Jurgens v. Martin

• Decision Date: 18 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 11-18-00316-CV,11-18-00316-CV
• Citation: 631 S.W.3d 385
• Parties: Brenda JURGENS, Appellant v. Gary MARTIN, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

631 S.W.3d 385

Brenda JURGENS, Appellant

v.Gary MARTIN, Appellee

No. 11-18-00316-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

Opinion filed March 18, 2021

M. Michele Greene, for Appellant.

Michael Martinez, Bedford, for Martinez Hsu, P.C.

Bernard R. Given II, John P. Mobbs, for Appellee.

Jules P. Slim, for Intervenor.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., and Wright, S.C.J.¹

JOHN M. BAILEY, CHIEF JUSTICE

This appeal arises from an ancillary civil action related to a probate proceeding. The related probate matter was the Estate of Alice Jean Martin, deceased.² The parties to this appeal are two of her children.

Gary Martin filed the underlying suit against his sister, Brenda Jurgens.³ Jurgens was the executor of Alice's estate. She was also the executor of Billy's estate, and she had held a power of attorney for both of her parents prior to their deaths. Martin alleged that Jurgens wrongfully took and appropriated money from their parents and their parents' estates. Martin alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, and civil theft.

After several hearings concerning Jurgens's compliance with discovery orders, the trial court imposed death penalty sanctions against her and subsequently entered a default judgment against her solely as to liability. The trial court later entered a final judgment against Jurgens and in favor of Martin in the amount of $353,000 in damages and $341,418 in attorney's fees. The trial court's judgment also ordered Jurgens to pay damages of $79,978.38 to Alice's estate. Jurgens timely filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329(b).

Jurgens brings fifteen issues on appeal. Issues One through Four and Issue Six are jurisdictional issues. The first two issues relate to an in terrorem clause in Alice's will, and the second two issues relate to the ancillary nature of the underlying proceeding. Issue Six concerns Martin's standing to assert a claim for fraud on the community on behalf of his mother's estate. In Issue Five, Jurgens challenges the death penalty sanctions entered against her. In Issue Nine, Jurgens challenges evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. Jurgens challenges the terms of the final judgment in Issues Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen. Finally, in Issue Fifteen, Jurgens challenges the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial. We affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part.

Background Facts

Billy and Alice were the parents of Jurgens, Martin, and Greg Martin.⁴ Billy passed away in September 2010. Alice passed away in June 2012.

Billy and Alice experienced health problems during their later years. Jurgens and Greg were both actively involved in taking care of their parents. Martin was not involved in taking care of either parent. He has been estranged from his family since 2000, and he admitted to having "very minimal" contact with his parents in the last five years before they passed away. Martin attributed his minimal contact with his parents to the alleged influence that Jurgens had over their parents.

Martin alleged that, for approximately the last four years of her life, Alice resided in nursing facilities and suffered from dementia and "an Alzheimer's-like condition." In August 2008, Alice signed a power of attorney granting Jurgens power over Alice's affairs. Nearly two years after Alice died, Jurgens produced a handwritten will that Alice had purportedly executed that appointed Jurgens as executor. In the will, Alice left Martin only a $100 specific cash bequest. Jurgens, Greg, and Alice's grandchildren were all to receive $1,000. The will also provided that Jurgens "will decide and oversee who gets what." Additionally, the will contained an in terrorem clause that provided as follows: "Alice wishes that if anyone contest [sic] this will that they be excluded from the will."

Soon after Jurgens's appointment as the executor of Alice's estate, Martin filed a will contest based on Alice's alleged lack of testamentary capacity when making the will that was admitted to probate. Martin then filed the underlying action asserting that Jurgens had misappropriated their parents' funds both before and after their deaths.

In the probate proceeding, Martin pursued discovery and filed multiple motions seeking to hold Jurgens in contempt for noncompliance with the trial court's discovery orders. The trial court entered oral and written discovery orders and contempt orders in the lawsuit underlying this appeal, ultimately imposing death penalty sanctions against Jurgens and entering a default judgment on liability due to Jurgens's noncompliance.

After a hearing on damages, the trial court entered the final judgment referenced above. In addition to the money judgment, the trial court imposed a constructive trust over all of Jurgens's assets, including her real property in Montana.

Analysis

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

In her first four issues, Appellant challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived. Id. at 443–44. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review it de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

In her first issue, Jurgens challenges Martin's standing to bring the underlying action. Based on the in terrorem clause, Jurgens contends that Martin's alleged injuries were purely conjectural or hypothetical when the underlying suit was filed because Alice's will had not been set aside. For the same reason, Jurgens asserts in her second issue that Martin's claims were not ripe.

In order for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must have standing to sue, and the plaintiff's claim must be ripe. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch , 595 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. 2020). The doctrines of both standing and ripeness stem from the prohibition of advisory opinions, which in turn is rooted in the separation-of-powers doctrine. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc. , 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998).

Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit to have a justiciable interest in its outcome. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato , 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). If a party lacks standing, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 849. A party's standing to sue is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction and will not be presumed—it must be proved. Linegar v. DLA Piper LLP (US) , 495 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. 2016). In Texas, standing requires that the plaintiff have suffered a concrete and distinct injury and that there be a real controversy between the parties that will actually be resolved by the judicial relief sought. Id. (citing Heckman v. Williamson Cty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) ). The plaintiff must show that it—rather than a third party or the public generally—was personally injured. Heckman , 369 S.W.3d at 155.

Like standing, ripeness "emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to be presented." Sw. Elec. Power Co. , 595 S.W.3d at 683 (quoting Patterson , 971 S.W.2d at 442 ). Standing focuses on the issue of who may bring an action, and ripeness focuses on when that action may be brought. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000). In determining whether a case is ripe, the focus is on whether "the facts are sufficiently developed ‘so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote’ " at the time the lawsuit is filed. Id. at 851–52 (quoting Patterson , 971 S.W.2d at 442 ). If the plaintiff's injury is based on "hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass," then the case is not ripe, and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 852. A claim is not required to be ripe at the time of filing. Robinson v. Parker , 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011) (citing Perry v. Del Rio , 66 S.W.3d 239, 251 (Tex. 2001) ). However, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the claim will soon ripen. Id. Also, "just as a case may become moot after it is filed, it may also ripen." Perry , 66 S.W.3d at 251.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d at 445. Jurgens did not raise the issue of standing or ripeness in the trial court by filing a plea to the jurisdiction.⁵ When an appellate court reviews the standing of a party or the ripeness of a controversy for the first time on appeal, it must construe the petition in favor of the party and, if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports standing and ripeness. Id. at 446 ; see Gibson , 22 S.W.3d at 853. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Martin had a sufficient connection to the suit and a sufficiently ripe claim in order to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.

Martin asserted in his original pleading that he was a "lawful heir" of Alice and Billy, a named beneficiary under Billy's will, and a named beneficiary under Alice's will. He further alleged that Jurgens was the current executor appointed for the estates of Alice and Billy. Martin alleged that Jurgens "abused her position as a fiduciary, both as power of attorney for Alice Jean Martin, but also as executor for the estates of Alice Jean Martin and Billy Martin."

Martin filed his claim in the underlying proceeding essentially as an effort to collect estate property from Jurgens, the executor of the estates. Ordinarily the personal representative of the estate of a decedent is the only person...