Hill v. Cassady

Citation571 S.W.3d 154
Decision Date22 January 2019
Docket NumberWD 81483
Parties In re: Leontae C. HILL, Petitioner, v. Jay CASSADY, in His Capacity as Superintendent, Jefferson City Corr. Center, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Jeannie M. Wililbey, Kansas City, for Petitioner.

Michael J. Spillane and Patrick J. Logan, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before Writ Division: Alok Ahuja, P.J., and Lisa White Hardwick, J. and Karen King Mitchell, C.J.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

Leontae Hill filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, asking this Court to vacate his 2002 convictions and/or sentences for four counts of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, and one count of armed criminal action. In his habeas petition, Hill contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for misinforming him that the charges of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer did not carry a mandatory minimum prison term prior to parole eligibility, when the law requires that an offender serve 85% of his or her sentence prior to becoming parole-eligible. Hill’s petition alleged that, if his counsel had correctly advised him concerning the 85% minimum term, he would have accepted a plea offer rather than taking his case to trial, and would have received a lesser sentence. Hill’s habeas petition also contended that the circuit court sentenced him based on the false understanding that first-degree assault of a law-enforcement officer was not subject to an 85% minimum term, and that he is accordingly entitled to be resentenced.

After the filing of Hill’s petition and a response from the State, we appointed a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claims in Hill’s petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the master issued a report recommending that Hill’s petition be denied. After consideration of supplemental briefing and argument of the parties, we adopt the special master’s recommendation and deny Hill’s habeas petition.

Factual Background

In the early morning of January 1, 2000, four Kansas City Police Department officers drove to 29th Street and Prospect Avenue in Kansas City after hearing gunshots in the area. When the officers arrived, they saw Leontae Hill and two other men on the steps of an apartment building, where they had apparently been attempting to shoot out streetlights. When the officers drove back through the area, Hill fired an automatic weapon approximately thirty times at the patrol vehicle, hitting and wounding two of the officers.

Hill was charged with four counts of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree and four counts of armed criminal action. A jury found him guilty on all counts. The jury recommended that Hill be sentenced to life imprisonment on each of the four counts of assault of a law enforcement officer, and to fifteen years' imprisonment on each of the four counts of armed criminal action.

The circuit court held a sentencing hearing on February 11, 2002. Prior to the hearing, a sentencing assessment report was prepared. The report did not discuss the fact that Hill would be required to serve 85% of any sentence for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer.

The State called three of the four officers who were victims of Hill’s crimes to testify at the sentencing hearing. Each of the officers asked that Hill be given consecutive life sentences on the four assault counts. One of the officers testified that, "I don't believe that [Hill] has any place in our society.... I think he needs to spend the rest of his life in jail."

During the sentencing hearing, Hill’s counsel argued that "[w]hat [the State is] actually asking for is life without parole. Several life sentences run consecutively is the same thing."

In addition to calling three of his own witnesses, Hill made a statement to the court at the sentencing hearing. Hill stated that "[e]ach day I'm in that cell, looking out the window, and every time that door shuts I know I'm convicted for a crime I didn't commit." Hill told the court that "[i]t never leaves my mind about how I'm convicted of a crime that I know, deep down in my heart, that I didn't commit." Hill asked the court to take into account the fact that he was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses, and twenty at the time of sentencing, and show mercy in its sentencing decision.

Prior to announcing Hill’s sentences, the court stated, that "[t]his is probably one of the most senseless vicious crimes that I have seen in the 25 years that I have been on the bench." The court emphasized that "[p]olice are here to protect us and to keep order and to make society safe," and that they "lay[ ] their life on the line every time they go out in their car." The court stated that "it’s almost impossible for me to realize why anybody would take a weapon and put 30 shells into a police car or any car." The court noted that one of the officer-victims "would have died if the bullet would have been probably one-fourth of an inch either way," but that instead he had suffered virtually complete loss of hearing and other serious injuries. The court said, "Mr. Hill, it’s hard to feel sympathy or find mercy for somebody that takes the law into their own hands and just shoots at people. You're fortunate you weren't here for capital murder on four people."

Consistent with the jury’s recommendations, the court sentenced Hill to life imprisonment for each count of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, and to 15 years on each count of armed criminal action. The court said, "Mr. Hill, over the years that I have been on the bench I haven't made a lot of sentences consecutive to each other. Counsel, in this case, the sentences will be consecutive to each other."

