Fields v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Topeka, Kan.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1943
• Docket Number: 38519
• Citation: 176 S.W.2d 281,352 Mo. 141
• Parties: Mary J. Fields Appellant, v. Pyramid Life Insurance Company of Topeka, Kansas, a Corporation
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

176 S.W.2d 281

352 Mo. 141

Mary J. Fields Appellant, v. Pyramid Life Insurance Company of Topeka, Kansas, a Corporation

No. 38519

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 1, 1943

Rehearing Denied December 6, 1943. Motion to Transfer to Banc Overruled January 3, 1944.

Appeal from Clay Circuit Court; Hon. James S. Rooney Judge.

Affirmed.

Russell D. Farris, Wilson D. Hill and Calvin & Kimbrell for appellant.

(1) The provisions of the supplemental contracts relative to double indemnity for accidental death which exempt the insurer from liability in case the death of the insured results from self-destruction while insane are invalid. Sec. 5851, R.S 1939; Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948; Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45; Andrus v. Business Men's Accident Assn., 283 Mo. 442, 223 S.W. 70; Aufrichtig v. Columbian Natl. Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249 S.W. 912; Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489, 51 L.Ed. 895 (2) The Missouri suicide statute applies to the supplemental contracts providing double indemnity for accidental death involved in this action. Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra; Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., supra; Aufrichtig v. Columbian Natl. Life Ins. Co., supra; Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra. (3) Self-destruction while insane was an accident within the meaning of the supplemental contracts involved. Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra; Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., supra; Andrus v. Business Men's Accident Assn., supra; Aufrichtig v. Columbian Natl. Life Ins. Co., supra; Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra; Scales v. Natl. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 212 S.W. 8; Woodlock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 225 S.W. 994; Rodgers v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 311 Mo. 249, 278 S.W. 368. (4) It being alleged in plaintiff's petition that the death of the insured resulted from self-administered poison while insane, the death of the insured from self-administered poison, while insane, being an accident, and the provisions of the supplemental contracts exempting the defendant from liability, if the death of the insured resulted from self-administered poison while insane being invalid, evidence on the part of the plaintiff proving, and tending to prove, that the death of the insured resulted from self-administered poison while insane was competent and the court erred in rejecting her proof directed to that issue and erred in rejecting her offer of proof in regard thereto. Authorities cited under points (1), (2) and (3). Reynolds v. Maryland, etc., Co., 278 Mo. 154, 201 S.W. 45; Edwards v. Business Men's, etc., Co., 168 S.W.2d 82; Lemmon v. Continental, etc., Co., 169 S.W.2d 920. (5) The provisions of the supplemental contracts, seeking to limit or avoid liability in certain contingencies, must be construed most strongly against the defendant for the reason that their restrictive terms tend to narrow the range and limit the force of the principal obligations of the contracts. Renn v. Supreme Lodge, 83 Mo.App. 442; Howell v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 215 Mo.App. 692, 253 S.W. 411; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen of America, 236 Mo. 326, 139 S.W. 151; State ex rel. v. Allen, 305 Mo. 607, 267 S.W. 379; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 327 Mo. 899, 39 S.W.2d 355.

Howell, Jacobs & Howell, Floyd E. Jacobs, Chas. M. Howell, Jr., Virgil Yates, Katherine Halterman and Scott R. Timmons for respondent.

