Gayton v. State
| Decision Date | 04 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-16-00218-CR,06-16-00218-CR |
| Parties | CLIFFORD JAMES GAYTON, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court Bowie County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
When she checked on her two young children, two-year-old David and one-year-old Mary,1 several hours after returning home from work, Frances Lucas found David cold and not breathing. Lucas and her boyfriend, Clifford James Gayton, Jr., made several attempts to revive David and finally called 9-1-1. Both police and emergency personnel responding to the emergency dispatch also attempted to revive David, to no avail. While emergency personnel were attending to David, two of the police officers learned from Gayton that Lucas' one-year-old daughter, Mary, was in a bedroom. When they checked on Mary, they found her awake, but not responding normally. After removing a blanket, the officers saw that Mary had red bruises and discoloration on her chest and entire abdomen, similar to the bruises found on David. Consequently, Gayton, who had charge of the children while Lucas was at work, was convicted by a Bowie County jury of capital murder2 and of injury to a child3 and was assessed punishments of life imprisonment without parole and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. In this appeal,4 Gayton challenges only the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his capital murder conviction. Because we find legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In evaluating legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd). We perform our review under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury "to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In drawing reasonable inferences, the jury "may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life." Duren v. State, 87 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. struck) (citing Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring)). Further, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may "believe all of a witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it." Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We give "almost complete deference to a jury's decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility." Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
In our review, we consider "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that each fact "point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. "Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone." Ross v. State, 507 S.W.3d 881, 904 (Tex. App. —Texarkana 2016, pet. granted) (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The "hypothetically correct" jury charge is "one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id. Under the indictment and the statute, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about January 27, 2016, (1) Gayton (2) intentionally or knowingly (3) caused the death of David, (4) who was under ten years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(8). Gayton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, focusing primarily on whether he intentionally or knowingly caused David's death, although he also points out that no witness directly testified that he inflicted the injuries on David that resulted in his death.
"Capital murder is a result-of-conduct offense; the crime is defined in terms of one's objective to produce, or a substantial certainty of producing, a specified result, i.e. the death of thenamed decedent." Louis v. State, 393 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), abrogated in part by Ex parte Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). An intentional state of mind is established "when it is [the actor's] conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). An actor has a knowing state of mind "when he [or she] is aware that his [or her] conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (West 2011).
A "defendant's state of mind is a question of fact that must be determined by the jury." Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Smith v. State, 965 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). It is determined from all of the circumstances. Smith v. State, 965 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury may infer the requisite mental state from the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant, and from the extent of the injuries to the victim, the method used to produce the injuries, and the relative size and strength of the parties. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Duren, 87 S.W.3d at 724. Other facts in evidence may also support the jury's inference of knowing conduct or an intent to kill on the part of the defendant. Brown, 122 S.W.3d at 800; Duren, 87 S.W.3d at 724.
The evidence at trial showed that, on the date of the incident, January 27, 2016, David was two years old, and Mary was one year old. Gayton had begun staying with Lucas and her children one or two months earlier, and Lucas had established the practice of leaving the children with Gayton while she went to work. Lucas testified that she changed the children's diapers early that morning, then she left them with Gayton while she ran some errands with LaQuanda Heard,Gayton's sister. At the time, the children were well and playing. Lucas returned home sometime later to get ready for work; she then left for work around 3:00 p.m. She testified that, when she left for work, the children were alive and well.
While she was at work, Lucas attempted to call Gayton several times to check on her children, but he would not answer. Around 6:00 p.m., Lucas was worried since she had not heard from Gayton and expressed her concern to her co-worker. Gayton finally called Lucas around 8:11 p.m., about the time she got off work. Gayton told Lucas that he had fed the children neck bones and corn and had put them in bed. He also told her he would call Heard to come pick her up.
When Heard picked Lucas up around 8:40 p.m., they picked up Heard's boyfriend, Ronnie Hollins, and went to the Smith-Keys apartments to purchase some synthetic marihuana. Although Lucas denied it, both Heard and Hollins testified that Lucas and Hollins smoked some of the synthetic marihuana on the way to Lucas' apartment. After Lucas returned to her apartment sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., she peeped into the children's bedroom door to check on them. She then took a shower and watched television until around midnight, when she again checked on the children. Lucas testified that, at that time, while Mary was breathing, David was cold and not breathing.
Lucas picked up David and woke up Gayton, telling him that David was not breathing. She testified that Gayton kept telling her that David was all right and was breathing. When Lucas attempted to perform CPR on David, she noticed that his jaw was locked shut. At some point, Gayton tried to revive David using warm water and kept telling Lucas that he was breathing andnot to call anyone. Lucas attempted to call, in turn, 9-1-1, Heard, and her mother, and she successfully connected with 9-1-1 around 12:23 a.m.
Craig Buster testified that he was one of the first officers to arrive at the apartment and that he arrived less than five minutes after receiving the dispatch. When he arrived, he found David lying on his back with his arms and legs spread. He could not detect a breath or a pulse and noticed that David was cool to the touch. He also testified that David, who was naked, had substantial bruising over much of his body and a fresh cut on his left upper lip. Buster said that, when the paramedics arrived shortly thereafter, they were unable to intubate David because his jaw was stiff.
Buster, as well as the other officers and emergency personnel that responded,...
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