General Motors Corp. v. Wolhar, 330
| Decision Date | 08 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | 1996,No. 330,330 |
| Citation | 686 A.2d 170 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,833 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and Frank W. Diver, Inc., a Delaware corporation, t/a Diver Chevrolet, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Elsie B. WOLHAR and Robert Wolhar, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, REMANDED for further proceedings.
Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County; C.A. No. 93C-04-024-SCD.
Somers S. Price, Jr. and Todd L. Goodman of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for appellants.
Lisa C. McLaughlin and Robert S. Goldman of Phillips, Goldman & Spence, P.A., Wilmington, for appellees.
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, JJ.
The plaintiffs-appellees, Elsie B. and Robert Wolhar, instituted a products liability lawsuit alleging negligence and breach of warranty against the defendants-appellants, General Motors Corporation ("General Motors") and Frank W. Diver, Inc. ("Diver"). 1 The complaint alleged that on April 9, 1991, when Mrs. Wolhar was operating the plaintiffs' 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, the brakes failed to operate properly, causing her to sustain serious physical injury during a collision with another motor vehicle. The plaintiffs obtained leave of the Superior Court to file an amended complaint to include additional allegations of negligence in the design and manufacture of the seat in the 1987 Chevrolet Blazer. 2
At issue in this expedited interlocutory appeal is the Superior Court's decision to strike the defendants ninth affirmative defense to the amended complaint. That affirmative defense addressed the allegation of negligent design of the seat back. It attributed Mrs. Wolhar's injuries to the supervening conduct of her failure to wear a seat belt. 3 The plaintiffs moved to strike the ninth affirmative defense on the basis that a Delaware statute precludes evidence of failure to wear a seat belt in any civil action. 21 Del.C. § 4801 et seq. ("Seat Belt Safety Act").
In granting the plaintiffs' motion to strike the ninth affirmative defense, the Superior Court held that the statutory bar in the Seat Belt Safety Act could not be applied retroactively to this case. Nevertheless, the Superior Court concluded that evidence regarding Mrs. Wolhar's non-use of her seat belt was inadmissible pursuant to the common law. In reaching that conclusion, it relied upon the holding in Lipscomb v. Diamiani, Del.Super., 226 A.2d 914 (1967).
This Court has determined the Superior Court's decision that the Seat Belt Safety Act could not be applied retroactively was correct. We have also concluded, however, the holding in Lipscomb is distinguishable from the present action and that seat belt evidence is admissible for limited purposes in defending against the plaintiffs' allegation of negligent seat design. Therefore, the Superior Court's interlocutory judgment striking the ninth affirmative defense must be reversed.
Substantive Rights Affected
The Seat Belt Safety Act became effective more than six months after the accident giving rise to this litigation. The Superior Court held that the Seat Belt Safety Act and, in particular, the evidentiary bar does not apply retroactively. 21 Del.C. § 4802(i). 4 That holding decided a question of law. Therefore, the applicable standard of appellate review is de novo or plenary. Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 63, 66 (1993); see also Moses v. Board of Educ., Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 61, 63 (1991).
Generally, in the absence of language demonstrating the legislature's intent to the contrary, a statute will not be given retroactive application if it affects substantive rights. Comer v. Getty Oil Co., Del.Super., 438 A.2d 1239, 1242 (1981); see also Chrysler Corp. v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 345, 351 (1983). The Seat Belt Safety Act does not indicate that the General Assembly intended that it be applied retroactively. Nevertheless, the Wolhars contend that the Seat Belt Safety Act applies to this matter and any other action tried after its effective date, January 1, 1992, because it is an evidentiary or procedural statute.
The Superior Court concluded that, although the Seat Belt Safety Act relates to the admissibility of evidence at trial, it affects the substantive rights of litigants. Other courts have held that similar statutes constitute rules of substantive law. See, e.g., Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir.1996); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir.1989); see also Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1001, 113 S.Ct. 605, 121 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 745 F.Supp. 288, 294 (E.D.Pa.1990), aff'd, 950 F.2d 722 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 867, 113 S.Ct. 193, 121 L.Ed.2d 136 (1992). We agree. The Superior Court properly determined that the Delaware Seat Belt Safety Act cannot be applied retroactively to this case.