There was no mention of parole eligibility at any point during Hill’s sentencing hearing.

We affirmed Hill’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Hill , No. WD61085, 114 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (mem. ). Hill then filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, we affirmed the circuit court’s rejection of Hill’s claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Hill v. State , 181 S.W.3d 611, 618–21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). We vacated Hill’s convictions and sentences for three of the four counts of armed criminal action, however, on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 615–17. Hill raised no claim in his direct appeal or post-conviction relief proceeding that his counsel had misinformed him concerning his eligibility for parole, or that the circuit court had sentenced him based on a misunderstanding concerning his parole-eligibility.

When Hill was first received by the Department of Corrections in 2002, the Department did not apply any minimum prison term to Hill’s sentences for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer. At the evidentiary hearing in this habeas proceeding, Hill introduced into evidence a Department Face Sheet prepared in July 2015, which indicated "Percent Required: 0%" on his sentences for each convictions for first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer. Hill testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was given a parole hearing in January 2014, and was scheduled for a further hearing five years later, in 2019.

The Department changed its position concerning Hill’s parole eligibility in February 2016. At that time, the Department provided Hill a revised Face Sheet, which indicated that he was required to serve a minimum prison term of 85% of his sentence for each count of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree. The Department issued the revised Face Sheet based on its determination that first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer constituted a "dangerous felony" within the meaning of § 556.061(8), RSMo. Cum. Supp. 1999, and that Hill was therefore required to serve 85% of his sentences on each count of first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer by operation of § 558.019.3, RSMo. Cum. Supp. 1999. The Department informed Hill that his 2019 parole review hearing had been cancelled, and that he had instead been scheduled for a parole hearing in January 2065.

On July 25, 2016, Hill filed a petition seeking declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of Cole County, arguing that the Department of Corrections had erroneously determined that his assault convictions constituted "dangerous felonies," and was therefore erroneously requiring him to serve 85% of his sentences before being considered for parole. While Hill’s petition was pending, this Court held in Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017), that first-degree assault of a law enforcement officer was a "dangerous felony" subject to an 85% minimum term between 1994 and 2003 (when Hill committed his offenses). Following the decision in Mann , Hill was granted leave to file an amended petition, in which he reasserted his claim for declaratory relief, but argued in the alternative that he should be entitled to habeas corpus relief because both his trial counsel, and the circuit court, incorrectly understood his parole eligibility at the time of his trial and sentencing. After briefing, the Circuit Court of Cole County granted the Department of Corrections' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the declaratory relief count, and denied Hill’s alternative petition for habeas corpus relief.

Hill appealed the circuit court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on his claim for declaratory relief. In an opinion issued on December 18, 2018, we affirmed the circuit court’s judgment denying declaratory relief. Hill v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. , No. WD81448, 570 S.W.3d 95, 2018 WL 6611875 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). We held that, under the Mann decision, Hill’s offenses constituted "dangerous felonies" at the time of his offenses and convictions. We also rejected Hill’s claim that it was fundamentally unfair to...

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4 cases
  • Dunn v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 22, 2022
    ...the calculation of offenders’ parole eligibility dates, years after an initial determination. See , e.g. , Hill v. Cassady , 571 S.W.3d 154, 157-58 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) ; Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). Dunn does not argue that he is entitled to relief based sole......
  • Dunn v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 22, 2022
    ... ... offenders' parole eligibility dates, years after an ... initial determination. See , e.g. , Hill ... v. Cassady , 571 S.W.3d 154, 157-58 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019); ... Mann v. McSwain , 526 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Mo. App. W.D ... 2017) ... ...
  • Clark v. Falkenrath
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2022
    ...motion for partial summary judgment." "There is no appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Hill v. Cassady, 571 S.W.3d 154, 158 n. 1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Blackmon v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 97 S.W.3d 458, 458 (Mo. banc 2003)). "Instead, '[t]he dismissa......
  • Clark v. Falkenrath
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2022
    ...for partial summary judgment.""There is no appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Hill v. Cassady , 571 S.W.3d 154, 158 n. 1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting Blackmon v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 97 S.W.3d 458, 458 (Mo. banc 2003) ). "Instead, ‘[t]he dismissal of ......

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