In re Fort Worth Star-Telegram

• Decision Date: 12 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 02–14–00144–CV.,02–14–00144–CV.
• Citation: 441 S.W.3d 847
• Parties: In re FORT WORTH STAR–TELEGRAM; Dallas Morning News ; CBS Stations Group of Texas LLC ; KXAS–TV ; NW Communications of Texas, Inc., On Behalf of Station KDFW Fox 4; and WFAA–TV, Inc., Relators.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

441 S.W.3d 847

In re FORT WORTH STAR–TELEGRAM; Dallas Morning News ; CBS Stations Group of Texas LLC ; KXAS–TV ; NW Communications of Texas, Inc., On Behalf of Station KDFW Fox 4; and WFAA–TV, Inc., Relators.

No. 02–14–00144–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Aug. 12, 2014.

Thomas J. Williams, Karen S. Precella, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Fort Worth, Paul C. Walter, Jackson Walker, L.L.P., Dallas, for Relators.

Joe Shannon, Jr., Criminal District Attorney, Charles M. Mallin, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, Anne E. Swenson, David M. Curl, Assistant Criminal District Attorneys, Fort Worth, for Real Party In Interest.

Panel: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

OPINION

SUE WALKER, Justice.

I. Introduction

In the underlying case involving juvenile R.J.D., Respondent, the Honorable Jean Boyd, sua sponte ordered the courtroom closed to the public and to members of the media during R.J.D.'s certification hearing and during the setting for R.J.D.'s determinate sentence trial. Relators Fort Worth Star–Telegram; Dallas Morning News; CBS Stations Group of Texas LLC; KXAS–TV; NW Communications of Texas, Inc., on behalf of KDFW Fox 4; and WFAA–TV, Inc. assert that Respondent abused her discretion by closing the courtroom, by excluding Relators from the courtroom during these proceedings, and also by subsequently denying Relators' motion for access to the reporter's records generated at these proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we will conditionally grant a writ of mandamus ordering Respondent to vacate her orders closing the courtroom; to set aside her March 20, 2014 order denying Relators' motion to vacate the closure orders; and to take immediate steps to make transcripts of these proceedings available to Relators upon payment and making proper arrangements.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The State alleged that R.J.D. had committed the primary offense of capital murder and sought to have him certified to stand trial as an adult. The certification hearing was held on January 10, 2014; R.J.D. had turned seventeen years old in December 2013. R.J.D. had been in detention an unusually long time based on the unavailability of his attorney due to medical conditions. Consequently, the trial on R.J.D.'s determinate sentence was scheduled for January 22, 2014, just twelve days after the certification hearing. In light of this fact, Respondent stated that she was finding good cause to close the courtroom on January 10 to avoid tainting the jury pool and ordered all members of the public and the media to leave the courtroom prior to commencement of the certification hearing. R.J.D. did not seek the courtroom closure, and the State opposed it.

Respondent declined to waive her exclusive jurisdiction by certifying R.J.D. to stand trial as an adult, and the State and R.J.D. subsequently reached a plea agreement. They planned to present the agreement to Respondent at R.J.D.'s determinate sentence trial setting scheduled for January 22, 2014. Prior to this setting, the State—in consultation with the victim's family—and the defense attorneys agreed to omit from the stipulation of evidence certain facts regarding the sexual relationship between R.J.D. and the victim. On January 22, Respondent again ordered the courtroom closed to the public and to members of the media. R.J.D. did not seek the courtroom closure, and the State opposed it. Respondent accepted the parties' plea agreement, and the case concluded.

Relators later filed a motion with Respondent seeking access to the reporter's records from the January 10 and the January 22 proceedings and requesting that Respondent vacate her courtroom closure orders.¹ Relators' motion urged Respondent to make available to any member of the public, upon request, copies of the transcripts of the January 10 and the January 22 proceedings. After a hearing, Respondent denied the motion.

Relators then filed this original proceeding. Relators claim that Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the January 10 and the January 22 courtroom closure orders and by denying Relators' motion seeking access to the reporter's records from the two proceedings.²

III. Standing

The general test for standing in Texas requires that there “(a) shall be a real controversy between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.” See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). A relator must have standing to seek mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re Baker, 404 S.W.3d 575, 577–78 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding); Cole v. Gabriel, 822 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding). A lack of standing may be raised at any time or by the court on its own motion. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445–46. Relators' standing is an element of our subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. Accordingly, we address it here.

Courts have routinely recognized that members of the press possess standing to seek relief from orders barring them from a courtroom. See, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani,

573 F.2d 835, 845–46 (3rd Cir.1978).³ In Cianfrani, several newsgathering organizations and two named reporters alleged that the order of a district court barred them from attending a hearing and prevented them from subsequently reading a transcript of that hearing; they sought aid from the appellate court to remove the continuing effect of the district court's action, as well as to establish the illegality of such closure orders for the future.Id. The Cianfrani court explained that these allegations pleaded specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harmed the newsgathering organizations and the two named reporters and that they would personally benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Id. Thus, the court held that the newsgathering organizations, as well as the two named reporters, had satisfied the standing requirements implicit in Article III of the United States Constitution and discussed in Warth v. Seldin: they had made an allegation of such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant invocation of federal-court jurisdiction (the injury-in-fact requirement) and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on their behalf (the prudential concerns requirement). Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 845–46 (discussing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205–06, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ).

Relators here allege that Respondent issued two courtroom closure orders barring them from attending proceedings conducted in her courtroom and then later denied their motion requesting that she vacate the orders and permit them to obtain a copy of the transcripts of these two proceedings. They seek aid from this court to remove the continuing effect of Respondent's action, as well as to establish the illegality of these types of courtroom closure orders for the future. We hold that these allegations satisfy the first prong of the general test for standing in Texas, akin to the injury-in-fact federal standing requirement, that requires a party seeking relief to have a personal stake in the outcome in order for a real controversy to exist between the parties. See Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.2001) (recognizing that to establish standing, plaintiff must allege injury distinct from public); see also Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 ; accord Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–500, 95 S.Ct. at 2205–06 ; Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 845–46. We next address whether Relators established the second prong of the general test for standing in Texas that required them to show that the controversy between them will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.

IV. The Mootness Doctrine

The mootness doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine in the United States and Texas constitutions, both of which prohibit courts from rendering advisory opinions. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ; Tex. Const. art. II, § 1 ; see also Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex.2000) ; Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. The doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists. FDIC v. Nueces Cnty., 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994) ; Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). An actual controversy does not exist when a party seeks a ruling on some matter that, when rendered, would not have any practical legal effect. See Meeker v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied).

Here, the parties agree that no actual controversy currently exists concerning Respondent's courtroom closure orders. Relators were ordered excluded from the January 10 and the January 22 proceedings, and any ruling by this court on the propriety of Respondent's courtroom closure orders will have no practical legal effect at this point; R.J.D.'s case has concluded. Thus, the issue of whether Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the courtroom closure orders has become moot. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex.2001) (holding inmates' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning unconstitutional program run in jail were moot because inmates had been released from jail); Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 822 (holding appeal of rule 202 presuit discovery order permitting deposition became moot when appellant produced representative for deposition).

Relators nonetheless contend that this issue falls within the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine. “Capable of repetition yet evading review” is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine. Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290–91 (Tex.2011). To invoke this exception, a party must establish both that the challenged act is of such short...