Hall v. Hormel Foods Corporation, 8:98CV304 (D. Neb. 2000)
| Decision Date | 01 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | 8:98CV304. |
| Parties | PAT HALL v. HORMEL FOODS CORPORATION. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims. Upon consideration of the pleadings, briefs, and case law, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment should be granted and the motion to dismiss should be denied.
Mr. Hall filed this lawsuit alleging age and disability discrimination by Hormel Foods Corporation because the company did not hire him. Hormel has now moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Hall is unable to establish a prima facie case of either age or disability discrimination. The company also requests dismissal of Mr. Hall's causes of action under Nebraska anti-discrimination statutes on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
Mr. Hall lives in Fremont, Nebraska. Most of his work experience has been in the food service and construction industries, primarily in California, New Mexico, and east-central Nebraska. He returned to college in the early 1990s and earned an associate's degree in a legal assistant/paralegal program and a bachelor of general studies degree majoring in business administration and political science. During this time he was living on Social Security disability benefits because he suffers from pulmonary dysfunction (asthma and sleep apnea). Since obtaining his degrees, he has done some paralegal work for his attorney and has continued to work, on a short-term basis, in various food service operations in the area. He was born in 1952, and was 44 years of age when he applied for work at Hormel.
In early 1997, Mr. Hall sought employment under Social Security's trial work program, which permits recipients of disability benefits to work for up to ten months without jeopardizing their benefits, simply to see if they have recovered sufficiently to return to gainful employment. Mr. Hall turned to a state vocational rehabilitation agency for help, where Rehabilitation Specialist Jo Lynn Isaacs helped him revise his résumé and cover letter. Mr. Hall was interested in exploring management positions with Hormel, so he asked Ms. Isaacs for advice. Ms. Isaacs contacted Tim Fritz, the personnel manager at Hormel's Fremont plant, and faxed Mr. Hall's résumé to Mr. Fritz on or about February 15, 1997. The parties take conflicting positions as to whether Mr. Fritz simply agreed to review the résumé as a favor or whether he told Ms. Isaacs the company was indeed looking for an entry-level production manager at the time and Mr. Hall's qualifications sounded promising.
In any event, Mr. Fritz sent a letter dated March 3, 1997, to Mr. Hall notifying him that the company would not be offering him a position at that time. Mr. Hall subsequently filed discrimination complaints with the state and federal equal employment opportunity agencies. The federal commission issued a right-to-sue letter in March 1998, and Mr. Hall filed the present lawsuit in June 1998. The Nebraska commission subsequently notified Mr. Hall that it found insufficient evidence to support his charge of age discrimination.
The age discrimination claim arises because Mr. Hall included in his résumé the year of his graduation from high school, which he believes put Hormel on notice that he was more than 40 years of age. The disability discrimination claim comes about because Mr. Hall believes Hormel knew he was, or at least regarded him as, disabled because his résumé was submitted via a vocational rehabilitation center. In his amended complaint, Mr. Hall enumerates violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 ("ADEA");the Act Prohibiting Unjust Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1001 to 1010; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"); and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1101 to 1126 ("NFEPA").
Motion for summary judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the question before the district court is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1124 (1998); Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 1992).
Summary judgment is an extreme and treacherous device, which should not be granted unless the moving party has established a right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy, and unless the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances. Vette Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. Id.; Widoe v. District No. 111 Otoe County Sch., 147 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1998); Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1998). Even if the district court is convinced that the moving party is entitled to judgment, the exercise of sound judicial discretion may dictate that the motion should be denied, so the case may be fully developed at trial. McLain v. Meier, 612 F.2d 349, 356 (8th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 509, 510 (8th Cir. 1985).
Essentially, the test is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251-52. Moreover, although under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 due deference must be given to the rights of litigants to have their claims adjudicated by the appropriate finder of fact, equal deference must be given under Rule 56 to the rights of those defending against such claims to have a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the action where the claims have no factual basis. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 327.
The court's role is simply to determine whether the evidence in the case presents a sufficient dispute to place before the jury.
At the summary judgment stage, the court should not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to determine the truth of the matter. Rather, the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine. . . . If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). See also Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) ().
A genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute of fact; (2) the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine, meaning a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly cautioned that summary judgment should seldom be granted in the context of employment actions, as such actions are inherently fact-based. Chock v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 1997); Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1995). "Summary judgments should be sparingly used and then only in those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989)). "Because discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence, [the court must be] particularly deferential to the nonmovant." Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994)). Such deference, however, will not preclude the entry of summary judgment when the facts of the case warrant it.
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 & 1332. "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter `spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is `inflexible and without exception.'" Godfrey v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 161 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1575 (1999).
There are two ways to challenge the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1): the complaint may be attacked either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Once subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. The plaintiff must validate the jurisdictional facts by competent proof or risk dismissal. Zunamon v. Brown, 418 F.2d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 1969). It is within the discretion of the court to determine how to proceed on jurisdictional questions, and the court "may consider materials outside the pleadings such as depositions or affidavits in determining whether the record...
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