The amended complaint alleged that Mrs. Wolhar sustained injuries that were proximately caused by the negligent design of the seat in her car. The nature of those allegations challenges the "crashworthiness" of her 1987 Chevrolet Blazer. The term "crashworthiness" relates to the protection that a vehicle affords its occupants against injuries resulting from accidents.
In a crashworthiness claim, a plaintiff does not seek compensation for injuries received from the initial collision between the vehicle and another object. Instead, the plaintiff seeks compensation for injuries that result from the "second collision" which occurs when the plaintiff strikes the interior of the vehicle or is thrown from the vehicle. LaHue v. General Motors Corp., 716 F.Supp. 407, 409 n. 1 (W.D.Mo.1989). Second collision injuries are often referred to as "enhanced injuries." See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.1968); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, 708 n. 4 (1987); see also DePaepe v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737, 742-43 (7th Cir.1994) (). Thus, in a crashworthiness claim, the plaintiffs seek compensation for injuries over and above the injury that would have occurred as a result of the impact of collision, absent the vehicle's alleged negligently defective design.
The plaintiffs contended that, as a result of an alleged design defect in the seating system of her 1987 Chevrolet Blazer, Mrs. Wolhar suffered enhanced injuries after the initial impact between her vehicle and another vehicle because of a seat failure or collapse. General Motors seeks to admit evidence that the use of a seat belt was an essential component of its over-all safety design. General Motors' ninth affirmative defense asserted that Mrs. Wolhar's enhanced injuries resulted from her movement, after her vehicle collided with the vehicle in front of her, because she was not wearing a seat belt. Thus, General Motors argues that the enhanced injuries suffered by Mrs. Wolhar were not proximately caused by an alleged defect in the vehicle's design.
In granting the plaintiffs' motion to strike the ninth affirmative defense, the Superior Court stated:
I find the facts of this case to be controlled by this Court's decision in Lipscomb v. Diamiani, Del.Super., 226 A.2d 914, 918 (1967), and for the reasons therein stated, will not permit GM to introduce into evidence the fact that Mrs. Wolhar was not wearing her seatbelt for the purpose of proving supervening cause.
Lipscomb was a traditional automobile tort action between the occupants of two motor vehicles. The question of whether the plaintiffs' automobile was negligently designed by the manufacturer, in a manner that proximately caused enhanced injuries, was not an issue in Lipscomb. In fact, the first "crashworthiness" case is generally considered to be Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). Larsen was decided one year after Lipscomb v. Diamiani, Del.Super., 226 A.2d 914 (1967).
At issue in Lipscomb was whether the defendant driver's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and consequential injuries sustained by the plaintiff. In Lipscomb, the defendant sought to admit evidence that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt to establish that the plaintiff had breached a common-law duty of due care and was therefore contributorily negligent. The Superior Court held that, because the question of automobile safety is comprehensively covered in Delaware statutory law, the legislative forum is the proper place to adopt a duty to wear a seat belt. Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d at 918.
In this case, General Motors does not seek to admit seat belt evidence for the purpose of establishing and then demonstrating Mrs. Wolhar's breach of a common-law duty of care that requires a seat belt to be worn. General Motor wants to admit evidence of seat belt non-use to establish that its seat design did not proximately cause the injuries to Mrs. Wolhar. Consequently, the concerns expressed by the Superior Court in Lipscomb about creating a new common-law duty to wear seat belts, when plaintiffs bring a traditional negligence action against defendant motor vehicle drivers, are not implicated in a plaintiffs' crashworthiness claim against a manufacturer for enhanced injuries attributed to a negligently defective design.
"There is a sharp split of authority amongst courts that have considered the admissibility of safety-belt evidence." 5 Swajian v. General Motors Corp., R.I.Supr., 559 A.2d 1041, 1043 (1989). The Swajian Court set forth numerous cases and jurisdictions ...
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