Ex parte Monroe County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2010
• Docket Number: 1090387.
• Citation: 48 So.3d 621,262 Ed. Law Rep. 702
• Parties: Ex parte MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Frankye Beal. (In re Pamela Jones Al-Sulaibe, as next friend of Rashid Jones, a minor child v. Monroe County Board of Education and Frankye Beal).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

48 So.3d 621 262 Ed. Law Rep. 702 Ex parte MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Frankye Beal. (In re Pamela Jones Al-Sulaibe, as next friend of Rashid Jones, a minor child v. Monroe County Board of Education and Frankye Beal). 1090387. Supreme Court of Alabama. May 14, 2010.

Mark S. Boardman and Clay R. Carr of Boardman, Carr, Hutcheson & Bennett, P.C., Chelsea, for petitioners.

Debbie Lindsey Jared of Jared & Brunson, Elba, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The Monroe County Board of Education ("the Board") and Frankye Beal, a fifth-grade teacher at Beatrice Elementary School in Monroe County, petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Dawn W. Hare to grant their motions for a summary judgment dismissing Pamela Jones Al-Sulaibe's tort claims against them because, they say, they are entitled to immunity-absolute immunity as to the Board and State-agent immunity as to Beal. We grant the petition and issue the writ as to the Board; we deny the petition as to Beal.

Facts

On February 27, 2007, Beal disciplined then 12-year-old Rashid Jones for having repeatedly disrupted his fifth-grade class. Jones was repeating the fifth grade and was two years older than most of his classmates. In the hall outside the classroom, Beal initially attempted to "hand-paddle" Jones using two rulers taped together to strike Jones's palms. Jones resisted by pulling his hand away several times. Beal then told Jones that she would have to paddle him, and she retrieved her paddle from the classroom. She and Jones entered an empty classroom next door to Beal's classroom. Beal instructed Jones to touch his feet and Beal attempted to paddle Jones. Jones repeatedly moved to avoid the spanking, and at one point hegrabbed the paddle and attempted to take it away from Beal. As Jones moved, Beal struck him on the back of his thigh. According to Beal, she made no further attempt to paddle Jones, who then disobeyed Beal again by not returning to the fifth-grade classroom. According to Jones, Beal continued to strike him and he suffered injuries to one of his legs and an arm. The next day, Jones's mother removed Jones from Beatrice Elementary School and enrolled him in another school where he finished the fifth grade.

On February 26, 2008, Pamela Jones Al-Sulaibe, as next friend of Jones, sued the Board, asserting claims of negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. Jones also sued Beal, asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and assault. According to Al-Sulaibe's complaint, Beal did not have good cause to discipline Jones, Beal did not first attempt to give Jones a "hand-paddling," and Beal struck Jones several times with the paddle, hitting his arm and leg. The Board and Beal answered, asserting immunity.

On August 31, 2009, the Board and Beal moved for a summary judgment. The Board asserted absolute immunity; Beal asserted State-agent, schoolmaster's, and statutory immunity. To support the motion, the Board and Beal submitted affidavits from Beal and her supervisors testifying that Beal acted at all times within the scope of her authority and in compliance with the Board's policies. Al-Sulaibe filed an opposing brief without supporting evidence and without addressing Beal's arguments regarding statutory and schoolmaster's immunity.

On November 4, 2008, the trial court summarily denied the Board and Beal's motion. The Board and Beal timely filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.

Standard of Review

" 'While the general rule is that denial of a summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an appellate court, the exception to the general rule is that a denial of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus....'

" Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002).

" 'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'

" Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001).

" 'This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce"substantial evidence" as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).'

" Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.2004)."

Ex parte Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 4 So.3d 1099, 1101-02 (Ala.2008). Additionally, in conducting our appellate review, we will consider only the factual material submitted to the trial court for its consideration in deciding the summary-judgment motion. Ex parte Madison County Bd. of Educ., 1 So.3d 980, 986 (Ala.2008).

Discussion

The Board contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a summary judgment as to it because, it says, claims against the Board are barred by absolute immunity under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14.

" 'Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." This section affords the State and its agencies an "absolute" immunity from suit in any court. Ex parte Mobile County Dep't of Human Res., 815 So.2d 527, 530 (Ala.2001) (stating that Ala. Const.1901, § 14, confers on the State of Alabama and its agencies absolute immunity from suit in any court); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.2000) ("Under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14, the State of Alabama has absolute immunity from lawsuits. This absolute immunity extends to arms or agencies of the state ...."). Indeed, this Court has described § 14 as an "almost invincible" "wall" of immunity. Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So.2d 943, 946 (Ala.1994). This "wall of immunity" is "nearly impregnable," Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002), and bars "almost every conceivable type of suit." Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So.2d 281, 283 (1971). Moreover, if an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case "presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent." Patterson, 835 So.2d at 142-43.'

" Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004) (emphasis added). For purposes of § 14 immunity, county boards of education are considered agencies of the State. Louviere v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So.2d 873, 877 (Ala.1995)('County boards of education, as local agencies of the State, enjoy [§ 14] immunity.'). Thus, this Court has held that county boards of education are immune from tort actions. See Brown v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 524 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1988); Hutt v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 454 So.2d 973, 974 (Ala.1984)."

Ex parte Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 4 So.3d at 1102-03.

In Ex parte Hale County Board of Education, 14 So.3d 844 (Ala.2009), this Court revisited the issue whether county boards of education were immune from suit, overruling Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education, 337 So.2d 1310 (Ala.1976), and Kimmons v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 204 Ala. 384, 85 So. 774 (1920),and stating that "because county boards of education are local agencies of the State, they are clothed in constitutional immunity from suit" and that the immunity accorded a county board of education is absolute.

The Board is a local agency of the State that has absolute immunity under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14. Therefore, the Board is entitled to a summary judgment and the trial court erred in denying the motion for a summary judgment as to the Board.

Next, Beal contends that the trial court erred in refusing to enter a summary judgment for her because, she says, Al-Sulaibe's claims against her are barred by State-agent immunity. Specifically, Beal contends that because she is certified by the State of Alabama as a school teacher, because, at the time of the incident with Jones, she was exercising her judgment in performing official duties for supervising and educating students, and because there is no evidence indicating that she exceeded her authority, she is entitled to State-agent immunity.

"A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

"....

"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in .... educating students.

"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity

"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise;

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