Ex parte Anthony
| Decision Date | 20 February 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27353. |
| Citation | 198 Wash. 106,87 P.2d 302 |
| Parties | Ex parte ANTHONY. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Proceeding in the matter of the petition of Arthur Anthony for a writ of habeas corpus to be discharged from custody of a California parole officer holding warrant of arrest issued in interstate rendition proceedings. From an order discharging the petitioner, the State of California appeals.
Order reversed, with instructions to deny prayer of writ and remand petitioner to custody of parole officer.
Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; E. D. Hodge, judge.
Stuart H. Elliott, of Tacoma, for the State of California.
H Sylvester Garvin and Anthony Savage, both of Seattle, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the superior court discharging a person held in custody by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued in interstate rendition proceedings.
In July, 1927, Arthur Anthony, alias Richard Stafford Bosworth petitioner herein, was convicted of the crime of forgery in Los Angeles County, California, and was committed to the state prison at Folsom. On June 20, 1932, he was paroled by the board of prison directors of that state. Some time later he was charged with the commission of an offense in Sonoma county and a warrant for his arrest was issued, but he could not be found at that time. In May, 1933, his parole was revoked for violation of its terms and conditions. On July 22, 1933, he was apprehended by the police in San Francisco and a charge was placed against him.
While in the city jail in San Francisco petitioner asked that he might confer with a post-office inspector, and in a subsequent interview with that official he confessed his complicity in a burglary of a post office in Florin, California, on the night of July 21, 1933. Through some arrangement, the exact details of which are not disclosed, made between the state parole officer and the federal authorities, petitioner was taken to Sacramento where he was indicted in the federal court for burglary of the post office and, upon his plea of guilty, was sentenced to a term of five years in a federal penitentiary. Upon commitment, he was brought to the state of Washington and imprisoned on September 14, 1933, in the United States penitentiary at McNeil Island. At the expiration of his term on September 10, 1938, he was released from the federal penitentiary and was immediately taken into custody by a state parole officer of California holding a warrant upon interstate rendition proceedings. Petitioner thereupon applied to the superior court for Pierce county in this state for a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing, obtained his discharge. The state of California has appealed from the court's order releasing petitioner.
The question presented to us for decision is this: If a convicted person is taken into custody in another state, after his parole in that state has been revoked, and is thereafter surrendered by the parole officer to federal authorities to answer for a federal offense committed in the same state, and upon conviction of such offense is brought to this state for imprisonment in a federal penitentiary, is such person, upon his release from the federal penitentiary in this state, subject to extradition as a fugitive from justice of the demanding state, within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the United States?
The authority, power and duty of the several states in matters pertaining to interstate rendition are contained and prescribed in Art. 4, § 2, of the United States constitution, U.S.C.A., which provides: 'A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.'
Sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 662, 663), and chapter 73, § 2, 48 Stat. 455 (18 U.S.C.A. § 662c), prescribe the procedure to be followed in such cases. Those provisions of the federal constitution and acts of Congress constitute the law applicable to extradition or interstate rendition of fugitives from justice. In re Roberts, 186 Wash. 13, 56 P.2d 703.
In the case just cited, wherein the facts, though not identical with, are similar to those in the case at bar, we declared the law of this state upon the subject, in language broad yet specific enough to govern a set of facts such as we have here. We there expressly held that if a party charged with a crime was physically present in the state of location, at the time of the commission of the crime, and if thereafter he left that state, he is a fugitive from justice, within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the United States relating to interstate rendition, regardless of his motive or reason for leaving the state.
The authorities upon which our conclusion was rested, beginning with Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544, continuing with Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073, and Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193, and followed by many others, both federal and state, were cited in the opinion and need not be repeated here. To those, however, may be added People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallon, 218 A.D. 461, 218 N.Y.S. 432, affirmed without opinion in 245 N.Y. 521, 157 N.E. 842; Ex parte Williams, 10 Okl.Cr. 344, 136 P. 597, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 668; Ex parte Foster, 60 Okl.Cr. 50, 61 P.2d 37; Ex parte George, Okl.Cr.App., 73 P.2d 471; Reed v. Colpoys, 69 App.D.C. 163, 99 F.2d 396. Our adherence to the views expressed in the case of In re Roberts, supra, is sufficiently indicated by this reference to it.
The one distinguishing fact between that case and this is that in the Roberts case the petitioner left the demanding state voluntarily, while in this case he was removed by legal compulsion. Upon that distinction, petitioner claims the right to be discharged from custody and relieved from rendition to the state of California. His contention is that since he did not 'flee from the justice' of that state, but was forcibly removed therefrom, he is...
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