Floding v. Gillespie (In re Dakota Cnty.), A13–1240.

Decision Date22 July 2015
Docket NumberNo. A13–1240.,A13–1240.
Citation866 N.W.2d 905
PartiesIn re the Matter of DAKOTA COUNTY, Appellant, Lorinda Elaine Floding, Petitioner Below, v. Darrell Ray Gillespie, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Sandra M. Torgerson, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, West Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Justin R. Anderson, Kratochwill & Anderson, P.A., Elbow Lake, MN, for respondent Darrell Ray Gillespie.

Patrick M. Hest, Jenese V. Larmouth, Assistant Ramsey County Attorneys, Saint Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Cynthia B. Jahnke, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Department of Human Services.

David L. Olson, David L. Olson Law Office, Edina, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & Bryant, Ltd., Edina, MN; and Mary Catherine Lauhead, Law Offices of Mary Catherine Lauhead, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Family Law Section, MN State Bar Association.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

The obligee of a child support obligation began receiving derivative Social Security benefits on behalf of her children, due to the obligor's eligibility for those benefits. The obligor brought a motion to modify his obligation, asking the court to offset his obligation by the amount of monthly benefits and to give him credit for all the benefits already received. A child support magistrate granted the obligor's motion. The district court modified the child support magistrate's order in part, retaining the offset and clarifying that the amount of the benefits already received by the obligee could be credited against the obligor's prospective obligation. The court of appeals affirmed.

Because the lower courts did not correctly interpret Minnesota's applicable child support statutes, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On June 23, 2000, in Dakota County District Court, Darrell Gillespie was adjudged to be the father of twin boys. The court ordered Gillespie to pay $1,500 a month for child support. Over time, the obligation increased to $1,977 a month due to cost-of-living adjustments. Dakota County was a party to the proceeding as the mother, Lorinda Floding, had applied for non-public assistance child support services.

Gillespie later retired due to a disability, and began to receive Social Security benefits in February 2012. At the same time, due to Gillespie's eligibility, Floding began to receive $1,748 a month in derivative Social Security benefits on behalf of the children. On July 23, 2012, Gillespie filed a motion to modify his child support obligation. He sought to reduce his obligation by $1,872 a month, citing his reduced income in retirement and the derivative benefits received by Floding. In response, Floding sought an upward deviation in support.

The child support magistrate (“CSM”) granted Gillespie's motion in part and offset his prospective child support obligation by the derivative Social Security benefits received by Floding. The CSM denied Gillespie's motion to otherwise modify his child support obligation and Floding's motion for upward deviation. As a result of the CSM's order, Gillespie was only required to pay $229 per month. Additionally, he received credit for the Social Security benefits from the time they commenced. The CSM determined that the total amount of excess payments was $10,488. From that amount, the CSM deducted $3,496 due to the “special needs” of one of the children during the period that the excess payments were made. The CSM then ordered the remaining $6,992 to be applied to any arrearages. If any excess payments remained, the CSM ordered that they “be addressed as provided by statute and/or applied to additional unreimbursed/uninsured expenses verified and undisputed.” The CSM concluded that such a credit did not constitute a retroactive modification. The CSM relied on County of Grant v. Koser, a court of appeals decision that held the child support statute “does not specify the manner in which the district court must subtract social security benefits from an obligor's child-support obligation, and does not limit the application of a credit to either arrearages or prospective obligations.” Cty. of Grant v. Koser, 809 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Minn.App.2012).

Each of the parties sought district-court review of the CSM's order. Gillespie asked the court to adjust several figures from the CSM's order, and asked that the order be amended to read that “the overpayment shall be reduced by crediting the entire amount of the Obligor's monthly obligation to the overpayment until the overpayment is fully satisfied.” Floding asked the district court to review the denial of her motion for upward deviation. Floding also argued that the CSM incorrectly relied on Koser to credit the excess payments, claiming that Koser is inconsistent with Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (2014), which prohibits retroactive modifications except from the date of service of the notice of the motion to modify. Dakota County moved the district court to deny Gillespie's request for review, and also to grant the mother's motion, arguing that any excess payments that remained after being applied to arrearages should be deemed a gratuity, not credited to prospective payments.

The district court granted Gillespie's motion for review in part to clarify the CSM's order. The court amended the CSM's order to state that “any [derivative Social Security] overpayment that remains is to be addressed as provided by statute and/or applied to additional unreimbursed/uninsured expenses verified and undisputed ... and to [Gillespie's] net child support obligation to include prospective child support.” The district court similarly relied on Koser to conclude that the derivative Social Security benefits already received by Floding could be applied against Gillespie's prospective child support obligation.

Dakota County appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In re Dakota County, A13–1240, 2014 WL 1272165 (Minn.App. Mar. 31, 2014). The court of appeals declined to overrule Koser, and held that “the overpayment received in February through July 2012 [as Social Security benefits] was properly credited against respondent's prospective child-support payments.” Id. at *4. In addition to Koser, the court of appeals relied on Minn.Stat. § 518A.34(f) (2014), which provides that if “Social Security benefits or veterans' benefits are received by one parent as a representative payee for a joint child based on the other parent's eligibility, the court shall subtract the amount of benefits from the other parent's net child support obligation, if any.” Id. The court of appeals seemingly interpreted “net child support obligation” to mean the existing child support obligation, regardless of when a motion for modification of child support was filed. Id. at *2. The court of appeals held that such a credit did not constitute a retroactive modification, as “the amount to which the children were entitled before, during, and after in February through July 2012 has not changed.” Id. at *4.

We granted Dakota County's petition for review.

II.

The question in this case is whether an obligor is entitled to credit for derivative Social Security benefits received by an obligee on behalf of the children before the obligor serves notice of the motion to modify. The answer requires a careful reading of Minnesota's child support statutes, found in Minnesota Statutes chapter 518A.

A.

Interpreting a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Gerber v. Gerber, 714 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.2006). The first step in statutory interpretation is “to determine whether the statute is ambiguous on its face.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.2014). A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn.2012). In order to determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we interpret “words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings.” Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 535. Additionally, we interpret statutes “as a whole,” and “the words and sentences therein ‘are to be understood ... in the light of their context.’ Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons, 818 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn.2012) (quoting Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943) ). “Multiple parts of a statute may be read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn.2013). If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the statute's plain meaning. Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn.2010).

Chapter 518A is Minnesota's child support law. The law provides that, in every case of dissolution, legal separation, or annulment involving a minor child, the district court shall make an order for maintenance and support. Minn.Stat. § 518A.38 (2014). A “support order” is “a judgment, decree, or order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification ... for the support and maintenance of a child.” Minn.Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 21 (2014).

Minnesota Statutes §§ 518A.27 –.36 (2014) explain how support is to be calculated for a “final child support order.” Minn.Stat. § 518A.34(g). The formula for calculation will be discussed below. Once calculated, the court must decide whether to deviate or not deviate, make written findings under section 518A.37, and enter an order under section 518A.38.

The child support order remains in place unless the district court modifies the order under section 518A.39, “on motion of either of the parties,” which the court may do “from time to time.” Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 1 (2014). The court may modify the order respecting both the amount of support money and the payment of it. Id. To obtain a modification, a party must show that the terms of the...

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