Hyatt v. City of Milford

• Decision Date: 07 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 9923,9923
• Citation: 600 A.2d 5,26 Conn.App. 194
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Harry HYATT v. CITY OF MILFORD.

Page 5

600 A.2d 5

26 Conn.App. 194

Harry HYATT v. CITY OF MILFORD.

No. 9923.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 23, 1991.

Decided Dec. 3, 1991.

Certification Granted Jan. 7, 1992.

Michael C. Sohon, Trumbull, for appellant (plaintiff).

Marilyn J. Lipton, City Atty., for appellee (defendant).

Before DALY, LAVERY and LANDAU, JJ.

LAVERY, Judge.

The plaintiff, a retired city of Milford firefighter, appeals from a judgment rendered for the defendant after the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The issue presented is whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by bringing an action under General Statutes § 31-300 ¹ instead of bringing his heart and hypertension claim before the workers' compensation commissioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The undisputed facts are as follows. In January, 1983, the plaintiff, then a Milford firefighter, discovered that he suffered from heart disease. He subsequently brought a claim under the heart disease and hypertension statute for policemen and firemen; General Statutes § 7-433c; ² before the workers' compensation commission. The plaintiff retired from the defendant's fire department in January, 1984. In January, 1985, the workers' compensation commissioner awarded the plaintiff benefits under § 7-433c. The commissioner found that the defendant had a 25 percent permanent partial impairment which entitled him to 195 weeks of compensation at a maximum rate of $326 per week, subject to the limitations of General Statutes § 7-433b(b). ³ For 195 weeks, the defendant paid the plaintiff the difference between the plaintiff's pension amount and an amount equal to 100 percent of the weekly compensation paid to members of the defendant's fire department in the same position that the plaintiff held at the time of his retirement. The difference came to $24.88 per week, or a total of $4851.60 for a period of 195 weeks. The 195 week period expired on October 21, 1987.

In October, 1990, the plaintiff filed this action. The plaintiff claims that by paying the plaintiff $4851 out of a total award of $63,570 (195 weeks times $326 per week) the defendant has deprived him of $58,714.40. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the workers' compensation commissioner who has primary jurisdiction over heart and hypertension claims under § 7-433c, citing Grover v. Manchester, 165 Conn. 615, 353 A.2d 719 (1973). The plaintiff appeals from the granting of the motion to dismiss.

"It is a well settled principle of administrative law that a party may not bring a matter to the Superior Court without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Silverman v. New Haven, 19 Conn.App. 360, 364, 562 A.2d 562, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 812, 565 A.2d 537 (1989)." Lopiano v. Stamford, 22 Conn.App. 591, 594-95, 577 A.2d 1135 (1990). Indeed, the failure to exhaust applicable administrative remedies deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Trigila v. Hartford, 217 Conn. 490, 493-94, 586 A.2d 605 (1991). We conclude that because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to chapter 568 ⁴ as required by § 7-433c, the motion to dismiss was properly granted.

The plaintiff's claim is that he received a specific award of $63,570 and that he is entitled, under General Statutes § 31-300, to bring an action in Superior Court to enforce that award. The plaintiff's claim relies principally upon McIntyre v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, Inc., 126 Conn. 491, 12 A.2d 544 (1940). In McIntyre, the voluntary agreement stated that the $6800 specific award was to be considered as an advanced commuted payment of compensation in a single lump sum. Id., at 496, 12 A.2d 544. The court went on to say that "[a]n obvious purpose of commutation into a single lump sum is to effect an immediate determination of the rights of the employee and the liability of the employer as to the entire compensation by fixing the amount to be paid and accepted, with a single payment thereof instead of the usual weekly instalments or other periodical payments extending over the compensation period, due allowance, as by discount, being made for the advantages accruing thereby to the employee. When, as here, the award is so commuted and made presently payable, it thereupon becomes a final judgment.... As such it is enforceable as provided in § 5251 of the General Statutes, at least in the absence of motion to reopen it." (Citation omitted.) Id.

The plaintiff here, unlike that in McIntyre, received neither a commuted and currently payable nor a lump sum award pursuant to General Statutes § 31-302, ⁵ but rather received an award of $326 for 195 weeks. In Grover v. Manchester, supra, our Supreme Court made it clear that the only procedural avenue for bringing claims under § 7-433c is chapter 568, which outlines the procedure to be followed by a claimant for workers' compensation before recourse to the courts is available. The plaintiff's claim in the present case can only be construed as an attempt either to modify his award into a lump sum payment or to interpret the payment method due under his award. The modification or interpretation of an award made by the workers' compensation commissioner is the function of the workers' compensation commission and not the Superior Court. General Statutes § 31-315; Welch v. Arthur A. Fogarty, Inc., 157 Conn. 538, 547, 255 A.2d 627 (1969); Forkas v. International Silver Co., 100 Conn. 417, 420, 123 A. 831 (1924).

While the Workers' Compensation Act and § 7-433c are separate pieces of legislation, "[t]he procedure for determining recovery under General Statutes § 7-433c is the same as that outlined in chapter 568...." Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 68, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). This is presumably because "the legislature saw fit to limit the 'procedural avenue' for bringing claims under section 7-433c to that already existing under chapter 568 rather than require the duplication of administrative machinery available under the work[ers'] compensation act and further burden the courts and the municipalities with additional litigation from claims by firemen and policemen pursuant to this legislation." Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 671-72, 425 A.2d 131 (1979); Collins v. West Haven, 210 Conn. 423, 429-30, 555 A.2d 981 (1989); see Grover v. Manchester, supra, 165 Conn. at 617-18, 353 A.2d 719.

The crux of this case is the proper calculation of § 7-433c benefits and whether or how pension payments may reduce such benefits under § 7-433b. The administration and interpretation of § 7-433c benefits is a primary function of the workers' compensation commissioner and the compensation review division. Those tribunals have developed a proficiency with §§ 7-433c and 7-433b, and have promulgated a body of law dealing with the interpretation of those statutory provisions. This is underscored by the fact that an appeal from the compensation review division is taken not to the Superior Court but to the Appellate Court. General Statutes § 31-301b; Practice Book § 2014 et seq.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is "designed to prevent piecemeal appeals of a litigant's claims before an administrative agency." Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. DPUC, 1 Conn.App. 1, 3, 467 A.2d 679 (1983); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. CHRO, 202 Conn. 150, 155, 520 A.2d 186 (1987). This case should proceed through the workers' compensation system.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other Judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 31-300 provides in pertinent part: "As soon as may be after the conclusion of any hearing, but no later than one hundred twenty days after such...