(1) Exceptions to coverage in double indemnity contracts attached to life insurance policies, should be construed as any other provisions. They should be given their ordinary meaning. The courts will not read into such exceptions ambiguities when none exist. Insured's death was admittedly caused by self-administered poison. The double indemnity contracts sued on except death caused "directly or indirectly by . . . poisoning." Scales v. Natl. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 186 S.W. 948; Wendorff v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99, 57 A.L.R. 615; Beem v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 231 Mo.App. 685, 105 S.W.2d 956; Reed v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 227 Mo.App. 1155, 60 S.W.2d 59; Dixon v. Travelers Protective Assn. of America, 234 Mo.App. 127, 113 S.W.2d 1086; State ex rel. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 276, 126 S.W.2d 181; State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Shain, 344 Mo. 623, 127 S.W.2d 675; Brock v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 200; Cleaver v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 346 Mo. 548, 142 S.W.2d 474; Erich v. State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16 A.2d 351; King v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 72 F.2d 620; Rasmussen v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 267 N.Y. 129, 195 N.E. 821; Diamond v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 247 A.D. 203, 286 N.Y.S. 625; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 14 F.Supp. 721, affirmed 84 F.2d 1011; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Murrell, 65 F.2d 990; Kennedy v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 172 So. 743; Osburn v. Com. Trave. Acc. Assn., 265 N.Y. 671, 193 N.E. 438; Northern Trust Co. v. Central L. Ins. Co., 274 Ill.App. 551, certiorari denied by Ill. Sup. Ct., Oct. 23, 1934; Riley v. Inter-State Business Men's Acc. Assn., 184 Iowa 1124, 169 N.W. 448; Stone v. Physicians Casualty Assn., 130 Neb. 769, 266 N.W. 605. (2) The parties had the right to enter into this contract which in no way violates Section 5851, R.S. 1939, the Missouri Suicide Statute. Such statute deals in express terms with suicide solely as a defense. The suicide of insured was admitted in defendant's answer and was not set up as a defense. Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45; Scales v. Natl. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 186 S.W. 948; Same case in Supreme Court, 212 S.W. 8; McReynolds v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 895; certiorari denied Jan. 5, 1942, see 86 L.Ed. 362; Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989, 130 S.W.2d 479; Gates v. Knights Templars & Masonic Mut. Aid Assn., 198 Mo.App. 688, 202 S.W. 280; New York Life Ins. Co. v. West, 102 Colo. 591, 82 P.2d 754. (3) Even if the death of the insured had been covered by the supplemental double indemnity contracts, still the court was not in error in refusing to accept the proffered offer of proof that the insured was insane at the time he drank the poison. The offer of proof was too general and contained conclusions and not offers of evidentiary facts. Thompson v. Conrad-Gideon Special Road District of New Madrid County, 323 Mo. 953, 19 S.W.2d 1049; Rodgers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 311 Mo. 249, 278 S.W. 368; Seibert v. Tiffany, 8 Mo.App. 33; Williams v. Williams, 259 Mo. 242, 168 S.W. 242; City of Kirkwood v. Cronin, 259 Mo. 207, 168 S.W. 674.

Bohling, C. Westhues and Barrett, CC., concur.

OPINION

BOHLING

The issue as presented is whether a beneficiary under accident insurance provisions which expressly exclude coverage for death caused by poison may recover the accidental death benefits where insured's death resulted from self-administered poison while insane. (We set out the policy provisions in the footnote ^[*]) The case is here upon certification from the Kansas City Court of Appeals. See Fields v. Pyramid Life Insurance Company, 169 S.W. 2d 111. It is an action by the beneficiary for double indemnity under accidental death provisions of two insurance policies issued by the insurer to insured, her husband, the insurer having paid the ordinary death benefit. The facts are detailed in the Court of Appeals' opinion, correctly ruling against recovery.

Section 5851, R.S. 1939, so far as material here, provides: " in all suits upon policies of insurance on life . . . it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide . . ., and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void." We have considered suicide by poisoning while insane an accident. Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (Banc, 1916), 278 Mo. 154, 165, 213 S.W. 45, 47, 7 A.L.R. 1213; Scales v. National L. & Acc. Ins. Co. (Banc, 1916), 212 S.W. 8, 9[1].

Plaintiff's position is that insured's death was an accident under the Missouri law, that the policy provision excepting liability in the event of "poisoning" has reference to poisoning while sane; and that plaintiff is entitled to recover.

Insurer defends on the ground, since all concede insured's death resulted from "poisoning", that insured's death was not within the coverage of the policy, and that Sec. 5851 has no applicability to the instant issue.

That the instant policy provisions are not ambiguous in the circumstances before us, see Dixon v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 234 Mo.App. 127, 133, 113 S.W. 2d 1086, 1089; Scales v. National L. & Acc. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 186 S.W. 948, 950[3]; Brock v. American Cent. L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 44 S.W. 2d 200; Cleaver v. Central States L. Ins. Co., 346 Mo. 548, 554, 142 S.W. 2d 474, 477; State ex rel. v. Shain (Banc), 344 Mo. 623, 629, 127 S.W. 2d 675, 678[7, 8]; State ex rel. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 276, 282[1], 126 S.W. 2d 181, 183[1]; Eirich v. State Mut. L. Assur. Co., 127 Conn. 252, 16 A.2d 351, 131 A.L.R. 1057, 1059[2, 4].

Counsel fail to direct us to and we find no ruling of this court on the precise issue. The beneficiary stresses the Missouri case of Applegate v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1910), 153 Mo.App. 63, 84, 132 S.W. 2, 9. Insurer stresses Scales v. National L. & Acc. Ins. Co. (1916, Mo. App.), 186 S.W. 948, 950[4, 7].

The beneficiary in the Applegate case, supra, sought recovery of the face of the policy for death by intentional suicide by poison of the insured, her husband, under a policy limiting liability "in the event of death . . . by poison" to "one-tenth of the amount otherwise payable . . ."; together with provisions "that the insurance should not cover . . . suicide sane or insane . . ." Insurer sought to defend on the ground that since death was the result...