Goodridge v. Department Of Public Health
Decision Date | 07 May 2002 |
Docket Number | 20011647A |
Citation | 2002 MBAR 115 |
Parties | Hilary Goodridge et al.1 v. Department of Public Health et al.2 |
Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
Mass L. Rptr. Cite: 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): CONNOLLY
The plaintiffs, Hilary Goodridge and Julie Goodridge, David Wilson and Robert Compton, Michael Horgan and Edward Balmelli, Maureen Brodoff and Ellen Wade, Gary Chalmers and Richard Linnell, Heidi Norton and Gina Smith and Gloria Bailey and Linda Davies (collectively, "the plaintiffs"), are seven same-sex couples who have applied for, and been denied, a marriage license. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in April 2001 seeking a declaration that their exclusion from marriage violates the present statutory scheme, the exercise of the fundamental right to marry the partner of their choice, the equality protections of the Massachusetts Constitution and their expressive rights. This matter is now before the court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED and defendants' cross motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED.
This case concerns the most fundamental institution: marriage. The plaintiffs are seven same-sex couples who want the state and society to recognize their commitment to each other through marriage.
Plaintiffs Hilary Goodridge and Julie Goodridge have shared their lives with each other for fourteen years. They seek to provide their daughter with the social recognition and security which comes from having married parents.
David Wilson and Robert Compton believe that marriage is a special expression of commitment that is uniquely understood by others, and they seek to marry to express their love for each other. They also seek to marry to provide maximum legal security to and for each other as they age, plan for retirement and face health-related problems.
Michael Horgan and Edward Balmelli want to marry to be part of the larger community of married persons. They desire both the legal security and social recognition marriage confers.
Maureen Brodoff and Ellen Wade have lived together in the Boston area for twenty years. The couple shares a twelve-year-old daughter. They seek to marry to secure the legal protections and obligations that civil marriage provides.
Gary Chalmers and Rich Linnell are both teachers residing in the Worcester area. They seek to marry to provide legal protection for themselves and their family. They want their eight-year-old daughter to have the security provided by her fathers' love and also the security that would come from her parents' legal bond to one another.
Heidi Norton and Gina Smith, together with their two sons, have made their home in Western Massachusetts. They seek to marry to make a statement for themselves and others about their enduring love and commitment to one another and also because they want their sons to grow up in a world where their parents' relationship is legally and communally respected.
Lastly Gloria Bailey and Linda Davies, both psychotherapists residing on Cape Cod, have been in a loving and thriving personal relationship for thirty years and have worked as business partners for the last twenty-five years. They seek to protect the assets they have accumulated together over those many years in the same way a spouse would be protected. But even more, they seek to marry so the world can see them as they see themselves a deeply loyal and devoted couple that is each other's mate in every way. They also seek the legal security and emotional peace of mind that flows from being a married couple.
Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) grants summary judgment to a moving party if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cassesso v Comm'r of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983). "The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue." Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). The court should deny a motion for summary judgment when the nonmoving party presents evidence of genuine issues of fact entitling him to a trial. Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 556 (1976). Here, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and ask the court to rule on the statutory and constitutional claims presented.3
Plaintiffs argue that the Commonwealth's marriage statute should be interpreted gender-neutrally so as not to restrict marriage to a man and a woman. To understand how the marriage statutes should be interpreted, it is necessary to explore the application of the word marriage, the construction of the marriage statutes and finally, the historical purpose of marriage. After analyzing the Commonwealth's marriage statutes, the court rejects plaintiffs' argument.
The word marriage is used to recognize a state of wedlock. Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713, 714-15 (D.Mass. 1924). The Supreme Judicial Court defines marriage as follows:
Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester, 7 Mass. (1 Tyng) 48, 51 (1810).
Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted "marriage," within Massachusetts' statutes, "as the union of one man and one woman." Id. Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 207-08 (1993) ("the laws of the Commonwealth do not permit [a same-sex couple] to enter into a legally cognizable marriage"). See also Connors v. City of Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 37 (1999) ( ). Likewise, other jurisdictions' courts have interpreted their marriage statutes to apply only to one man and one woman. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 868-69 (Vt. 1999); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-88 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1996); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 312-16 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56-57 (Haw. 1993); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash.Ct.App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1971). See also Rutgers Council v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828, 834-35 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1997) ( ); Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798-99 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993) ( ); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 953 (Pa.Super. 1984) ( ).4
Second, the statutory construction of the marriage statutes demonstrates the Legislature's intent to limit marriage to a man and a woman. To ascertain the Legislature's intent, it is necessary to examine the statutes' words, construed by the ordinary and approved usage of language, the cause of the statute's enactment, "the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished..." Commonwealth v. Smith, 431 Mass. 417, 421 (2000). Because marriage is not defined in the statute itself, the term must be construed as it is "commonly understood." Nile v. Nile, 432 Mass. 390, 394 (2000). A term's plain and ordinary meaning is determined by its dictionary definition. Town of Boylston v. Comm'r of Revenue, 434 Mass. 398, 405 (2001). Accordingly, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) defines "marriage" as "[t]he legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife," and defines "husband" as "[a] married man." Id. at 986, 746. Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1964) defines marriage as "the state of being united to a person of the opposite-sex as husband or wife." Id. at 1354.
Additionally, courts look at a term's meaning when the Legislature enacted, codified or amended the statute to ascertain its meaning. In the mid-eighteenth century, when the Legislature codified many of the marriage laws in their present form, "[t]he word marriage [wa]s used to signify... a civil status, existing in one man and one woman legally united for life." Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage 29 (1856); see also Milford, 7 Mass. at 51. The second edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1919, similarly defined marriage as the "civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex."
Further evidence of the Legislature's intent to restrict marriage to one man and one woman is the use of gender-specific terms not only in the marriage statutes themselves, but also in those concerning the related subjects of divorce and domestic relations. See Adams, 486 F.Supp. at 1122; Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d at 313-14; Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191; Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186; Dean, 653 A.2d at 313-14; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. For example, an entire chapter of the General Laws, chapter 209, is entitled, "Husband and Wife." See also G.L.c. 207, 1 (...
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