Hubbard v. Samson Management Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96 Civ. 1400 (BDP).,No. 96 Civ. 9005 (BDP).,96 Civ. 1400 (BDP).,96 Civ. 9005 (BDP).
• Citation: 994 F.Supp. 187
• Parties: Susan L. HUBBARD, Plaintiff, v. SAMSON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and Manny Zevallos, as Property Manager, Samson Management Corp., Defendants. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. SAMSON MANAGEMENT CO. and Manny Zevallos, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

994 F.Supp. 187

Susan L. HUBBARD, Plaintiff, v. SAMSON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and Manny Zevallos, as Property Manager, Samson Management Corp., Defendants.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. SAMSON MANAGEMENT CO. and Manny Zevallos, Defendants.

No. 96 Civ. 1400 (BDP).

No. 96 Civ. 9005 (BDP).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 5, 1998.

Michael D. Hampden, Westchester/Putnam Legal Services, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Marianne T. O'Toole, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for Consolidated Plaintiff.

Kenneth J. Finger, Finger & Finger, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

PARKER, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1995, Susan Hubbard, who is disabled, rented an apartment in the Sleepy Hollow Gardens apartment complex ("Sleepy Hollow"), owned by defendant Samson Management Corporation and managed by defendant Manny Zevallos. After Samson refused Hubbard a free parking space near her home, she commenced this action for injunctive relief and damages, alleging, among other things, that defendants failed reasonably to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The United States filed a separate action on Hubbard's behalf, making the same claim. The two actions have been consolidated.

The central issue on this motion is whether a free, reserved parking space near her apartment is a reasonable accommodation required by the Fair Housing Act. The United States and Hubbard contend that the space must be provided without charge, whereas the defendants maintain that a monthly fee is a reasonable accommodation. The parties concede that plaintiff's handicap necessitates that she park close to her apartment.

The United States and Hubbard have moved, and the defendants have cross-moved, for summary judgment on the issue of liability.¹ For the reasons that follow, the motions of the United States and Hubbard are granted in part and denied in part. The defendants' motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The parties have stipulated, for purposes of this motion only, that plaintiff Susan Hubbard is handicapped as defined in the Fair Housing Act.² Prior to renting her apartment in June 1995, Hubbard injured her left foot at work and, as a result, suffers from a chronic fracture of her foot and persistent back pain. She has undergone a variety of treatments, including surgery, none of which has been wholly successful in alleviating her condition. Hubbard walks with the aid of a cane and has difficulty walking long distances.

Sleepy Hollow is a fifteen building complex that contains 215 apartments. The complex has 150 outdoor, unreserved parking spaces used on a first come, first served basis, free of charge. Additionally, there are 20 reserved, outdoor spaces available for a monthly fee of $34.15. The complex also offers 81 reserved, indoor parking spaces for a monthly fee of $66.26. The parties do not dispute that none of the reserved spaces are sufficiently close to plaintiff's apartment, although at least 4 of the unreserved spaces are. There are no parking spaces at Sleepy Hollow designated for handicapped tenants. Because the unreserved parking spaces near her apartment were typically full, Hubbard frequently had to walk a quarter of a mile or more to and from her car. Walking that distance was painful and apparently risked further injury to her foot.

Within a month after moving into Sleepy Hollow, Hubbard requested, through a series of letters, a reserved parking space near her apartment. On July 18, 1995, Hubbard, through her attorney, wrote to Samson requesting a parking space located near her apartment, explaining that she needed the space on account of her physical condition. On August 11, 1995, the defendants informed Hubbard that she could avail herself either of the unreserved free parking or pay for one of the reserved parking spaces. On August 31, 1995, Hubbard's attorney responded, reiterating Hubbard's request for a parking space near her apartment and stating explicitly that she needed such a space due to her disability. Enclosed with the letter was a copy of the regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b), relating to a landlord's responsibility to make reasonable accommodations for a handicapped tenant. On October 6, 1995, Hubbard's attorney, having received no response to the August 31 letter, renewed the request.

In November 1995, Hubbard filed a housing discrimination complaint with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, alleging that the defendants failed reasonably to accommodate her handicap by not reserving a parking space near her apartment solely for her use.

On December 2, 1995, defendants offered to designate the parking space closest to Hubbard's apartment for her sole use, provided that she pay the customary monthly fee for reserved spaces of $34.15, along with a security deposit. On December 21, 1995, Hubbard rejected defendants' offer. Subsequently, defendants offered to establish three parking spaces designated "handicapped" at different locations throughout the complex. None of these parking spaces was as close to Hubbard's apartment as the space that she desired and which defendants offered to reserve for her on a fee paid basis.

After a hearing, this Court denied Hubbard's request for a preliminary injunction. Thereafter, defendants designated a space for Hubbard's sole use and Hubbard paid the monthly fee of $34.15 applicable to outdoor, reserved spaces. Hubbard agreed to pay for the parking space without prejudice to her claim that defendants were required by law to provide a space without charge. In August 1996, Hubbard moved from Sleepy Hollow.

On October 4, 1996, HUD, after investigating Hubbard's complaint, issued a Determination of Reasonable Cause and Charge of Discrimination, contending that the defendants engaged in discriminatory housing practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. On October 26, 1996, Hubbard, having elected, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), to proceed in this Court rather than administratively, filed this action. The United States subsequently filed a separate action on Hubbard's behalf.

DISCUSSION

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment should only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hayes v. New York City Department of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.1996); Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). This Court's responsibility is to perform "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F.Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); Hayes, 84 F.3d 614 at 619.

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must resolve all ambiguities in the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the party opposing the motion. Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 382 (2d Cir.1996); In re State Police Litigation, 88 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 1996).

FAIR HOUSING ACT

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the "Act") makes unlawful discrimination on the basis of handicap, "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 333 (2d Cir.1995). Discrimination prohibited by the Act includes the refusal to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped individual] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 115 S.Ct. 1776, 1779, 131 L.Ed.2d 801 (1995). Reasonable accommodations can involve "changing some rule that is generally applicable so as to make its burden less onerous on the handicapped individual." Proviso Assoc. of Retarded Citizens v. Village of Westchester, Illinois, 914 F.Supp. 1555, 1562 (N.D.Ill.1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Accommodations required under the Act must be both reasonable and necessary to afford the handicapped individual an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. Proviso Assoc. v. Westchester, 914 F.Supp. at 1562; Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 911 F.Supp. 918, 940 (D.Md.1996). Whether a requested accommodation is required under the Act is "highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination." United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994) ("California Mobile Home Park I"); Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir.1995).

To determine whether the Act requires a proposed accommodation, courts generally balance the burdens the contemplated accommodation imposes on the defendant against the benefits to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Proviso Assoc. v. Westchester, 914 F.Supp. at 1562 (weighing costs to defendant against the benefits to plaintiff); Bryant Woods v. Howard County, 911 F.Supp. at 941 (balancing "the plaintiff's interest in equal housing opportunity against the defendant's interest in the integrity of the scheme to be affected by the [proposed accommodation]").

As the balancing test suggests, courts typically find an accommodation reasonable "when it imposes no undue financial or administrative hardships on the defendant ... and when it does not undermine...