Huizar v. State

• Citation: 12 S.W.3d 479
• Parties: (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) VINCENT HUIZAR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 794-98
• Decision Date: 23 February 2000
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Page 479

12 S.W.3d 479 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) VINCENT HUIZAR, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS NO. 794-98 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS. February 23, 2000

ON STATE'S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS, BEXAR COUNTY

Page 480

OPINION ON REHEARING

Meyers, J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Court granted rehearing on our own motion. Our previous opinion is withdrawn.

Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, sentenced to confinement for 99 years and assessed a fine of $10,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. Huizar v. State, 966 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998). We granted the State's petitions for discretionary review to address whether a trial court should, under Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07 3(a), sua sponte instruct the jury on the burden of proof for evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts admitted at punishment.¹

Article 37.07 3(a) provides in relevant part:

. . . evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to . . . evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the

Page 481

defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible . . ..

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 3(a). The plain language of this provision "requires that such evidence may not be considered in assessing punishment until the fact-finder is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the extraneous bad acts and offenses] are attributable to the defendant." Fields v. State, 1 S.W.3d 687, (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

During the punishment phase of trial the State introduced evidence of extraneous offenses and bad acts. The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding the burden of proof applicable to such evidence. Appellant did not request such instruction or object to its omission from the charge. Addressing the issue as unassigned error,² the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction. Id. at 709. Pointing to Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), which held that a failure to define reasonable doubt at guilt is "automatic reversible error," the Court of Appeals concluded the same rule applies to a failure to instruct on reasonable doubt at punishment. Id. at 707-09. The Court of Appeals viewed the error as implicating constitutional rights. Id. at 709 & fn.2. The Court of Appeals further noted its holding was supported by language in article 37.07 3(a) and (b). Finally, the Court held that because the error implicated constitutional right's Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2 rather than Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(op. on reh'g), applied in assessing harm. Id. at 709-10.

A.

We begin by addressing the Court of Appeals' holding that the reasonable-doubt instruction is constitutionally required, per Geesa. We recently addressed a related issue in Fields, supra. In that non-capital case, as in the instant case, the State introduced extraneous-offense evidence at punishment. Although the charge included an instruction that the extraneous-offense evidence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before it could be considered by the jury in assessing punishment, it did not provide a definition of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1-2. The appellant did not request such definition or object to its omission. We granted review to decide whether "the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court must sua sponte submit a definition of reasonable doubt as to proof of extraneous misconduct at the punishment phase of trial." Id. at 3. We concluded that "[ne]ither Geesa nor art. 37.07 could be read to require that a reasonable-doubt instruction be given at the punishment phase, absent a request." Id. at 4. The instruction to which we referred, and which was in question in Fields, was the Geesa definition, not the instruction on burden of proof. Thus, more precisely than therein stated, Fields stands for the proposition that "neither Geesa nor art. 37.07 could be read to require that a reasonable-doubt [definition] be given at the punishment phase, absent a request."

In support of this conclusion, Fields emphasized that "the reasonable-doubt standard...