under Miranda , provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. A statement by an interrogating agent that contradicts the Miranda warnings is a circumstance that can indicate a suspect did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. Although we defer to the trial court's findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State , 309 Ga. 529, 534 (2) (a), 847 S.E.2d 347, 353 (2) (a) (2020). And we will not disturb a trial court's ruling regarding the voluntariness of a defendant's Miranda waiver unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 535 (2) (a), 847 S.E.2d 347. With these principles in mind, we turn to Edwards's specific claims, concluding that neither has merit.

(a) The first interview.

Edwards contends that the statements he made during his first interrogation should have been suppressed because they were induced by the detective's promise that he would receive counseling. We disagree.

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-8-824, in order for a confession to be admissible, it must "have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury."

It has long been understood that "slightest hope of benefit" refers to promises related to reduced criminal punishment – a shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at all. By contrast, exhortations or encouragement to tell the truth and comments conveying the seriousness of a suspect's situation do not render his subsequent statements involuntary.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reed v. State , 307 Ga. 527, 533 (2) (a), 837 S.E.2d 272 (2019).

At the Jackson-Denno⁵ hearing, the detective testified that he initially interviewed Edwards regarding the case in Missouri involving S. H.; that he advised Edwards of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview; and that he obtained Edwards's signature on a waiver form. The detective further testified that he did not promise Edwards anything in exchange for his statements, nor did he coerce or threaten Edwards.

Our review of the videotaped interview confirms the detective's testimony.⁶ Approximately 15 minutes before Edwards confessed to touching S. H., the detective stated that his primary concern was providing services to S. H., and then he noted that Edwards might need counseling as well. Even if this remark could be interpreted as a promise to provide Edwards with counseling, such a promise would not result in the interview's exclusion. OCGA § 24-8-825 ("The fact that a confession has been made under a ... promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it."); see also Pittman v. State , 277 Ga. 475, 478 (2), 592 S.E.2d 72 (2004) (Custodial statements were admissible where detective admonished defendant to tell the truth, otherwise, the police "can't help you like this."). Nowhere in the interview did the detective promise a reduction in the charges or the potential sentence in exchange for the confession. As such, Edwards's confession was not wrongly...