Holloway v. State, 97-01094
| Decision Date | 16 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-01094,97-01094 |
| Citation | 718 So.2d 1281 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2325 Louis HOLLOWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Frank D.L. Winstead, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Following a conviction by a jury for possession of marijuana, Louis Holloway appeals the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress, contending that the search of his residence was improper. Because the method used to execute the search warrant was an improper no-knock search in violation of State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1994), and Craft v. State, 638 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), we reverse Mr. Holloway's conviction.
A warrant was issued to search Mr. Holloway's residence for cocaine and United States currency. Neither the search warrant nor the supporting affidavit averred that Mr. Holloway possessed a firearm in the residence. In executing the search warrant, SWAT team officers knocked on the front door, announced "police with a search warrant," verified that the door was locked, then struck the door with a battering ram. The officers forced open the door, entered the home, searched it, and arrested Mr. Holloway after finding marijuana. Only a couple of seconds elapsed between announcing "police with a search warrant" and ramming the door, a fact undisputed by the State.
The knock-and-announce rule is codified in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1995), and provides that a law enforcement officer may forcibly enter a home for the purpose of executing a search warrant only after announcing his or her authority and purpose and, thereafter, being refused entry to the premises. This policy derives from the sentiment that there Bamber, 630 So.2d at 1052 (quoting Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla.1964)).
This court must presume that a search that does not comply with the knock-and-announce rules is invalid, unless the State proves that the officers' conduct falls within a recognized exception, such as officer peril. See Benefield; Craft. When the State asserts that this exception applies, the court must examine...
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